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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
For many years manufacturers have conducted business on a cash and
carry, no return basis. Once the customer took possession of the purchased
item, seller's liability ceased. During the late 1950's and early 1960's,
manufacturers introduced commercial product warranties in an attempt to
outdo competitors and gain a larger share of the available market. This
strategy seemed to work only until the competitors discovered the warranty
and decided to match warranty coverage or attempt to cover their own pro-
ducts longer than competitors. It soon became apparent to the manufacturer
that warranties could and would have a significant impact on corporate pro-
fit and many companies ceased offering warranties or offered only very
short-term, limited liability coverage.
Trends of the late 1970's and early 1980's seem to indicate a return of
longer and better warranty coverage. Because both private and public sector
dollars seem more scarce, good business sense and survival instincts have
forced the marketplace to provide better products and improved warranty
coverage. Warranties have become a part of durables transactions as they
are "expected" as an inclusion in nearly any purchase.
Over the years, the Department of Defense has not dealt with warranties
or warranty issues with much tenacity. As a matter of fact, the Department
of Defense has been cited on numerous occasions as paying the equivalent
price as private industry for identical items, while not the receiving benefit
of the warranty coverage that was provided to private enterprise. [1:1-2]
8
Additionally, attention has been directed toward defense contractors
and their alleged inability to provide functional, durable weapons systems
to the Department of Defense. As a consequence, Congress has mandated in
both the 1984 and 1985 Defense Appropriations Acts the absolute require-
ment that a manufacturer's warranty be included as part of all Defense
weapon systems acquisitions.
B. FOCUS AND SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH
The focus of this research is to examine in detail some aspects of war-
ranties or warranty issues facing the Department of Defense. After a small
amount of investigation, it quickly became clear that addressing warranties
as a whole would be an impossible task for the time frame of this study.
Initial research efforts led to the discovery that, as several authors had
suggested, commercial aviation warranties had been used very effectively
and successfully for years. Since the Department of Defense does not buy,
or at least hasn't to any degree in the past bought, aircraft under the um-
brella of a commercial aviation warranty, this researcher decided that an
examination of the characteristics of the various types of aviation war-
ranties used by the Department of Defense should be explored and compared
to standard commercial aviation warranties.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The general research question of this study is:
What types of warranties are being used by the Department of Defense and
the commercial aviation industry for aircraft procurements?
Specific research questions to be addressed in the study are:
1. What are the costs and risks of a warranty to the Government?
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2. What are the costs and risks of a warranty to the contractor?
3. How can warranties be priced?
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The majority of the warranty information and background data was col-
lected through an extensive literature review. A considerable amount of in-
formation is available on the reliability improvement warranty, but it is
dated. Little information or analysis is available on other warranty types.
The literature search included a computer data base search and a review of
all related material located at the Defense Logistics Studies Information
Exchange. Other warranty information and background data were gleaned
from personal and telephone interviews with legal, financial, and warranty
administration executives from the Lockheed California Company, Douglas
Aircraft Company of McDonnell Douglas Corporation, and General Dynamics
Pomona Division.
E. DEFINITIONS
The following definitions shall apply for purposes of this thesis and are
included to provide a clear understanding of terms.
1. Commercial Aviation Manufacturers: The commercial aircraft indus-
try is comprised primarily of the Boeing Company and McDonnell
Douglas Corporation. To a lesser extent, Lockheed Corporation has
also been a key player, although now only in a fleet support role for
the out of production L-101 1 aircraft. U.S. manufactured aircraft
account for 85.3 percent of jet powered transports and 67.6 percent
of the total world turbine engine aircraft fleet. [2:15-16]
2. Warranty: The principal purpose of a warranty in a government con-
tract is ( 1 ) to delineate the rights and obligations of the contractor
and the government for defective items and services and (2) to foster
quality performance. Generally, a warranty should provide (Da
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contractual right for the correction of defects notwithstanding any
other requirement of the contract pertaining to acceptance of the
supplies or services by the Government, and (2) for a stated period of
time or use, or the occurrence of a specified event, after acceptance
by the Government to assert a contractual right for the correction of
defects. The benefits to be derived from a warranty must be
commensurate with the cost of the warranty to the Government.
[3:46.702]
3. Guarantee: For purposes of this thesis, the term guarantee is assumed
to be synonymous to the definition of a warranty. The two terms will
be used interchangeably.
4. Warranty cost: Warranty costs arise from the contractors' charge for
accepting the deferred liability created by the warranty and Govern-
ment administration and enforcement of the warranty. [3:46.703b]
5. Service and Warranty Costs: Service and warranty costs include those
arising from fulfillment of any contractual obligation of a contractor
to provide services such as installation, training, correcting defi-
ciencies in the products replacing defective parts, and making refunds
in the case of inadequate performance. When not inconsistent with
the terms of the contract, such service and warranty costs are allow-
able. However, care should be exercised to avoid duplication of the
allowance as an element of both estimated product cost and risk.
[3:31.205-39]
6. Weapon System: The term will be defined as an item that can be used
directly by the armed forces to carry out combat missions and that
costs more than $100,000 or for which the eventual total procure-
ment cost is more than $10,000,000. Such term does not include
commercial items sold in substantial quantities to the general public.
[4:2403]
7. Uniform Commercial Code (UCC): The UCC, based on common law,
specifies the rights and obligations of the parties to a commercial
transaction on the basis of fairness and reasonableness, in light of
accepted business practice. The UCC is designed to simplify, clarify,
and modernize the law governing commercial transactions. [2:48]
8. Reliability: The probability that an item will perform its intended
function for a specified interval under stated conditions. [5]
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9. Maintainability: A characteristic of design and installation which is
expressed as the probability that an item will be retained in or re-
stored to a specified condition within a given period of time, when
the maintenance is performed in accordance with prescribed proced-
ures and resources. [5]
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION
Chapter II describes the history and legislative development of warran-
ties in the Department of Defense. Chapter III focuses on specific warranty
types such as the reliability improvement warranty, the mean time between
failure warranty, and several standard commercial warranties. Chapter IV
identifies the various costs and risks associated with warranty usage.
Costs and risks are described for both the Government and the contractor.
Chapter V is a presentation of several warranty pricing models. The models
are analytic in nature, but the last section in the chapter addresses some
nonanalytic pricing suggestions. Chapter VI, the final chapter, offers con-
clusions and recommendations for action and further study.
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II. WARRANTY HISTORY AND LEGISLATION
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides the reader with background on how the warranty
concept was developed and what impact Congressional action has had on the
use of warranties within the Department of Defense. Warranty history will
be presented first, followed by a brief description of the current Congres-
sional oversight process. Finally, a short section discussing the 1984 and
1985 laws will be offered.
B. WARRANTY HISTORY
For many years business operated on the principle of the buyer beware.
Simply stated, this means there were no warranties, either implied or ex-
press, included with the purchase of durable goods. It was the responsibil-
ity of the buyer to determine product quality, reliability and performance
characteristics. The buyer needed to make these decisions based on his own
best judgement and at his own risk. If the product failed to perform as ad-
vertised or just plain failed to perform at all, there was little if any re-
course available to the buyer. [2:78]
In 1938 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law
and the American Law Institute started an initiative to develop and dissem-
inate a rather comprehensive act known as the Uniform Commercial Code.
This act covers the aggregate field of commercial transactions. Although
there were a number of revisions and changes to the act, it was published in
1 957 and again in 1 962 as the " 1 962 Official Edition." The Uniform Com-
mercial Code was the first attempt to thrust some portion of the
13
responsibility for commercial transactions toward the seller. The Code
defines the rights and obligations of the buyer and the seller in commercial
transactions and provides definitions of warranties. [2:48]
In the Department of Defense there was very little use of any type of
warranty prior to 1965 [6:4]. The Government up to that time had assumed
the risk and cost associated with not having a warranty and seemed content
with the concept of being a self-insured entity. The inspection clause that
is normally included in each contract provided only limited protection to the
Government, especially since inspections usually can not identify equipment
performance deficiencies. Therefore, once an item was accepted by the
Government, contractor liability was terminated.
As the technology and complexity of equipment and weapons systems
increased, it became apparent that some form of contractor guarantee was
needed that would ensure that the system do what it was designed to . In
1965, the Armed Services Procurement Regulation provided for the use of
warranties [6:4]. This spawned the development and use in 1967 of the re-
liability improvement warranty which is discussed in detail in the follow-
ing chapter.
Coincidentally, in 1965 consumer goods were receiving in-depth scru-
tiny from Ralph Nader who, through intensive investigation, had discovered
serious design flaws in the automobile manufacturing process. His efforts
helped focus public attention on the idea that the manufacturers have a
moral and legal responsibility to produce products that would meet the ex-
pectations of the marketplace. As a result of the increased public atten-
tion, the warranty has come to serve as a legal tool to resolve the issue of
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consumers* and manufacturers' rights and has been instrumental in devel-
oping and enforcing quality standards. [7:45-46]
Over the last twenty years, the use of warranties has increased and has
become commonplace for purchases of consumer durable products. Although
consumer products warranties are considered warranties (since they do pro-
vide some level of insurance against premature product failure), they must
also be recognized as express statements which limit manufacturers" liabil-
ity because coverage is usually for a very brief period and does not gener-
ally cover such things as performance or design.
While the consumer marketplace-has seen an extensive increase in the
use of warranties, the Department of Defense, on the other hand, has not
made warranties a major contract issue except for occasional use in a few
past aircraft procurements. Warranty coverage was simply not a matter of
significance in the source selection process until the inception of the pres-
ent Congressional attention. [7:47]
C. CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT
The American public, the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the
President of the United States have all expressed concern over the increas-
ing national debt. Additionally, public interest seems to be aroused by the
news media's attention to the occasional ineptness of the Department of
Defense and defense contractors in the procurement process. Such inci-
dents exacerbate the public's perception of defense mismanagement. As a
result, Congress has become more involved inihe management of individual
programs over the last ten years. The primary emphasis has been to spend
the fewest dollars possible and still receive desired effectiveness and
efficiency.
15
When public emotion is sufficiently aroused to create pressure on elect-
ed Congressional representatives, adequate impetus is provided to motivate
intervention and encourage legislative action. While the level of federal
spending for human services has increased from a very small proportion of
defense spending to over double the present Department of Defense spending
level, the perception pervades that defense spending is detracting from the
Government's ability to provide human services programs. It is this emo-
tional stigma that seems to be the motive focusing Congressional interest
in warranty legislation, and it has resulted in a mandate that the Depart-
ment of Defense will "get its monies worth." [7:54]
D. WARRANTY LEGISLATION
Following the introduction of the reliability improvement warranty in
1978 the Air Force Systems Command directed the expanded use of war-
ranties in Air Force weapons procurements. Specific procurements included
the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile and various jet fighter en-
gines. The Air Force, in conjunction with industry representatives, devel-
oped a Product Performance Agreement Guide and the Product Performance
Agreement Center in an effort to establish an industry/DoD wide product
performance and data analysis clearinghouse. [7:61]
In January 1981, the U.S. Army published AR 702-13 to establish re-
quirements and procedures for use with the Army's warranty programs, but
the regulation was apparently not very well promulgated nor was it compre-
hensivley used [7:61]. Since 1981, the Department of Defense Acquisition
Improvement Program has directed increased emphasis on the various incen-
tives to improve reliability and support [8:9]. In 1983, Congress placed spe-
cific language in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act which
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required warranties to be purchased as a part of any new weapons system
acquisition unless a waiver is approved [8:9]. In 1984, the language was
modified for the 1985 Appropriations Act which subsequently relaxed some
of the earlier requirements of the 1984 act.
1. The 1984 Act
The 1984 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Section 794
became effective on March 14, 1984 The act required that all Department
of Defense fixed-price production contracts for weapons systems and/or
significant components would contain a warranty provision.
There were two distinct warranty types covered by the act, both of
which would be included in the contract: ( 1 ) the warranty would cover the
weapon system and all major components and guarantee that each was de-
signed and manufactured in conformance with government specified per-
formance requirements and (2) the weapon system and each significant
component shall be free from defects in material and workmanship at the
time of delivery. [9:6]
Under the 1984 act, the contractor is required to bear all the costs
of work for repair or replacement of parts that are necessary to attain the
specified performance requirement. If the contractor fails to promptly
repair or replace the required items, the contractor may be assessed to
reimburse the Government for any costs incurred by the Government while
making such necessary repairs through another source. [9:6]
The 1984 act specifically deletes the requirement for a warranty
under cost-type contracts. Also, the warranty requirement is mandatory for
prime contractors, but not necessarily for subcontractors. Section 794 re-
quires guarantees from "the prime contractor or other contractors for such
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(a weapon ) system." The DoD Guidance [10] defines "procurement" as a
prime contract, thusly allowing for the exclusion of a mandatory warranty
on subcontractors.
A weapon system is defined in the 1984 act as "Equipment which,
without substantial modification, is or can be used by the armed forces to
carry out combat missions." [9:6]
The 1984 act has the provision for the waiver of the warranty re-
quirement if it is in the interest of national defense and if the warranty is
not cost effective. [9:6]
2. The 1 985 Act
None of the affected parties, i.e. DoD, Congress, or industry, were
happy with the original legislation. The 1985 act was passed essentially as
a reform to the 1984 legislation. Some of the changes and modifications are
discussed In this section.
The first noted alteration included a change in the definition of a
weapon system. (See Definition 6, Chapter I for 1985 language.)
Of note also is the fact that the 1985 act required warranties that
cover the weapon system to conform to design and manufacturing require-
ments. Additionally, the weapon system will be free from defects in mate-
rials and workmanship at the time of delivery to the Government, and if not,
the prime contractor shall take whatever action is necessary to correct any
deficiency at no additional cost to the Government. Failure of the prime
contractor to make timely corrective action can cause the contractor to pay
the Government for costs incurred. The Secretary of Defense is empowered
to reduce the price of the contract to collect the cost of corrective actions
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[1 1:131 Any reference to other contractors I.e. subcontractors, has been
removed from the 1 985 act [9:6].
Interestingly, the 1985 revision does not automatically exclude
cost-type contracts. Warranties are mandatory unless a waiver is author-
ized. Warranties will be Included In cost-type contracts, but are applied
only to the production of a weapon system. [11:13]
Under the 1985 act, the cost of a warranty may be included in the
procurement price or may be priced as a separate line item. Language was
added so that negotiation of specific warranty details could be accom-
plished. Such items include reasonable exclusions, limitations, and duration
of the warranty. [1 1:13]
The 1985 Act was necessary to allow a reasonable avenue of ap-
proach that heretofore was not present in the 1984 legislation. The 1984
act seems to have been hastily passed without sufficient hearings or thor-
ough development of terms, conditions, and requirements. It was quickly
recognized that a modification was required to the 1 984 act, and the pas-
sage ot the 1985 act helped narrow some of the major differences that had
developed between industry and the Department of Defense. While there are
still a number of issues to be resolved between the Government and the con-
tractors, the 1985 act allows for flexibility in the tailoring of warranty
coverage.
E. SUMMARY
The use of warranties is not new. Some form of warranty has been used
in commercial/consumer transactions for at least thirty years. While the
Department of Defense has attempted on several occasions to use
19
warranties since the mid 1960's, no real sustained warranty program was
maintained or universally applied.
Public awareness is now focused on perceived Governmental inefficien-
cies and this attention seems to have been the cause of the passage of the
1 984 and 1 985 legislation. Clearly, the defense establishment is going to
have to learn how to adapt and price warranties as their usage is no longer
voluntary in weapon systems acquisitions.
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III. TYPES OF WARRANTIES IN USE
A INTRODUCTION
The use and understanding of warranties are increasingly difficult is-
sues. There is an unlimited number of variations that may be used to cause
one type of warranty to differ from another. This chapter will focus on the
warranties that are most commonly used by the aviation industry, but will
briefly discuss the characteristics of warranty types; that is, implied and
express warranties.
B. IMPLIED WARRANTIES
Implied warranties according to Ruben [12:40] are read into contracts by
common law, even if the specific language is not addressed. The protection
given under implied warranties is in the provisions of merchantability, us-
age of trade, and fitness for purpose. The Uniform Commercial Code defi-
nition [13:125] of an implied warranty is as follows:
Implied Warranty: Merchantability: Usage of Trade (UCC 2-514)
( 1
)
Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-3 1 6), a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this sec-
tion the serving of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or
elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as:
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract
description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality
within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such foods are
used; and
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(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even
kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved;
and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the
agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any [14:865].
Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular Purpose (UCC 2-515)
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is
relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable
goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an
implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose [14:865].
Although implied warranties provide protection to the buyer, an implied
warranty may be specifically excluded by calling the buyer's attention, in
understandable language, to the fact that warranties are excluded and that
there is no implied warranty. In addition, an implied warranty is excluded
when a buyer has examined the goods, sample, or model as fully as he
wanted to (prior to entering into the contract) or he has refused to examine
the goods. [ 1 4:865]
The benefits and limitations of an implied warranty should be fully
understood by the buyer. A violation of an implied warranty as defined by
the Uniform Commercial Code can cause a seller to be liable for restitution
to the buyer. Other liabilities not covered explicitly and not defined by
common law or the Uniform Commercial Code should not be construed to
constitute an implied warranty.
C. EXPRESS WARRANTIES





Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of -the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform
to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall
conform to the sample or model.
(2) It in not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that
the seller use formal words such as "warranty" or "guarantee" or that he
have specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of
the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's
opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty. [14:865]
In general terms, the express warranty represents the seller's assurance
that his equipment, parts or other goods are free from defects in material,
workmanship, and design for a specific period of time. Design is a special
case somewhat unique to the Government and will be discussed in more de-
tail later in the chapter.
Black's Law Dictionary [ 1 5: 1 423] further defines the warranty as:
A warranty is a statement or representation made by a seller of
goods, contemporaneously with and as a part of a contract of sale, though
collateral to express object of sale, having reference to character, qual-
ity, or title of goods, and by which seller promises or undertakes to in-
sure that certain facts are or shall be as he then represents them.
A warranty is a written statement arising out of a sale to the con-
sumer of a consumer good pursuant to which the manufacturer, dis-
tributor, or retailer undertakes to preserve or maintain the utility or
performance of the consumer good or provide compensation if there is a
failure in utility or performance; or in the event of any sample or model,
that the whole of the goods conforms to such sample or model. [ 1 5: 1 423]
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In most cases, the express warranty is the preferred warranty type. It
offers very specific protection to the buyer against premature failure,
defect, or misrepresentation over a specified period of time. The express
warranty, by being offered either orally or in writing, can become an instru-
ment of the courts and therefore, has the power and effect of law behind it.
There are other benefits, however. The greatest apparent benefit at-
tending the inclusion of warranties in contractual clauses is strictly a
financial one. The warranty can provide for the repair or replacement of
defective items or compensate the buyer during the period of coverage. This
can be either prorated through the useable life remaining in the product, or
it may be a free replacement or repair. [7: 15-16] As is the case with the
standard commercial warranty, Chrysler Corporations 5 year/50,000 mile
vehicle warranty for example, the costs of parts and repair labor are essen-
tially free to the buyer. The term "free" needs further definition at this
point. The replacement of parts and expenditure of labor is "free" to the
buyer from the aspect of no additional charge for the warranted defect. The
buyer, however, should be thoroughly aware that the warranty costs are in
fact not "free", but implicitly charged in the initial purchase price of the
vehicle.
The remainder of this chapter and indeed, the thesis as a whole, will
deal specifically with the various forms of express warranties. The pre-
vious section on implied warranties is presented to aid the reader's under-
standing and awareness of the two major catagories of warranties and to
complete the spectrum of the research effort.
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D. WARRANTIES IN USE
1. The Reliability Improvement Warranty
The reliability improvement warranty has developed as a result of
many years of trial, error, and modification. The basic purpose of the relia-
bility improvement warranty is to force contractors to share some measure
of the risk in the development and sale of equipment that historically has
demonstrated high failure rates.
The reliability improvement warranty had its origin in 1960. The
Air Force Logistics Command in 1960 was tasked to study a concept called
the Real/Ultimate Cost of procurement. The study was expanded to include
a product-life warranty system. The results of the study lead to the identi-
fication of a piece of equipment for which improved reliability was severely
needed. The Instrument Division of Lear Siegler, Inc., offered to participate
in the development, through a planned multi-year procurement starting in
1965, for several thousand MD-1 vertical gyroscopes. Lear Siegler agreed to
participate in the development of the "failure free warranty", which was ul-
timately called the reliability improvement warranty, on the basis of re-
pairing or replacing, at their option, any unit that failed within five years or
5000 operating hours, whichever occurred first. This initial offer was
never accepted by the Government. However, in 1967, the Navy did award
Lear Siegler the first failure free warranty contract for the overhaul and
repair of 800 displacement type gyroscopes. The contract called for the in-
crease of the mean time between failure from the 400 hour baseline to 520
hours by December 1972. Actual progress resulted in an achieved 531 hours
mean time between fai lure by January 1 973. As a fol low on, the Air Force
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awarded Lear Siegler a similar contract which was competitively awarded,
to produce an avionics system for the F— 111 aircraft. [16:7-9]
After the early successes with the initial Lear Siegler contracts, it
became clear that the old way of doing business, i.e. the contractor's liabil-
ity ceased once the equipment was accepted by the Government, was no
longer the most advantageous to the Government. Under the then existing
procurement practices, it was difficult, if not impossible, to motivate the
contractor to improve reliability since there was no requirement to con-
tinue the relationship after the initial procurement contract was fulfilled.
The reliability improvement warranty on the other hand, incentivises the
contractor to improve the reliability of the product since the contractor ( 1
)
will be required to effect repairs at a fixed fee for periods of two to five
years after initial delivery and (2) will improve profit margin, up to a ceil-
ing, by bettering the mean time between failure rate (ergo reducing main-
tenance costs), with the difference in dollars spent realized as additional
profit. Because the contractor now has a vested interest in the reliability
of the product, it becomes paramount that the contractor develop tracking
and recording techniques to monitor use, performance, reliability, maintain-
ability, and other information that heretofore has been of little concern
because liability was limited only up to the time of Government acceptance.
The contractor's collection and use of this new information should impel
design reviews and retrofit, resulting in a more reliable product, increased
profit for the contractor and lower life cycle cost for the Government.
Furthermore, the continuous contact between the Government and
the contractor can provide considerable market advantage for future pro-
curement needs. The contractor may be able to obtain knowledge of other
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Department of Defense requirements and therefore, have a competitive edge
during the competitive bidding process. [7:41 ]
It should be also noted that the reliability improvement warranty
was not designed to be a maintenance contract. In fact, the routine main-
tenance and upkeep of the equipment is the responsibility of the buyer un-
less otherwise specified by contract. [6:6]
If, during the course of the warranty period, the contractor dis-
covers that a design change or equipment change will improve the reliability
of the system and result in a reduced number of future repair actions, a no-
cost-to-the Government Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) may be submit-
ted. If the change proposal is approved, the design change is authorized.
The contractor's profit from the design change is realized only by the reduc-
tion in the number of required repairs occurring during the warranty period.
[17:222]
The Reliability Improvement Warranty Guidelines, enclosure to
A5D/I&L to Service Assistant Secretaries dated 14 August 1974 [18:5], set
forth the parameters that are to be considered in determining equipment as
candidates for the reliability improvement warranty. Specifically, they are
as follows:
(a) A warranty can be obtained at a price commensurate with the
contemplated value of warranty work to be completed.
(b) Moderate to high initial support costs are involved.
(c) The equipment is readily transportable to permit return to the vendor's
plant or, alternatively, the equipment is onefor which a contractor can
provide field service.
(d) The equipment is generally self contained, is generally immune from
failures induced by outside units, and has readily identifiable failure
characteristics.
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(e) The equipment application in terms of expected operation time and the
use environment are known.
(f ) The equipment is susceptible to being contracted for on a fixed price
basis.
(g) The contract can be structured to provide a warranty period of several
years. This should allow the contractor sufficient time to identify and
analyze failures in order to permit reliability and maintainability
improvements.
(h) The equipment has a potential for both reliability growth and reduction
in repair costs.
(i) Potential contractors indicate a cooperative attitude toward accept-
ance of an RIW provision and evaluation of its effectiveness.
(j) A sufficient quantity of the equipment is to be procured in order to
make the RIW cost effective.
(k) The equipment is of a configuration that discourages unauthorized
field repair, preferably sealed and capable of containing an Elapsed Time
Indicator (ETI) or some other means of usage control.
(1) There is a reasonable degree of assurance that there will be a high
utilization of the equipment.
(m) The equipment is one that permits the contractor to effect no-cost
ECPs subsequent to the Government's approval.
(n) Failure data and the intended operational use data can be furnished the
contractor for the proposed contractual period and updated periodically
during the term of the contract.
These are the guidelines that were mandated, although it should be
noted that each and every one of the listed recommendations does not have
to be met in order for an equipment to be eligible for coverage under a re-
liability improvement warranty. [16:20]
Finally, there are several key points to consider when attempting to
use and evaluate the reliability improvement warranty. First, there is the
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potential for the contractor to understate the initial mean time between
failure operating levels so that the opportunity exists for definite "shown"
reliability improvement at some point later in the contract [5:421. Second,
because each piece of equipment is different in operating characteristics
and inherent failure rates, the use of a "standard" reliability improvement
warranty clause for each contract is not suggested. Instead, every potential
reliability improvement warranty contract must be evaluated on its own
merit. The reliability improvement warranty clause should include items
such as length of warranty, the definition of a failure, purpose of the war-
ranty, the cost of shipping failed goods to the contractor and who pays for
it, repair turn around time, who maintains records for each unit under war-
ranty, and any other special circumstance that is peculiar to that type of
equipment. [6:7]
2. The Mean Time Between Failure Warranty
The mean time between failure warranty is actually a subset of the
reliability improvement warranty. Under the provisions of the mean time
between failure warranty, a manufacturer guarantees that the equipment
will operate/perform equal to or exceeding some agreed upon mean time
between failure baseline. In the situation where it falls short of the estab-
lished baseline, the manufacturer must institute corrective action at his
expense until the mean time between failure improves to meet the previ-
ously agreed level. [17:2221
Additional requirements for contractor resolution/support may also
be used in the mean time between failure warranty. An example is cited in
the Air Force F- 1 6 procurement contract.
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Two of nine line replacement units (LRUs) are also covered by an MTBF
guarantee. In addition to requiring the contractor to repair or replace
failed units, the MTBF guarantee requires him to provide corrective action
as well as additional spares if units fail to meet the mean time between
failure specified in the contract. The actual number of spare units to be
provided must be calculated from a formula contained in the RIW contract.
If the value of MTBF that is guaranteed to be achieved by the final year of
the RIW is achieved prior to that time, as demonstrated by two consec-
utive measurement periods, then the contractor is released from any
further obligations under the MTBF guarantee. The LRUs will, however,
remain under the RIW. [19:4-2]
Note the very fine distinction between the reliability improvement
warranty and the mean time between failure warranty. The reliability im-
provement warranty typically establishes a baseline mean time between
failure and attempts to provide sufficient incentive, such as additional
profit, to induce the contractor to increase product reliability to a higher
mean time between failure level. Attainment of that goal is not mandatory
nor is it guaranteed. In comparison, the mean time between failure warran-
ty establishes a baseline mean time between failure very similar to the
reliability improvement warranty, but in this case, the contractor must
guarantee achievement of performance to the agreed level.
Because the mean time between failure warranty establishes "must
meet" requirements, the very first unit off the production line has to be
capable of performing to the required mean time between failure baseline.
Consequently, the higher-than-usual initial performance criteria may tend
to drive up the cost of the warranty and therefore, should be used primarily
where high readiness is mandatory.
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3. The Mean Time to Repair Warranty
Like the mean time between failure warranty, the mean time to
repair warranty has historically been used as an option included with the
reliability improvement warranty contract. Simply stated, it establishes a
time period by which the contractor is required to perform repair work on a
.
defective piece of equipment and return it to operational condition [7:43].
The Air Force F- 1 6 reliability improvement warranty included repair
turnaround time requirements. Average turnaround time was computed in
six month intervals. Repairs, replacement, and modifications were required
to be completed within 22 days. If the contractor failed to meet the dead-
line, additional units were to be loaned to the Air Force. Failure to provide
the loan units could result in a dollar penalty. [17:225]
Even though the mean time to repair warranty is usually used in
conjunction with the reliability improvement warranty, it does not add to
the improvement of equipment reliability [7:43]. This type of warranty is a
tool to insure that the contractor performs warranted repairs in an expedi-
ent fashion so as to reduce the amount of downtime on vital major systems.
4. The Non-Warranty Warranty
The non-warranty warranty is the researcher's reference to a con-
sumer products warranty. The purpose of this discussion is to differentiate
between the consumer products warranty and the standard commercial avi-
ation warranty type which will be examined in the following section.
Consumer goods warranties have actually had a very poor record
over the years. This type of warranty has generally been used as an en-
ticement to improve product sales or, and this is key, to limit the seller's
liability through inclusion of specific disclaimers or exclusions.
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The automobile industry warranties provide an excellent example of
the non-warranty warranty principle.
Prior to 1960 all automobile manufacturers were providing a three month
or 4,000 miles warranty to consumers and a concealed one year or 12,000
miles warranty to dealers [20:35-36].
In an effort to increase sales, Ford Motor Company decided to trans-
fer the hidden one year or 12,000 miles warranty directly to the customer.
The other major car manufacturers, recognizing the threat to their sales po-
sition, followed suit and matched their warranties to that of Ford. [20:36]
In 1962, Chrysler Corporation initiated the 5 years or 50,000 miles
warranty which covered power and drive train. The other manufacturers
elected not to match Chrysler's offer, but instead elected to offer two year
warranties for the entire automobile. This dissimilarity remained in effect
until 1967 and is believed to have been the primary factor in improving
Chrysler's market share by 67.7 percent, doubling sales volume and tripling
net income. [20:36]
In 1967 all automobile manufacturers, seeing the apparent benefits
gained by Chrysler, matched the 5 year or 50,000 mile warranty which
remained intact until it was abandoned in 1971,
. . . because they were too expensive. In those days, our cars weren't
really good enough to back them for half a decade [21:1 48].
Mr. lococca appears to have been correct. The Federal Trade Com-
mission's Report on Automobile Warranties in 1968 concluded that:
1. Quality control and warranty performance were declining.
2. The industry deliberately oversold its improved warranty in the 1960s,
creating the impression that "higher levels of engineering and
manufacturing skill" had overcome the complexity of the automobile.
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3. Warranty extensions had no correlation with quality or developments
in engineering or manufacturing.
4. The industry ran one ad after another emphasizing the warranty as
proof of a better made car. [20:36]
As was previously mentioned, the consumer products warranty can
also act as a limitation on seller's liability. In the House Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee's Staff Report on Consumer Products Warran-
ties [22], it was found that numerous exemptions and disclaimers were used
that specifically limited producer's liability rather than protecting the
buyer. The report listed some of the more common disclaimers as follows:
1
.
Transportation and shipping costs and/or serviceman's travel charges
excluded.
2. Home use only—other uses excluded.
3. Filters, plastic, and/or glass parts excluded.
4. Consequential damages excluded.
5. Disclaimer of implied and all other warranties.
6. Limited to parts or specific parts only.
7. Warranty registration card required.
8. Void if serial plate defaced.
9. Special appliances excluded.
10. Opinion of seller governs.
1 1. Valid for original purchaser only. [20:37-38]
Although the Federal Trade Commission has been tasked by Congress
to monitor warranty protection to the consumer, the non-warranty warranty
is still used extensively. The five years or 50,000 miles warranty has been
reinstituted by Chrysler Corporation on all of its vehicles. Mr. lococca says,
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"we build them better and we back them better", but on further examination
the warranty covers material and workmanship only. Original Chrysler
spares and repairs are required to keep the warranty valid, and the cost ef-
fectiveness is unknown to the buyer since the warranty cost is an integral
part of the purchase price.
Under the 1985 warranty law mandated by Congress and described in
the previous chapter, a warranty has three distinct parts. First, a warranty
must cover material and workmanship. The Chrysler warranty does. Second,
a warranty must cover performance requirements. The Chrysler warranty
does not. Third, design and manufacturing requirements are to be warranted.
Again, Chrysler does not. The 1985 Defense Authorization Act also allows
waiver of warranty if it is not cost effective. The Chrysler warranty is not
a "delete for credit" cost option. Clearly, the commercial warranty does not
meet the Congressional definition of a warranty. Defense contractors have
"to back them better."
5. The Standard Commercial Aviation Warranty
The standard commercial warranty, like most consumer warranties,
seems to have been developed as an instrument of competition. Aircraft
manufacturers, seeking increased sales and larger market shares, intro-
duced the warranty as a marketing tool. Seemingly, the manufacturer offer-
ing the most attractive warranty, all other factors being nearly equal, may
capture a larger portion of available customers.
Again, like the consumer protection warranty, the standard com-
mercial aviation warranty operates as a manufacturer's limit of liability.
The warranty may be considered a customer protection plan, but as the
34
commercial warranty is written, it also serves very heavily as a protective
measure for the manufacturer.
The warranty can also provide the manufacturer with a form of
feed-back such that the field reliability of the product, as well as apparent
design weaknesses, can be improved and further increase marketability of
the aircraft. Both the military and the commercial aircraft industry are
vitally interested in field reliability and life cycle costs, albeit for re-
putedly different reasons. The military is concerned primarily with opera-
tional readiness and mission effectiveness, although concern over budgetary
limitations is fast becoming a major issue as well. The commercial air-
craft industry's motivation is much simpler; that is economic survival.
The most prevalent commercial aircraft warranty is the "failure
free" warranty which covers equipment during a specified period of time and
provides for repair of failed items by the manufacturer, or seller if not one
in the same, or for cost reimbursement to the airline for the repair work
performed during the warranty period. This warranty often includes a
guaranteed turn around time similar to the reliability improvement warran-
ty discussed earlier. Of special note, almost every standard commercial
aviation warranty includes a disclaimer and exclusion of any other implied
or express warranties, which not coincidental ly, meets the requirement of
the Uniform Commercial Code. Standard commercial aviation warranties
typically have been in force for a one year period, although longer periods of
up to three years have been noted on newer aircraft systems [ 1 6: 1 3].
Because the commercial warranty covers aircraft performance rath-
er than specific end use, a commercial buyer historically has received a
longer, more extensive warranty than has the military. An exception to that
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trend will be explored in the next section on the Air Force KC-10 aircraft.
[23:14]
Examples of commercial aviation warranties are summarized below:
1. Lockheed-California Company: Lockheed Corporation manufactured the
now defunct Lockheed L-lOl 1 aircraft for the commercial market. The
warranty provided an 18 month period to cover design-related defects
on the airframe. Material and workmanship were covered for a two
year period after delivery of each aircraft. A service life contract
was provided with each aircraft and provided protection for 12 years
from the date of delivery with no limitations on flight hours or number
of landings. The service life contract covered primary structural
elements of the wing, fuselage, vertical fin, horizontal stabilizer,
pylons, main landing gear, and the nose landing gear. Note that there is
no engine warranty except as what may be offered separately by the
engine manufacturer.
. . . Lockheed's warranties as set forth in paragraph (a) hereof are
exclusive, are in lieu of, and buyer hereby waives, all other warranties,
express of implied, including without limitation, any implied warranties
of merchantability or of fitness. [See Appendix A for actual warranty].
2. The Boeing Company : The Boeing Aircraft Company manufactures the
Boeing 727/737/747 models primarily for the commercial airline in-
dustry. These three aircraft are warranted to be free from defects in
material and workmanship for a period of 24 months after delivery of
the aircraft. However, if a defect in material or workmanship is
discovered in an accessory, equipment, or part which was installed in
an aircraft at the time of delivery and which has not been inspected by
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the buyer under the buyer's approved maintenance program prior to the
expiration of the above period, the warranty period as to such defect
shall be extended to the first to occur of the following:
. . .
completion of the first inspection applicable to such item under
the buyer's approved maintenance program following expiration of the
above period, or
. . . expiration of 36 months after delivery of such aircraft.
Defects in design are covered for 18 months after delivery of the
defective aircraft, accessory, equipment or part.
The Boeing Company also offers a service life policy. This policy
covers any covered component that fails within 10 years of delivery of the
aircraft on which it was installed. Like the Lockheed service contract, the
Boeing offer also covers any airframe component or landing gear component,
but it is not free. Price for such service is established in the contract. The
Boeing Company does not itself offer an engine warranty, but is authorized
to extend to the buyer the provisions of the engine manufacturer's warranty.
Also note the warranty limitations as follows:
. . . The warranties, obligations and liabilities of Boeing and remedies
of the buyer set forth in this part A are exclusive and in substitution for,
and buyer hereby waives, releases and renounces all other warranties,
obligations and liabilities of Boeing and any assignee of Boeing, express
or implied, arising by law or otherwise, with respect to any noncon-
formance or defect in any aircraft or other thing delivered under this
agreement, including but not limited to (A) any implied warranty of
merchantability or fitness, (B) any implied warranty arising from course
of performance, course of dealing of usage of trade, (C) any obligation,
liability, right, claim or remedy in tort, whether or not arising from the
negligence of Boeing of any assignee of Boeing, actual or imputed, and (D)
any obligation, liability, right, claim of remedy for loss of or damage to
any aircraft, for loss of use, revenue or profit with respect to any
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aircraft, or for any other direct, incidental or consequential damages.
[See Appendix B for the full Boeing Warranty provisions.]
3. McDonnell Douglas Corporation: McDonnell Douglas Corporation manu-
factures the DC-8/9/ 10 series aircraft and the MD-80 aircraft for the
commercial airline market. The McDonnell Douglas Corporation war-
rants aircraft defects in material and workmanship and defects caused
by installation by the seller of any article not manufactured by seller
in a manner not in accordance with the reasonable instructions of the
manufacturer; defects arising from failure to conform to the Detail
Specification (Exhibit "A" of the purchase agreement), except as to
portions so stated to be estimates, approximations, or stated to be
design objectives, for a period of twenty-four months after the deliv-
ery of each product. As with the Boeing Company, McDonnell Douglas
Corporation will warrant defects in material and workmanship for a
period of up to thirty-six months or until the buyer's established
maintenance program has had full opportunity to inspect, whichever
shall first expire after delivery of each product.
Defects inherent in the design, including defects arising from
select- ion by the seller of materials or process of manufacture, in
view of the state of the art as of the date of such design, are covered
for a period of eighteen months within delivery.
McDonnell Douglas Corporation, as do the other commercial air-
craft manufacturers, has a service life policy. The policy states that
should a failure occur in any covered component of an aircraft within
ten years after delivery to the buyer regardless of the number of flight
hours or cycles, the seller will, at the price provided and as promptly
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as practicable, design and furnish to the buyer a correction for such
failed component and provide any parts required for such correction.
Like the previous two warranties McDonnell Douglas Corporation also
includes exclusion statements
The warranty and service life policy provided in this part I. and the
obligations and liabilities of seller under said warranty and service life
policy are exclusive and in lieu of, and buyer hereby waives, all other
remedies, warranties, guarantees or liabilities, express or implied, with
respect to each aircraft, article, product, accessory, equipment, part,
service, manual, document and data delivered under this agreement and
related documents, arising by law or otherwise (including, without limi-
tation, any obligation or liability arising from negligence or tort or with
respect to fitness, merchantability, loss of use, revenue or profit or con-
sequential damages). This warranty or service life policy shall not be ex-
tended, altered or varied, except by a written instrument signed by seller
and buyer.
Buyer and seller state and agree that this part I. has been the sub-
ject of discussion and negotiation and is fully understood by the parties
and that the price of the aircraft and the other mutual agreements of the
parties set forth in this agreement were arrived at in consideration of
the provisions of this part I., specifically Including the waiver by buyer
set forth in paragraph D.I. above. [See Appendix C]
Comparisons of all three of the above standard commercial warran-
ties reveal very few differences. The Lockheed Company's service life
policy runs for 12 years versus 10 years for Boeing and McDonnell Douglas.
All other aspects of the warranties, including coverage for design, mate-
rials and workmanship, are the same except for minor wording changes in
the disclaimer and release clauses. Due to the nearly indistinguishable na-
ture of these warranties, any perceived benefit, i.e. the benefit in choosing
one company's aircraft over another resulting from better warranty inclu-
sion in a purchase agreement, is nullified. It seems a moot point, but the
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similarity of the warranties would appear to preclude any likelihood of one
particular company having any noticeable market advantage over another.
6. The Commercial/Military Aviation Warranty
The commercial/military aviation warranty is an adaption of the
standard commercial aviation warranty to reflect consideration for the mil-
itary use of a commercial type aircraft. Since the commercial operating
environment differs significantly from the military environment, aircraft
are frequently different in design and performance [23:101. Such is the case
with the Air Force's KC-10 Extender Advanced Tanker Cargo Aircraft. This
particular aircraft is about 80 percent DC- 10 with 20 percent modification
to meet the military mission requirement.
This contract is unique in that the Air Force decided to procure the
KC-10 as the commercial market would, but additional emphasis was place
on warranty provisions to be included in the proposals.
The KC-10 program office obtained copies of the aircraft manufacturers
standard warranty provisions and compared them to the correction of
deficiencies clause contained in the contracts for major weapons
systems [24:371.
Although the correction of deficiencies clause was preferred to the stand-
ard commercial warranty, it was not insisted on as an inclusion to the con-
tract. Each competitor was to be afforded the opportunity to offer their
best business deal to the Government in hopes that an included warranty
would exceed the limitations of the standard clause. The decision to allow
the use of the standard commercial warranty was based on four reasons:
1
.
The high cost of a correction of deficiencies clause.
2. The negligible cost savings of deletion of the standard warranty
provision.
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3. The apparent success the commercial airlines have had with the
standard commercial warranty.
4. The existence of the option of passing on the responsibility for
warranty administration to a competitively selected logistics support
center. [24:37]
Douglas Aircraft Company of the McDonnell Douglas Corporation was
ultimately awarded the contract, and the logistics support contract was
included as a simultaneous award. The resultant contract was a standard
commercial contract with a warranty which had been modified to reflect
military usage.
Interestingly, several warranty improvements resulted from the
process. Douglas Aircraft Company warranted spare and replacement parts
[24:37]. Other warranty coverage was as follows:
Defects in material and workmanship and defects arising from the
failure to comform to specifications must become apparent to the cust-
omer within 60 months or 5,000 flying hours, whichever comes first. In
light of the relatively low utilization rate anticipated for the KC-10, the
normal commercial warranty life of 24 months was expanded to 60
months; the number of flying hours remained the same.
Defects in design, including those arising from the contractor's se-
lection of material or manufacturing process, were also warranted.
These defects must become apparent to the customer within 24 months of
delivery. Normally, coverage for these kinds of defects extends 18
months. No flying-hour limitation was tied to this category of warranted
defects. [24:38]
As is the case with the standard commercial warranty, and that is
nearly what the KC-10 warranty is, there are a number of exclusions to be
noted. For example, if aircraft maintenance is not performed in accordance
with the contractor's approved method, the warranty will be voided. Other
things such as improper operation or performance of repairs without the
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contractor's approval will also relieve the contractor of any liability.
[24:38]
The service life policy, again a characteristic of the commercial
warranty, is included and provides coverage of selected components. The
service life policy for airframe components is 30,000 flying hours or 10
years, whichever occurs first. Landing gear components are covered for
20,000 landings, 30,000 fV g hours, or 10 years. [See appendix D for exact
warranty coverage.]
This researcher has discovered numerous references to the noted
success of the commercial aviation warranty. The Air Force's KC-10 pro-
gram appears to have all the merits of the commercial warranty plus the
benefits derived by uniquely allowing the warranty coverage to be tailored
to the military operating environment.
7. The Military Aviation Warranty
The Department of Defense frequently has aircraft requirements for
performance and design that do not fall within the auspices of the commer-
cial aviation marketplace. When this happens, development programs are
instituted. Such was the case for the Air Force's C- 1 7 cargo aircraft.
The C- 17 program was initiated because the Air Force felt there
existed a critical shortage in airlift capability. This was especially true
for oversized cargo such as infantry vehicles, artillery, and helicopters.
Since there was no capable aircraft already commercially available, the Air
Force released a request for proposal for development of such an aircraft.
The McDonnell Douglas Corporation won the contract which was to perform
limited research and development and included options for full scale engi-
neering and production. [25.38]
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The program failed to reach the production stage, but the program
itself was useful in that it was targeted toward design to life cycle cost
and not just design to production cost goal. The advantages of a design to
life cycle cost goal instead of a design to production cost goal become evi-
dent at the front of the program because it forces the contractor to consider
support costs via specified reliaility and maintainability levels from the
outset. It also causes the contractor to evaluate materials selection and
design choice carefully since the contrator's profit for initial spares and
repairs can be reduce if he fails to achieve reasonable support cost goals.
Air Force concern over support costs was emphasized because support costs
for several other cargo aircraft programs, specifically, the C-5 and 747 had
averaged 180 percent of the acquisition costs. By designing to life cycle
cost objectives, the contractor is inclined to consider the design trade-offs
since they will certainly impact on the reliability and maintainability of the
aircraft in future periods. [25:38-39]
In most of the other warranty types previously discussed, reliability
and failure parameters were established as a subsystem of the major plat-
form. The reliability improvement warranty for the Air Force's F-16 estab-
lishes the mean time between failure for line replacement units on various
electronic components as an example [ 1 9:39]. The C- 1 7 contract establishes
the reliability and maintainability at the system level. There are several
advantages to this approach. First it allows the manufacturer the flex-
ibility to consider design trades and provide some degree of design freedom.
Second, it drives the follow-on design of future support and maintenance
equipment to be compatible with the system. [25:39]
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The C-17 contract required a continual review and evaluation of the
aircraft reliability and maintainability.
Depending upon the reliability, maintainability, and availability
levels achieved, either a special warranty provision or an incentive
provision will apply. If the contractor exceeds the threshold and reaches
the goal established for a particular factor, an incentive provision takes
effect. But if the contractor fails to satisfy any one system-level relia-
bility, maintainability, or availability requirement, a warranty provision
obligates him to provide no-cost corrective action.
The warranty covers the aircraft itself, equipments and support
items, including technical orders, software, and data. Besides requiring
no-cost corrective action, the warranty provision stipulates that if the
contractor fails to meet any one system-level reliability, maintainability
or availability threshold, he loses one half of any other reliability, main-
tainability, and availability incentives earned. [25:41]
In contrast to the warranty examined in the previous section, where
the period of warranty coverage was up to 60 months, the C- 1 7 warranty
period was to be 1 80 days. However, with this warranty, the contractor
must meet or exceed system specifications for 180 days after initial oper-
ational capability or the contractor must effect repair, rework ,or redesign.
Initial operational capability is defined as the delivery of 12 production
configured aircraft, with all ancillary items required by the contract to
perform the assigned mission. Each aircraft and its structures, subsystems,
spares, support equipment, and software must be free from defect in design,
materials, and workmanship for 180 days after delivery of the last aircraft.
If a defect is found, the contractor must repair, rework, or redesign. Design
information must be free from defect for 180 days from delivery of the data
or the contractor must correct defects and repair any subsystem damage
which resulted from use of the data.
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The service life policy for the C-17 provides for a prorated price
sharing of any airframe or landing gear defects. The airframe components
are covered for a period of 10 years or 10,000 flight hours. The landing gear
is covered for 10 years or 20,000 landings. [See Appendix E for exact war-
ranty details.]
This application of contracting and warranty usage is quite a radical
concept when compared to the standard commercial warranty. The short-
ened warranty period is most notable, but the extensive coverage of the full
system in lieu of subsystems may result in considerable life cycle cost
reductions to the government.
E. SUMMARY
Only a few of the warranty variations possible in the Department of
Defense and commercial aviation procurement processes have been exam-
ined. The intent of this chapter is to highlight some of the more important
details of the warranty types that have been used, so that understanding and
realization of warranty ramifications can be employed to the best advantage
in future procurements. Warranty issues are not going to disappear. The
1984 and 1985 warranty legislation approved by Congress will direct even
greater emphasis toward warranty usage and effectiveness. Finally, it is
important to realize that the warranty methods examined do not necessarily
reflect what is the most economical nor efficient alternatives to the var-
ious aircraft contracts. The program manager must evaluate and use careful
judgement in making that determination.
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IV. WARRANTY COSTS AND RISKS
A. INTRODUCTION
Warranty costs are a major concern to both the Government and the pro-
spective contractor. The inclusion of a warranty can have a significant ef-
fect on contract cost and contractor profit, especially if governed by the
recent Congressional mandates. As demonstrated in the previous chapter,
there are numerous types of warranties and seemingly an infinite number of
variations possible within each warranty type. This chapter will address
warranty costs in generic terms with the hope that better understanding of
the cost issues by both Government procurement personnel and prospective
contractors will drive better business deals for both parties and reduce ad-
versarial relationships.
B. COST/RISK TRADEOFFS
To a contractor, risk translates simply to cost. As a general rule, when
risk increases, cost of the contract will also increase. The contractor is in
neither a financial position nor the business to assume unrewarded risk. It
seems likely therefore, that the more warranty coverage required by the
buyer, the more risk the contractor is being asked to assume and the greater
the probability that, in the long run, those costs will be passed on to the
buyer. The spectrum of cost/risk tradeoff can be carried to extremes. One
party can absorb all of the costs and risks or the other party can absorb all
of the costs and risks, but neither solution is usually equitable. Generally,
marketplace negotiations force cost/risk sharing between the buyer and the
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seller, although the sharing is not necessarily an equal split. This concept
can be demonstrated by the following examples.
In the application of a reliability improvement warranty, assume the
contractor is being tasked to improve or increase the reliability level of a
new piece of equipment. Because there is little to no failure data available,
the contractor is forced to assume a very high risk due to the inability to
determine or accurately estimate either the failure rate or the amount of
expense required to correct future deficiencies. Therefore, it would stand
to reason that the risk would be converted to a "most likely" cost estimate,
which would be included in the procurement price and result in higher over-
all cost. Recall that while a minimum threshold failure rate is established
in the basic reliability improvement warranty, it does not usually penalize
the contractor for failing to achieve that level. It merely attempts to in-
centivize the contractor to improve reliability through the instrument of
potentially higher profits. However, because very high initial risk is an-
ticipated by the contractor, warranty price may be very high in order to
compensate the contractor for the perceived risk. The Government, on the
other hand, desires product reliability and may pay unnecessarily high cost
and still not receive much benefit of the included warranty. [26:59]
Introduction of a mean time between failure clause in a reliability im-
provement warranty tends to raise contractor risk even more. Inclusion of
the mean time between failure guarantee will often be accompanied by pen-
alty provisions such that if the contractor fails to achieve the specified
mean time between failure level, corrective action must be initiated. Typi-
cally, these corrections would include the performance of engineering anal-
ysis to identify the cause of failure or substandard performance, submission
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of engineering change proposals, modification of existing units, and pro-
vision of additional spares to the buyer on a loan basis until mean time
between failure improves to the guaranteed level [26:44-45]. Inherently,
every one of these provisions introduces added risk to the contractor, since
each represents potential additional expense. It follows that because the
buyer insists on stronger warranty requirements, which in turn raises con-
tractor risk, the warranty coverage will be passed on to the buyer in the
form of higher contract cost, either implicit or explicit.
Determining real warranty cost and price is a very delicate balancing
game and the contractor must carefully evaluate warranty price versus risk.
Competition in Department of Defense procurement actions is becoming
more prevalent. As such, if the contractor in the bidding process submits
too high a price, the contract will be awarded to a lower bidding competitor.
If the contractor underestimates the risk factor and fails to charge suffi-
ciently to recover costs and is therefore caused to render excessive repairs
during the warranty period, a decrease in profit or even a loss can result
[26:21].
The risk associated with the standard commercial warranty seems to be
significantly less than with defense warranties for several reasons. First,
commercial aircraft are sold to several customers instead of just one,
which allows the production base to be larger and be spread out over a long-
er period of time. This helps reduce total risk, because greater numbers of
aircraft will be sold and risk can be absorbed at a less apparent amount per
aircraft. Second, as pointed out in the last chapter, standard commercial
warranties specifically include disclaimers and releases of liability as con-
ditions of express warranty coverage. Third, all implied warranties are
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totally excluded from the standard commercial warranty which again
reduces risk. Finally, commercial aircraft are used very heavily so usually
little total time has to elapse before defects become evident. This allows
the manufacturer the opportunity to make corrections early in the produc-
tion run thus reducing the risk of costly redesign or retrofit after large
numbers of aircraft have already been delivered to the customers.
Risks seem to be sufficiently low in the standard commercial warranty
because every major aircraft manufacturer in the United States offers near-
ly the identical warranty to commercial customers at "no extra cost." This
indicates that either the risk/cost factor has in fact been reduced to an ac-
ceptable level because of the broad production base, or these same manufac-
turers have decided that whatever inherent risk remains, it is necessary in
order to remain competitive in the market.
C. COSTS AND RISKS TO THE GOVERNMENT
This section will discuss the costs and risks of warranties as they per-
tain to the Government. The topics treated include warranty price, warranty
price with regard to the reliability improvement warranty, warranty admin-
istration, warranty effect on long-term operational costs, costs of war-
ranties for dual sources, reduced self-sufficiency, transit times for failed
and repaired components, design costs, and finally the risk of not having a
warranty at all.
The first cost to be realized with a warranty is the warranty price it-
self. When the Government requires that a warranty be provided with a pro-
curement, the warranty costs will be included in the purchase price of the
equipment, if the warranty is not paid for explicitly as a separate item.
This is especially true in reimbursable cost type contracts since it may be
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difficult to break out warranty-related costs from the non-related cost
elements [7:29]. The inclusion of a warranty as a term and condition of sale
will inherently increase the overall price of the purchased equipment as
opposed to the price of the same equipment without warranty inclusion. The
contractor simply is not going to provide a warranty free of charge, because
a contractor must bear considerable cost and risk to support the long term
warranty requirements.
The warranty price represents risk to the Government, especially with a
reliability improvement warranty [27:1-4]. If improvement parameters are
too loosely defined, then the Government may pay an excessive amount for
the warranty and not realize a significant improvement in reliability. War-
ranty price is determined by, among other factors, the expected cost for the
anticipated warranty work. If the covered system has historical reliability
data available, a good approximation may be possible.
The next significant cost is the cost of warranty administration. War-
ranty administration is an absolute necessity since most warranties require
that covered items not be tampered with except by fully authorized service
personnel, usually contractor representatives. To avoid warranty invalida-
tion, particularly since current emphasis is on increasing the use of war-
ranties, the Government is going to need to develop data base management
systems to monitor the location of warranted equipment, track failure
rates, failure history, warranty maintenance requirements, warranty time
remaining on each covered piece, and other data that may be a precondition
of the warranty. The intrinsic costs of legal expenses should not to be
ignored. While an adversarial relationship between the Government and the
contractor is not sought, legal fees should be anticipated because of the
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different interpretation of clauses in the warranty provision and the need to
enforce rights and claims. [27: 1 -4]
A long term effect of warranty usage may be reflected by increased sys-
tem life and, hence, system operational costs. Hopefully, the application of
warranties to weapons system will increase the reliability and longevity of
the system, especially if the reliability improvement warranty is the type
of warranty in force. The increased reliability and maintainability should
extend service life, hence, the requirement to continue funding the operating
costs over a longer period of time [7:30]. It should be noted conversely, that
as the reliability of the system increases, maintenance costs should de-
crease, although, not necessarily in proportion to operating costs. Some
form of continual maintenance will always be required, so even though there
may be a decrease in maintenance requirements overall, it may not be suf-
ficient to displace total operating expenses over the full system life.
The Competition Advocate of the United States Navy, Rear Admiral Piatt,
is strongly in favor of developing dual sources for weapon system acquisi-
tions [28]. Development of dual sources may provoke increased costs in
warranty application. Where there are dual sources, the primary contractor
may be able to accomplish modifications with little or no cost impact since,
the primary source was most likely involved with product development. The
second source supplier may not have the same data availability or operating
efficiency and therefore, may require greater remuneration to implement
the same changes for the same warranty coverage. [7:30]
Warranty usage can reduce self-sufficiency which represents another
form of risk to the Government. Since most contract warranties require
"hands off" treatment of the covered components, the Government becomes
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reliant on the contractor for maintenance and parts support. Due to the na-
ture of military duty, unexpected deployments, emergency actions and other
unknown short notice requirements, dependence upon a contractor for war-
ranty support may be a significant risk to the Government. Additionally, un-
like the private sector, the military is not plagued with labor disputes.
Consequently, military operations tend to continue even when the contrac-
tor's labor force may be on strike. This raises the issue of how to maintain
contractor support and parts flow while not invalidating an effective war-
ranty if such a preeminent circumstance should arise. [27:1-4]
Pipeline transit times for parts or repaired components represent a risk
that should be a concern to the Government. This is particularly the case in
the reliability improvement warranty and the mean time between failure
warranty. If a very high readiness factor is required, the warranty should
include a clause defining reasonable turnaround time for the repair of de-
fective components. Good business sense would dictate that too short of a
time puts an undue hardship on the contractor, which in turn, will either
raise the price of the warranty or encourage the contractor not to perform.
Should the turnaround time requirement be such that it mandates quick re-
sponse, then the Government should consider the number of required opera-
tional units, the number of replacement spares, and their availability during
the contract development stage. If however, the total liability of providing
spares coverage is the responsibility of the contractor as a provision of the
warranty, the cost shifts completely to the contractor but the risk to the
Government may remain notably high . [7:29]
Design costs represent a risk to the Government. In the reliability
improvement warranty for example, when a piece of equipment fails, the
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responsibility to redesign falls on the contractor. The contractor's profit
can be enhanced when redesign improves equipment reliability and reduces
repair costs. Should the redesign prove too expensive; that is, cost more
than the repair effort, the contractor will then use the minimal design mod-
fication that is most conducive to the warranty and not necessarily suited
to the best military function. [27: 1 -4]
With respect to design costs, warranty and equipment age can play
significant roles in where the contractor will devote the most attention. If
modifications to design are required early in the warranty life, the contrac-
tor is more apt to make the modifications since there is greater likelihood
to recover the costs. In contrast, as the warranty and equipment age, the
contractor is inclined to make smaller scale improvements or perform in-
terim fixes in lieu of major modification because cost recovery is unlikely;
therefore, Government risk increases with warranty age. [7:30]
Training expenses should not be ignored. There will be a requirement to
train personnel to administer the warranty as mentioned before, but just as
importantly, technical training will be required so that the system can be
maintained and repaired when the warranty ceases.
Finally, as a matter of note, the absolute highest risk the Government
can assume is the risk associated with not having a warranty at all. With-
out any warranty coverage whatsoever, the Government assumes 1 00 per-
cent risk and responsibility for equipment performance and operation. Once
the system is delivered and accepted, the contractor is totally released
from any culpability with regard to reliability or performance and, there is
no incentive to pursue performance statistics or make design improvements
except for the hope of a follow-on contract at some future time.
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D. COSTS AND RISKS TO THE CONTRACTOR
The costs and risks that the contractor must face are examined in this
section. The subjects investigated are, warranty price considerations for
the contractor, subcontractor risk, effect of mean time between failure
threshold, cost of testing, Government paperwork delays, misuse or abuse of
equipment, engineering design risk, specialized production expense, ripple
effect, quality control, warranty administration, and latent defects.
The contractor faces a similar risk to the Government with respect to
warranty price. While the Government is concerned whether too much was
paid for the warranty, the contractor is concerned whether enough was
charged to recover costs plus some profit. Again, if a new technology is
involved, contractor risk will be significant due merely to the inability to
predict with sufficient accuracy the frequency of failure or the cost to
repair. [27:1-6]
The contractor may experience considerable risk when forced to procure
system parts from subcontractors. The subcontractors may not warranty
their parts for the duration agreed upon by the primary contractor which
forces the primary contractor to assume the risk and responsibility to ef-
fect repairs regardless of who manufactured the part. Contractor risk can
be reduced through active negotiation with subcontractors to develop parity
of warranty coverage.
In the mean time between failure warranty, the contractor is exposed to
considerable risk. If the negotiated mean time between failure threshold is
established at a level significantly higher than the actual equipment per-
formance, then the contractor must ( 1 ) make corrections or redesign at his
own expense and, (2) can be penalized for failing to achieve a satisfactory
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reliability level. Significant misjudgement here can have a notable effect
on contractor profit or loss.
Since most warranties specify that the buyer will not attempt to repair
or troubleshoot covered components, the contractor is exposed to the ex-
pense of testing and returning non-failed items. Costs can be significant in
this category, especially with today's "black box" technologies. Also, mis-
handling or tampering with equipment by untrained or uncaring military
maintenance personnel can cause premature failures, increasing contractor
risk. [27:1-6]
Government delays in the processing of paperwork, like engineering
change proposals, present some degree of risk to the contractor. In the
scheme of the reliability improvement warranty, a contractor is supposed to
submit engineering change proposals for approval whenever design changes
are necessary on covered systems. When the engineering change proposals
are approved, the contractor installs the change, reducing warranty main-
tenance costs, thereby increasing contractor profit. When the Government
delays action on the engineering change proposal, the contractor is forced to
suffer the loss of potential profit and at the same time, the Government is
foregoing or delaying the added benefit of improved system reliability.
[27:2-5]
Besides the innate risks associated with engineering change proposal
processing delays, the contractor is imperiled by other forms of Government
inattention. The contractor is reliant on failure data and other related in-
formation to develop appropriate warranty design modifications or repairs.
If the Government fails to provide timely, complete, and accurate data, the
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contractor is placed at risk because of improper warranty management and
the inability to control Government actions. [27:2-5]
The next risk the contractor faces is the misuse or abuse of equipment
by the buyer. Once equipment is delivered to the Government, the contractor
generally has very little direct control on how the system is used and by
who. Consequently, abused or misused equipment that fails is usually re-
turned to the manufacturer for repair under the warranty. Unless there is
significant physical evidence to support proof that the equipment was a-
bused (and this is not always easy to prove) then the contractor bears the
cost of the repair.
Engineering design represents a form of risk for the contractor, partic-
ularly, if the contractor did not participate in the system design . Quite
often in the past, the military provided a design to the contractor to man-
ufacture the system according to the specifications. Since the contractor
was usually eager to have the business, the system was constructed as di-
rected, with only minor additional attention being paid to actual form, fit,
and function. Ultimately when the new system was introduced into service,
there was no guarantee that the system would actually perform, and if it
did, for how long. If the contractor is required to warranty the system, the
risk level is significant in that the Government is requiring the contractor
to cover a design that is not directly under the contractor's cognizance or
responsibility.
Aircraft design uniqueness is a form of risk to the contractor. The
military infrequently buys a standard commercial aircraft. Aircraft of
completely different designs place additional procurement and inventory
problems on the contractor. Due to the inability in most applications to
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have interchangeable parts, the contractor must either establish a new
manufacturing capability to meet the requirement or must develop new
outside manufacturing sources, if none presently exists. Nonstandard air-
craft, especially where state of the art technologies are involved, represent
additional risk to the contractor. Allowing that there may be insufficient
historical data by which the contractor can establish failure rates, early
warranty support becomes a delicate balance of too much or too little in-
ventory. In the case of the mean time between failure warranty, the con-
tractor is required to provide replacement spares to the buyer if threshold
reliability is not maintained. If too little inventory is available, the con-
tractor can be assessed damages. If too much inventory is available and not
required, the contractor wastes valuable resources which again decreases
profits. [7:36]
The antithesis is also a form of contractor risk. Should aircraft relia-
bility levels greatly exceed the predicted failure rate, then the contractor
will be maximizing the profit incentive of the contract. It may therefore,
appear to the Government that initial reliability levels were established at
too low a level and the contractor may be considered to be making excess
profit. [27:2-5]
Another form of risk that should be mentioned is represented by the re-
quirement of the contractor to keep production lines either operational or
near operational for multiyear procurements. When compared to standard
commercial operations, i.e. manufacturing aircraft like the MD-80 or the
747, typically the military buys smaller quantities over a period of several
years. As a result, the contractor must keep a specialized production capa-
bility available which may not necessarily share a commonality with the
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commercial production process. The contractor is consequently forced to
bear additional cost of maintaining expanded capability and at least a nucle-
us engineering and support staff above and beyond normal business scope to
provide long-run warranty support for unique military aircraft.
The contractor is at considerable risk and potential dollar expense when
component failure causes a ripple effect. Ripple effect is defined as the
resultant failure of one or more additional parts due to breakdown of an ini-
tial related part. In this circumstance, the contractor may have been re-
sponsible for warranty repair on the original failed component, but it is
unclear whether the responsibility for repairs to the other component fail-
ures caused by ripple effect, extend to the other effected components, par-
ticularly when the parts were manufactured by another company. Precedent
seems to indicate that the prime contractor or warranty agency is liable for
all related repairs.
There is an associated risk issue revolving around quality control. The
prime contractor has direct control over the quality effort that will be di-
rected toward the end product. Because of this direct control, the contrac-
tor should be able to minimize risk with regard to long-term warranty
coverage due to the ability to make the decision on the level of effort and
material quality choice. When the prime contractor uses components or
parts manufactured by other companies, the degree of quality control may be
inferior to that applied to in-house manufactured products. Because the
prime contractor provides the warranty coverage, use of parts manufactured
by other companies represents some degree of controllable risk. Should the
prime contractor opt to increase the quality specifications on outside sup-
pliers, added cost must be anticipated.
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Like the Government, the contractor will bear its costs of warranty ad-
ministration. To support the long-run warranty effort, the contractor will
need a trained staff to deal with numerous facets of warranty claims . Ad-
ditionally, the warranty administrators will require specialized knowledge
and training to handle the procurements and warranties under a Government
contract. Because the Government is a public sector entity, it must operate
under additional rules and regulations that are not applicable to the stand-
ard commercial market. This supplementary training adds to contractor
cost considerations.
The Government's use of the latent defects clause appears to be a risk
issue of major proportion to the contractor. The clause as presently writ-
ten places no time limitation or dollar expenditure ceiling on latent defects.
The contractor perceives this lack of any limitation as an "open door" policy
which provides the Government with unlimited ability to charge against the
warranty. Examine the following situation. The Lockheed Corporation has
been building and delivering the P-3 Orion aircraft to the Navy for over 20
years. Assume a latent defect is discovered, such as, a structural crack
that is caused by harmonic vibration. Under the latent defects clause,
Lockheed Corporation would be required to render a fix to every aircraft in
fleet service regardless of how old the aircraft is or how much cost was
accrued by the contractor. This may be an extreme case, but it is not beyond
the realm of possibility. Latent defects probably represent the single most
significant cost/risk that the contractor must face since there is no means
to determine the upper bound on costs that could.be charged back to the
manufacturer. Additionally, budgeting and accounting for an unknown such
as this is very difficult. How can a contractor budget for a contingency cost
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such as a latent defect? A latent defect may never be discovered, but if one
is, it may have such a drastic ramifications that a reasonable profit could
be reduced to a substantial loss.
E. SUMMARY
The use of warranties is not a cost or risk free environment for either
the Government or the contractor. As the use of warranties increases, bet-
ter understanding of true cost versus risk should also increase. Both the
contractor and the Government need to cooperate with each other so that
each party can derive the maximum benefit from the use of the warranty.
The Government needs to devote special attention to defining realistic
reliability requirements. Consideration should include resolution of desired
versus required reliability levels. Placing undue or unrealistic require-
ments on the contractor not only creates an adversarial relationship, but
also defeats the intent of the warranty. The Government needs to recognize
that the warranty negotiation process is a give and take situation. An un-
workable warranty is no warranty at all.
The contractor needs to recognize that the costs and risks associated
with warranty usage are not undivided. A realistic, reasonable profit should
be expected, but defining absurdly low initial reliability goals to demon-
strate a "marked improvement" is not only misleading, but dishonest. As
trustees of public revenues, the Government must pursue the best business
deal possible. Contractors should not expect the Government to bear the
cost of everyday business risk, but the contractor should be paid a fair fee
for risk assumed above routine operations that are directly attributable to
the unique requirements of military contracts.
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V. WARRANTY PRICING MODELS
A. INTRODUCTION
Warranty pricing is a very inexact and difficult process. Both the con-
tractor and the Government must, through some form of analysis, attempt to
determine what is a fair and reasonable price for a warranty. Understanding
that there are some similarities of cost for both the Government and the
contractor should not cloud the fact that cost and risk are not necessarily a
50/50 tradeoff. Valid warranty pricing dictates careful analysis of the
specific equipment being purchased and the type of warranty coverage re-
quired. The Government and the contractor need to be thoroughly knowl-
edgeable of their own costs and risks and those existing for the other party.
This chapter will focus on several algorithmic pricing models to illus-
trate possible avenues of approach to the warranty pricing problem. The
reader should fully understand that these models are neither a panacea nor
do they represent the entire spectrum of possible evaluation models. There
are simply too many conceivable variables that are impossible to accurately
quantify, making the straight algorithmic approach beneficial only for rela-
tively certain parameters. Finally, a nonanalytical overview of warranty
pricing will be presented to further enhance awareness that the analytical
models do not cover all aspects of warranty price consideration.
B. WARRANTY MODELS
This section will present models which discuss the free-replacement
warranty and the pro-rata warranty. These particular models are examined
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to determine warranty cost as measured in terms of indifference price with
or without a warranty. Other models discuss warranty planning and evalua-
tion through the analysis of several warranty rebate models. Also included
in this section is a discussion of how warranty support can be predicted
through the use of learning curves.
I. Blischke and Scheuer
The material in this section comes from Wallace R. Blischke and
Earnest M. Scheuer [29]. The researcher has taken free licence with para-
phrasing and word changes, but fully acknowledges the concepts and equa-
tions as those of Blischke and Scheuer. Subjects covered include a brief
analysis of warranty policy, analysis of the free-replacement warranty, and
the pro-rata warranty form both the buyer's and seller's view point.
a. Warranty Policy
There are two types of warranty policies to be analyzed, the
free-replacement warranty and the pro-rata warranty. As will be seen, the
latter incorporates a feature of the former but is a distinct type.
In the free-replacement warranty, the supplier, for a one-time
cost of C\, will furnish the customer with as many items as necessary to
yield service for the warrantied service duration Wj.
In the pro-rata warranty with warranty period W2 and free re-
placement period A, any item failing before time A is replaced at no cost to
the customer; if any item fails after service time W2 the customer must pay
the full price of C2 for a replacement; between time A and W2 the customer
incurs a pro-rata cost. Specifically, the buyer's replacement cost for an




c 2 , x>w2
(2.1)
The replacement item has the warranty of a new item.
The viewpoint of the customer will be considered first. The
viewpoint of the supplier will be considered separately. The following
notation will be used:
X = lifetime of the item (a non-negative random variable);
L = life cycle of the item (anticipated operational life);
F() cumulative distribution function of the item;
F(t)« l-F(t)
Xj, X2 , . . . = lifetimes of successive items (independently and identically
distributed as F);
i=1
N(t) = number of replacements of the item made in the time interval (0,t);
= max (k: 5kit);
M(t) = E[N(t)] (the "renewal function");
u = E(x); a2 = var (x), (Note: let d = sigma)
W
x dF(x) = the "partial expectation" of X until time W;






F(n)(.) = nfold convolution of F() with itself. From renewal theory it can be
shown that
P[N(t) = n] = F<n)(t)-F<n+ D(t), n=0, 1,2,...
where





(n).M(t) = 2F (t)
k=1
b. The Free-Replacement Warranty—The Customer Point of View
It is important to note that with a free-replacement warranty,
the customer does not immediately incur the replacement cost C
t
at the end
of the warranty period, w,. That cost is not incurred until the failure of the
item then in service at the time Y^, where Y = W,+d(W
t
). It is easy to
prove that
E(Y)=u.[1+M(W,)], (2.2)
so that over the life cycle the average number of times payment must be
made under the free-replacement warranty is for large L, 1+L/E(Y)
= l+L/fun+rKW,)]}. Thus the average total life cycle cost of the item with
a free-replacement warranty is
C,(1*L/lu[1+»KW f>D) (2.3)
If no warranty were in force, a replacement cost of K would be
incurred, on the average, 1+M(L) times, so that over the life cycle the
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average total cost would be K[1+M(L)]. Equating this to (2.3), the cost C,*,
is found for a free-replacement warranty at which the customer would be
indifferent between buying the item with or without warranty. The ratio of





If the length of the item's life cycle is sufficiently long, it may
be worthwhile to include, in the preceding analysis, discounting of future
payments at rate g back to time zero. With the free-replacement warranty,
payments of C, are made, on the average, at time intervals of length E(Y).














Similarly, if one discounts the payments of K made, on the aver-
age, at intervals of duration u. when no warranty is in effect, the average
present value of all these payments into the indefinite future is
00
K 2exp(-jcu) = K[1-exp(-cn)] _1
j=0
(2.6)





as the ratio of indifference price under free-replacement warranty to un-
warranted price when present value of future payments is considered.
c. The Pro-Rata Warranty—The Customer Point of View














Conditional upon there being exactly n replacements over the item"s life
cycle (i.e., upon N(L) = n), the expected cost over the life cycle under pro-
rata warranty is
C2 + nR = C2 ( 1 + n/W2[Uw2 - uA + W2F(W2 )]).















Without warranty, the expected cost over the life cycle is










as the ratio of indifference price under pro-rata warranty to price without
warranty.
If present value of future costs into the indefinite future with




U " U + W F (WJ
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(2.11)
is the ratio of indifference price under pro-rata warranty to price without
warranty when present value is taken into account. Note that the discount
rate is not involved in (2. 1 1 ). This comes about because payments would be
made at the same times with or without pro-rata warranty. Equation (2. 11
)
can also be obtained directly by equating K with R.
d. The Free-Replacement Warranty—The Seller's Point of View
The focus now turns to the seller's interests. These are under-
stood to be the determination of selling prices under the two warranties
that would yield the same long-run expected profits for him if he offered no
warranty. Profit is simply the difference between his revenue (the cost to
the customer) and his costs. In the free-replacement warranty the seller's
revenue per warranty period is fixed (at Cj), while his costs are a random
variable, since the number of free-replacements he must make is random. It
is necessary to obtain the expected value of these costs.
In the free-replacement warranty, the expected number of units
supplied per warranty cycle (i.e., the time between payments) at no
(additional) charge is M(W,). If each unit costs the seller an amount g, the
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Consider a fairly general sampling situation in which there is so-
called incomplete data, i.e. the time-to-failure for some items, and periods
of observation on other items which may or may not begin at the inception
of use of the item and may or may not end with the failure of the item. A
nonparametric estimate £(•) of F( ) has been provided by Kaplan and Meier
[30] for this circumstance. Their estimator is a step function which re-
duces to the empirical cumulative distribution function in the case of com-
plete samples. With this estimate of F() one can in turn estimate u. = E(X),
d2 = Var(X) (if needed), uB , F*)(), P[N(t) = k], M(t), etc., from the following











P(N(t) = kj = F(k)(t) - F<k+1 >(t), k = o, 1, 2.
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Substituting the step function F( ) into the preceding formulas
yields sums in place of integrals in the equations which will then yield
estimates
A *„ A *.
\l, d*, ^ Fft)(t), P[N(t) = k], and M(t).
The Kaplan-neier procedure yields F( ) and successive convolu-
tions are obtained in straightforward fashion. There need be some concern,
however, about core storage and time limitations in the computer deter-
mination of F( ) and the convolutions FW( ), particularly if the sample
contains a large number of failure times and if more than just a very few
convolutions are needed.















where a, < a2 < . . . < am+1 are the ordered failure times and < h 1 < h2 < . .
.
.
. < hm < 1. F<2>(-) will similarly be a step function and, unless there is some
coalescing, the number of steps will be (m+2)(m+ 1 )/2." The number of steps
in F<3>() can be as large as (m+2)(m+ 1 )2/2. Generally, ?<*>(•) can involve as
many as (m+2)(m+ 1 )k/2 steps. This soon imposes excessive demands on
storage capacity and on computation time.
Fortunately, it is often not necessary to compute too many con-
volutions. If one is interested in P[N(W) = n], he must calculate FM(W) and
F(n+D(w) and take their difference. It would probably not be desirable for
either customer or seller if there were a non-negligible probability of need-
ing quite a few replacements over a warranty period W.
In order to obtain ji one needs to calculate F(t) completely, i.e.
from t = until the smallest t for which F(t) = 1. If computer core space is
at a premium, one needs only to calculate the successive convolutions F^Ht)
for t up to the lenth of the warranty period W. Since the life cycle L is gen-
erally very long, one might be able to get away with taking
M(L)rk +L2 _
,/2
To reduce computations and storage requirements, it is conven-
A
ient to lump steps in the F<k > that are within some small distance 13 of each
other. In some computations made, 13 = 1 0~3 was taken.
To illustrate the growth of the number of steps in successive
convolutions, the following numbers are cited. In an incomplete sample of
lifetimes of an aircraft component, 48 actual failure times were observed.
Then F(t) has 49 steps, F<2Kt) can have as many as 1 1 76 steps, F<3Kt) can
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have as many as 56,448 steps, and F<4Kt) can have as many as 2,709,504
steps.
The following are some calculated values from the data just
mentioned for an 8000 hour warranty period:
& = 6069 F(8000) = .1564
d= 1914
P[N(8000) = 0] = . 1564
P[N(8000)= U-.7742
P[N(8000) = 2] = .0686








Thus for a free-replacement warranty with warranty period 8000
hours, and life cycle 100,000 hours, the estimate of the ratio of indiffer-
ence price with warranty to price without warranty from (2.4) is
C
l _ 6069 [1+ 100,000/6069][1+.9135]
. « 818
K 606911+9135] +100,000
For a pro-rata warranty with warranty period 8000 hours, initial
free-replacement period 0, and life cycle 100,000 hours, the estimate of
the ratio of indifference price with warranty to price without warranty
from (2.10) is
Z
j_ _ 8000(1 + 100,000/6069] .
, |Qg
K 8000 + ( 1 00,000/6069) (59 1 8+8000(. 1 564)]
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The above presentations of the Blischke and Scheuer models show
that warranties must be evaluated on their own criteria. It is also impor-
tant to understand that as discussed in Chapter IV, the Blischke and Scheuer
models demonstrate that the more warranty coverage required, the more it
will cost. Note from above, the 81.8 percent cost for the free-replacement
warranty as opposed to the 1 0.9 percent cost for a pro-rata warranty.
Clearly, the Blischke and Scheuer models do not cover all facets of warranty
cost and they assume that both the buyer and seller have respective knowl-
edge of product failure rates. This assumption may not be true, especially
if a new product is being developed under a reliability improvement
warranty.
2. Thomas
The rebate models and examples presented in this section are the
work of Marl in U. Thomas [31]. In the interest of brevity, this researcher
has omitted portions of Thomas' paper, but the analysis and results have not
been altered. Warranty models are presented to examine the cost-benefit
tradeoffs where the buyer receives a total rebate for equipment failures.
The prorated rebate model and the renewable warranty are also examined.
a. Background
If product quality is high, then the cost of the warranty will be
relatively low and whenever a low product line or lot is released the man-
ufacturer will eventually be penalized by increasing warranty expense. If
low quality production continues repeatedly over time then the market
position of the product becomes threatened. In general, a minimum cost
warranty program is a vital element for overall cost control in manufac-
turing. This requires a sound planning program.
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The development of a warranty planning program requires a good
knowledge and control of the relationship among quality, reliability, and
warranty cost. The models presented examine these relationships. The
first model is the policy of total rebate for any failure occurring during the
warranty period. This policy is typically applied for relatively inexpensive
production units with moderate to high product reliability. Next, the pro-
rated rebate policy is considered whereby total compensation is rendered
for failures that occur before a fixed time. Beyond this time the failures
that occur during the remaining warranty period result in prorated compen-
sation to the buyer. This policy is generally applied to moderately expen-
sive items. In the next section, a policy is described where the warranty is
renewed if failure occurs within a specified time. Here it is possible for a
consumer to have a infinite warranty period for a single purchase. This is
the least common policy and is typically granted only for highly reliable
inexpensive items.
b. Rebate Models
Consider a manufactured product with failure time T distributed
F(t) for which a rebate cost A(w) is incurred for each failure that occurs
during a warranty period (0, w). Since the prime motivation for warranties
is to penetrate or maintain a market, assume that the expected benefit
B(w), w i 0, is realized through a favorably decreasing market cost. In ad-
dition, the routine costs for warranty administration is assumed to be fixed
at Kw . The aggregate expected total cost function is
C(w) = A(w) + B(w) + Kw , w l 0.
(1)
In order to find the optimum warranty period W*, the cost
components must be quantifiable. It is very difficult in general to specify
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B(w) due to the many uncertainties involved. For this discussion, B(w) will
be treated as linear and B(w) = b - b,w, w i 0. It therefore follows that
w
C(w) = c f(u) du + b - b w, w >
(2)
where c is the unit cost, in dollars, of failures during (0, w). To find an
optimum interval length, straightforward differentiation leads to
(3)
w*
provided V (w) > 0.
( 1 ) Example -I . As an example suppose a manufacturer wants to
warranty a product that has an exponential failure time distribution with a
mean-time-to-failure of 1/tt. Thus in (3)
f(t) =
r
TJe~*\ t > o
, otherwise
and the optimum warranty interval length is given by
w*= 1/Ttln(cTi/b,)
(4)
Suppose the mean-time to failure is 1.5 years and the failures
result in a unit warranty cost of $200. Further, from a marketing study the
impact of warranty on marketing expense is estimated at A(w) = 200 - 20w,
< w < 10, dollars per unit. Therefore, tt = 2/3, c = b = 200, and b, = 20
from which it follows from (4) that w* = 2.85 years or approximately 34
months.
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c. Prorated Rebate Model
The results of (2) and (3) apply to the case whereby the buyer
experiencing a failure during (0, w) receives total compensation. Now con-
sider a more general model for which a manufactured item is warranted
such that the buyer is given total rebate if failure occurs during a fixed
interval i t i w
t
and prorated compensation if failure occurs during
w
1
< t i w2 . The total cost is given by




















Policies of this type are applied to moderately valued products
that render significant but well defined wear. Note that for the special
case of w, = w2 = w in (5a) the result is the same as the total rebate model.
To find an optimum warranty interval (0 i w
1
i w2 ) for this
policy one can proceed formally by substituting the rebate cost from (5b)
into the expected total cost function of ( 1 ). Thus,
w
2
rfwu w \ I cF(t) dtC(w
i<
W




where B(w,, w2 ) is a function of the prorata interval. To minimize (6) solve
the system of equations derived from setting
d/dw, C(w b w2 ) = d/dw2 C(w b w2 ) = 0.
Still another approach for finding an optimum policy is to apply
the following result.
( 1 ) Proposition 1 . For each prorated policy defined over an in-
terval \] = {t: t (0 < w 1 i w2 < <»)) there is a cost eqivalent total rebate
policy over l = {t: t (0 < w < «>)}, where w, i w i w2 .
Consider a prorated policy over \ v From (5b)

















Proposition 1 is based on the implicit assumption that the
comparable marketing cost function are equal, i.e. B(w) = B(w,, w2 ). Given a
rebate policy over l
t ,
determination of the interval l by computing a value
w' satisfying (7) can be done. Compare this value to the optimum interval
length w* given by (3).
(2) Example - 2 . Again, let T be exponentially distributed as in
Example 1 with





















and using the second order approximation













where tt < (wj + W2)' 1 .
Suppose rr =1/15 failures per month and the policy is to
provide full compensation for failures occurring within 6 months and pro-
rated compensation for failures that occur between 6 months and one year
(i.e. w, » w2 = 6). From (8) obtain w" = 8.29 months, and hence the equiv-
alent total rebate policy is to provide full compensation for failures that
occur up to that point in time and nothing thereafter,
d. Recurring Warranty Period Model
Thus far cases have been treated where the probability of a par-
ticular product having more than one failure in (0, w) is very small. Now
consider the warranty policy whereby if a failure occurs during (0, w) then
the buyer receives full compensation at a cost to the manufacturer of c dol-
lars per unit and the warranty intervals starts over.
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So the number of effective warranty intervals N for a given buyer
is distributed geometrically with discrete probability function
g(n) - [1 - F(w)][F(w)]n-i, w > 0, n = 1, 2, . .
.
(9)
The particular warranty rebate cost for a particular product is
therefore,
A(w) = c/i-F(w) (10)
It now becomes necessary to consider the warranty lifetime, T,
which is the effective warranty duration for a product. This time then




where the product failure times Tjm i=1, 2, . .
.
, form a sequence of inde-
pendent random variables each distributed F(T), 1 1 0.







for each i=l, 2, . .
.
, the Laplace Transform of the probability density
function for T is given by
h ( S )
-
n-F(w)]f(s) w > ^ Re(s) ,
t " r-f(s)F(w)
Since Tj: i=1, 2, . . . is an independent sequence, the
conditional probability density function for T given N = n is th n-fold









G(z) = 2zn g(n)
n=0
Is the probability generating function for G(n). For N geometric, substi-
tuting (9) into ( 1 2) gives the results of ( 11 ).
Proposition 2 is useful in determining the relationsh-ip be-
tween the warranty lifetime T and the failure times Tj, i=1, 2, . . .. From the










Now to determine an optimum warranty interval W* formu-
late the expected unit warranty cost function of ( 1 ) with A(w) given by ( 1 0),
C(w) = c/1-F(w) + b , -b
1
w (14)
Assume the marketing cost is a linear function B(w). A value w* minimiz-
ing (14) is not available in closed form, but can be determined or approx-
imated for a particular F(w).
(2) Example - 3 . Continuing with the case of exponential failure
times with mean 1/ti,
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F(s) tt/tt+s, Re(s) >
so








which is the Laplace Transform for the probability density function
h
T
(t) = flexpI-Tmje-**^-^ 1*, t >
(15)
Thus, for exponentially distributed failure times the warran-
ty lifetime T is also exponentially distributed but with a rate weighted by
the probability of a failure occurring outside a warranty interval. The war-
ranty lifetime mean and variance is therefore e^/fl and (e^/TT)2 - respec-
tively, which also follows from ( 1 3a) and ( 1 3b).
From (14) the total expected unit warranty cost is
C(w) = ce™ -b w + b' (16)
from which it follows that the minimum cost warranty interval is given by
W*= 1/TTlnOVCTT), b, >C7T. (17)
Note that this result is the same as that obtained in the sim-
pler one time rebate model of (4), only here the ratio of the slope of the
benefit function B(w) to ctt must be greater than 1.
e. Conclusion
Warranty planning like any other planning function involves goal
setting, performance assessment, and action plan development for future
products. The models described here are useful in carrying out these activ-
ities. These models allow management to examine warranty policies under
some relatively broad conditions. Still, there are some limitations and
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needs for extension. The general total expected warranty cost function of
( 1
)
can take on a variety of forms but the most common function will have
convex components A(w) and B(w). Only a slight extension is required in
order to accommodate other choices of convex B(w), w)0. The benefit of a
warranty is indeed the most difficult cost component to assess, but it is
necessary in order to examine cost and warranty interval tradeoffs and
establish goals.
The results reported here hold for a general failure time distri-
bution F(t), t i 0. The examples have treated the important special case of
exponentially distributed failure times. While this is clearly the simplest
case analytically, it is also commonly used in planning studies. Other im-
portant failure time distributions to be dealt with are the Weibull and Log-
Normal. These require more computations, but conceptually pose no greater
difficulties. In addition, these results can be extended to include discount-
ing and inflation considerations by incorporating the appropriate factors in
(2) and (14).
3. Barton
In this section Harvey Barton [32] offers an interesting variation on
using learning curves to predict warranty support requirements. The work
is entirely that of Mr. Barton, but it is included for the reader's considera-
tion and evaluation. As before, the researcher has taken some liberties with
wording and has edited the article for brevity,
a. Introduction
The 1984 Defense Appropriations Act requires the Government to
obtain warranties for performance as well as freedom from defects. One
aspect of performance subject to such warranties is reliability. If the
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requirement is demonstrable by test, there seems to be a basis to limit the
warranty duration to that of the test. In these early stages of application
of the warranty requirements, the required duration is still being explored.
Such requirements have included evaluation in field operation of equipment,
and for longer periods than normally encountered during inplant tests.
The major problem in such evaluations is the lack of maturity of
the equipments used as the basis for test. Early failures are likely from
defects in parts, defects in assembly workmanship, and correctable design
errors. In fact, workmanship errors are likely to predominate. Reliability
improvement of the fielded units will be obtained in the normal course of
fixing these failures. Some parts defects will be corrected only by substi-
tution of different parts types of vendors. Such corrections confer initial
reliability improvements upon future equipment deliveries. Future deliv-
eries are also enhanced by feedback of workmanship problems for corrective
action and are affected in the normal course of correction of design defects.
The risk inherent in these situations can be reduced with consideration of
equipment reliability growth. The objective is to estimate the expected
number of failures during a proposed warranty period and the resulting cost
to implement the warranty. This has been attempted through the use of
learning curves to estimate reliability growth. The application requires
establishment of a reliability estimate for a specific equipment age and an
expected rate of reliability growth,
b. Learning Curves
Learning curves were first used in the aircraft industry, to fore-
cast the effect of learning on production rate per hour. The analysis of
World War II data indicated that production efficiency increased
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logarithmically with respect to production quantity. The relationship ap-
peared to conform to the following expression:
Y = Ax-*> (1)
where •
Y = average cost per unit
A = cost of the first unit
x = number of units produced
b - the "slope" parameter
Since the original applications to forecast labor costs for aircraft assem-
bly, the learning curve has been found to fit a wide variety of operations.
Because of the characteristics of equation ( 1 ), a meaningful
method was found to represent the rate of improvement, or slope, of the
learning curve. This measure relates the percentage of improvement for
each doubling of production quantity, and is a constant. In an 80 percent
learning curve, for instance, each doubling of production quantity reduces
average unit labor to 80 percent of the previous level. If the average cost
for 100 units is $10; the average cost for 200 units will be $8, and the av-
erage cost for 400 units will be (0.8 x $8. =) $6.40. Different kinds of oper-
ations appear to tend toward different slope values, and analysts have found
it convenient to estimate "learning factors" from the content of an opera-
tion. The following table lists a few learning factors and corresponding
slope parameters.
Learning Factor Slope Parameter (b)
95% 0.074






The relationship of the learning curve is useful for many func-
tions showing exponential decay. The reliability growth model used by
Duane [33] and others is identical to the learning curve relationship. A bet-
ter understanding of the identity may be had from a comparison of para-
meter definitions. The following repetition of equation ( 1 ) is accompanied
by parameter definitions used for manufacturing cost projection, and cor-
responding definitions for reliability growth.
Y = Ax-t>
Parameter Manufacturing Reliability
Y = Average cost per = Cumulative failure
unit rate
A = First unit cost = Initial failure rate
x = Number of units = Cumulative operating
produced hours
b - "slope" parameter - "slope" parameter
The similarity of definitions is interesting. It should be noted
that the value of "A" is not measured directly in either application. In esti-
mation of manufacturing cost, the "first unit cost" is determined from the
other parameters, and used for extension to different production quantities.
By the same token, "initial failure rate" is not measurable directly, and is
referred to as "constant". It may be useful to recognize it as the initial
failure rate, for the same purpose as used for "first unit cost". The fact
that the "reliability growth curve" is a learning curve seems to provide a
basis for using the learning factor as a measure of slope. 5uch a relation-
ship was being used for reliability growth by the mid 1950's. Fielded elec-
tronic equipment was shown to improve in reliability logarithmically with
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respect to equipment age. The rate of reliability improvement varied de-
pending upon how well faults were removed from equipment before delivery
and the nature of corrective action after delivery.
In recent applications to reliability growth, the learning curves
have lost their identity, being called "Reliability Improvement Curves" or
"Reliability Growth Curves". The trends and mathematical relationships are
the same as they were in Duane's analyses, which recognized the concept of
the "Learning Curve". Recognition of the commonality of reliability growth
and learning relationships seems very useful to visualizing the reliability
growth phenomenon. The Program Manager will find it easier to evaluate a
70 percent learning curve than a reliability improvement slope of 0.515.
Therefore, the commonality of relationships is discussed here.
MIL-STD-1635 and MIL-STD-189 treat the concept of reliability
growth. MIL-STD-1635 describes requirements forReliability Growth Test-
ing. It is useful in estimating the cost of a reliability warranty, based upon
application of learning curves.
c. Application of Learning Curves
Two parameters are necessary to apply the learning curve to the
prediction of warranty support requirements. The slope and intercept of the
expected reliability growth curve will define its position and the expected
number of failures. In addition to definition of the expected reliability dur-
ing the warranty evaluation period, an estimate must be made of the cost
consequences of a failure. The cost aspect of the problem will not be treat-
ed in detail here. The cost consequences of failure may include feedback of
corrective action to changes in design and manufacturing processes, or may
be limited to the repair actions at failure. Costs are estimated to fulfill
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contract requirements, and may be subject to negotiation of warranty
terms.
d. Learning Curve Slope
The slope of a learning curve can be expressed as the slope of
the straight7line representation on log-log paper, or as the relationship of
reliability levels at two points in time with a 2:1 ratio of operating hours.
An 80 percent learning curve would represent a rate of improvement such
that the failure rate at 2000 hours would be 80 percent of the failure rate
at 1000 hours. The slope of such a curve on log-log paper would be 0.322.
MIL-STD-1635 describes the probable range of slopes to be be-
tween 0.3 and 0.6, depending upon the corrective action program invoked.
Other references report slopes as small as 0.2, for equipment having fail-
ures screened out before official reliability testing. It seems obvious that
removing the most likely failures before'test will reduce the potential for
early failure during test, and therefore reduce the rate of improvement from
that point. If all defective parts, design errors, and workmanship errors
could be eliminated by pre-screening, reliability growth would be nil.
The most reasonable estimates of slope appear to be in the range
of 0.3 to 0.5, corresponding to learning factors of about 70 percent to 80
percent.
The expected value of slope is somewhat controllable by the
amount of screening used to eliminate potential failures. The desirablility
of such screening varies, depending upon contract type and criteria of ac-
ceptable performance.
If the acceptance criterion comprises the demonstration of an
acceptable trend, then pre-screening may make it much more difficult to
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demonstrate the trend by eliminating failures which would provide an














Figure 1. Reliability Improvement
Affected by Censoring Early Data
The upper line shows a reliability growth curve constructed from hypothet-
ical test data from MIL-STD-1635. The lower line shows the result of cen-
soring out the first hundred hours of operation and failures. Obviously, the
apparent rate of improvement has been reduced. Although this illustration
uses well-behaved hypothetical data, the effect is likely to be more em-
phatic in a real-life program, where a rash of early failures may occur at
turn-on. In a fixed-price contract, some screening may be desirable to limit
the field support costs of the warranty, especially if the warranty requires
achieving some level of reliability during warranty period. A cost reim-
bursable contract gives no incentive to screen. In such a case, the negoti-
ated length and acceptance basis for the warranty period should determine
the desirability of screening. Short warranty periods need all the data they
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can get to show a trend, if reliability growth is an acceptable criterion, so
screening is undesirable. If average field performance during the warranty
period is the criterion, all possible potential faults should be eliminated by
screening.
e. Baseline MTBF
MIL-5TD-1635 establishes an intercept at 100 hours of test time
or one-half the predicted MTBF, whichever is greater. At this intercept the
cumulative MTBF is postulated to be ten percent of the predicted MTBF. This
appears to be a conservative estimate for our purposes. The value of this
intercept appears to depend upon the effectiveness of prior screening tests.
Screening appears to have its greatest effect early in an equipments life.
From the reviewed reference data, the cumulative MTBF at such a test time
can be as high as twenty-five percent of predicted MTBF. This range can be
part of the basis for competitive risk analysis and negotiation.
(1) Defining Warranty Criteria . The considerations of reliability
growth can be used to influence warranty measures as well as estimating
warranty cost. Early test data could be used to show a trend toward the re-
liability goal before the goal is reached.
Duration of a warranty period for reliability could be limited
to the requirement to show a learning trend toward the MTBF goal. The cost
of supporting the warranty period can be predicted with consideration of the
expected reliability trend for the duration of the warranty period. A histor-
ical basis exists for prediction of reliability improvement throughout any
conceivable warranty period. Therefore, the rate of improvement becomes a
more valid measure of equipment reliability than average performance dur-
ing the warranty period.
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Development of a competitive warranty program can benefit
from certain cost tradeoffs. The cost of a screening program may be effec-
tive in either of two ways. If the screening data are used to measure relia-
bility growth, they add data points and enhance the improvement rate. If
screening data are excluded from warranty evaluation, a higher average re-
liability may be shown for the warranty period, with fewer field failures to
be supported.
The feedback effect of corrective action to design and manu-
facturing processes depends upon the warranty population delivery rate. If
the corrective actions can be incorporated for a significant portion of the
warranty, they can enhance measured reliability growth. On the other hand,
if the warranty period is short, and/or covers only an initially-delivered
number of equipments, such corrective actions may not affect the measured
equipment nor help warranty evaluation. In such a case, reliability improve-
ment will result from removal of defective parts, repair of solder joints,
etc. This means of reliability improvement exists because of the variability
of electronic parts and the presence of some marginally defective parts in
any population. Removal of these parts when they fail improves the average
reliability of the remaining population. This occurs because the replace-
ment parts have smaller defect rates than those being replaced, assuming
that the replaced parts are mostly defective. Additional sources of relia-
bility improvement include repairable parts and processes, such as solder
joints. If a marginal solder joint is repaired, its probability of later failure
is reduced. These methods have been proven effective, with equipment reli-
ability improvement throughout measured life.
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f. Conclusions
Learning curves can be used in prediction of warranty support
requirements. The learning curve improvement percentage factor is a useful
measure of the rate of reliability improvment. It offers a tangible measure
of improvement rate which the Program Manager can relate to other appli-
cations of the learning curve, as for manufacturing costs.
Prediction of reliability improvement requires estimation of the
learning rate and a point estimate of reliability. The expected range of
learning rates is from 70 percent to 80 percent, corresponding to exponen-
tial slopes of about 0.3 to 0.5. Reliability screening tests may be expected
to reduce the subsequent learning rate by elimination some of the early
failures. The learning rate could be estimated at 70 percent (or 0.5 slope) if
all data are used, or about 80 percent (0.3 slope) if prescreened data are
censored from consideration.
The initial value of reliability may be estimated as the cumula-
tive MTBF when test time equals one-half the MTBF. The reliability may be
estimated at ten percent of the predicted MTBF if all data are included, or
as much as 25 percent of predicted MTBF with exclusion of the results of a
strong screening program.
Evaluation of support requirements by these methods can be a
valuable tool in equipment design tradeoff. Support cost drivers can be iso-
lated and subjected to reliability or maintainability improvement.
C. A SIMPLE NONANALYTIC MODEL
The following model is presented to add insight to the difficult task of
warranty pricing. It highlights many of the questions and points of interest
that must be examined when developing the warranty price. The model was
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developed by Dr. Harold Gault, Director of Estimating, for General Dynamics
Pomona Division [34]. The model is generated using an eight step process.
1. Step One—Product Warranty Scenario
The first key issue that needs to be understood is, what triggers
cost incidence under a warranty.
* What hardware is covered?
—line items, part numbers, components, subcomponents.
* When and where does coverage commence?
* How is a failure ascertained?
—test procedures, inspection methodology.
* How is a failure verified?
* How are repairs and corrective actions sold?
* How and when is the warranty obligation fulfilled?
2. Step Two— Product Warranty Task Statement
Each item must be customized or tailored for the specific pro-
duct. The warranty task statement must specify which party is responsible
for what task. The following tasks should be defined in the warranty.
* Transport of failed hardware
* Test hardware required to verify failure
* Determination of corrective action
* Repair of hardware and correct documentation
* Sell-off the repair/correction
* Transport repaired hardware
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* Maintain configuration accountability and marking
* Calibrate and maintain support equipment during warranty period
* Provide warranty administration
—logistics
—program management
—budgets and cost analysis
3. Step Three—Hardware Failure Rate/Documentation Deficiency
Experience reduces conjecture which makes pricing simpler. Ask for
advice from the customer; he may have better data.
* Develop historical average hardware failure rate
* Develop historical average documentation deficiency rate
Adjust for
* Reliability growth trends
* Current commitment parameters
* Confidence level
4. Step Four—Hardware and Documentation Cost/Correction
* Historical average cost per hardware repair
* Historical average cost per documentation correction
Adjust for
* Learning curve
* Current commitment parameters
* Economics
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5. Step Five—Summarize Quantity-Based vs. Time-Based Costs
* Quantity-based
—Hardware fixes x cost per fix
—Documentation corrections x cost per correction
—Items transported x cost per trip
* Time-based
—Configuration management
—Equipment calibration and maintenance
—Warranty administration
6. Step Six— Itemize Assumptions and Exclusions
* Assumptions (examples):
—Follow-on procurements
—Continued availability of tooling and test equipment
—Customer test program




—Contractor costs for processing non-defects
Exclusions may be subject to negotiation or equitable adjustment.
7. Step Seven—Determine Proposed Earnings
Risk is not the same for the basic production task as for the war-
ranty. There are two profit elements to evaluate, compensation for addi-
tional production tasks and reward for bearing additional risk.
* Proposed production contract earnings are a baseline but are not
determinative
* Examine warranty task cost breakdown and variability
* Consider limitation of financial liability approach
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8. Step Eight—Develop a Historical Data Base
Warranty administration is a major issue. Projectable cost exper-
ience depends on orderly and equitable warranty administration. Cost based
pricing projects cost experience. Nonconformance with design, manufac-




* Analysis through statistics and simulation
9. Conclusions
A good negotiated warranty at a fair and reasonable price depends on
not only the good faith of the parties, but also on their realism and innova-
tion. There is no rule in terms of dollar amount or percentage of contract
acquisition cost as to what price should be attached to the warranty. The
worth of a warranty should be measured in terms of reliability, maintain-
ability, and availability.
D. SUMMARY
The models presented in this chapter represent only a few of the avail-
able warranty pricing approaches. Clearly, no particular pricing algorithm
or nonanalytical model can provide the definitive price for each and every
warranty situation. Just as no two acquisition contracts are exactly alike,
no two warranties should be alike either. Similarities of warranty type can
be used to gain insight to pricing estimations, but incontestably each
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warranty will have built-in differences which will force alternate evalua-
tions into the pricing equation.
Warranty pricing is the responsibility of both the buyer and the seller.
With the passage of Section 794 of the Defense Appropriations Act of 1984,
the Government has indicated that the inclusion of warranties in weapons
systems acquisitions are absolutely required, and the Government is willing
to explicitly pay for them. It will be incumbent on all contractors as well
as Government Program Managers to learn how to evaluate warranties and
establish a fair price for such coverage since warranty price will become a
major section of the contract negotiation process.
The two Blischke and Scheuer models have direct application to the
standard commercial aviation warranty. These models would not be suitable
for use with the reliability improvement warranty or the mean time be-
tween failure warranty since the equations fail to take into account the
pricing benefits of improved reliability. The Thomas rebate model could be
applied to commercial aviation warranties and other such warranties like
the one used with the KC- 10 Tanker. This model should not be used with a
newly developed platform because it deals with high reliability items which
should automatically rule out reliability improvement warranties of any
sort. The Thomas prorated rebate model is very similar to the principle
presently applied to commercial aviation warranties. Examination of the
warranties in Appendices B, C, and D will reveal the prorated formulas used
by the commercial companies in their service life policies. The Barton
learning curve model seems appropriate to any type of warranty, but seems
especially suited to the reliability improvement and the mean time between
failure warranties. The success of this model is based on projecting
97
support costs through reliability improvement in production and repair.
Lastly, the nonanalytic model is presented for the purpose of directing dis-
cussion and aiding negotiation for each and every warranty used. The eight
step process represents a methodology by which to define each party's obli-
gations and responsibilities in a proposed warranty.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The first objective of this thesis was to examine types of warranties
being utilized in the commercial aviation marketplace and what the types of
warranties the Department of Defense has used during the aircraft procure-
ment process. The next objective was to determine the generic costs and
risks associated with the use of warranties. Finally, several pricing models
were studied to develop an understanding of some of the many facets of
warranty pricing.
The first conclusion drawn from the research is that one of the reasons
that standard commercial aviation warranties are considered to be so suc-
cessful is that they very specifically define the exact equipment covered,
how it is covered, and for how long. The warranty is designed to provide the
buyer with reasonable protection, yet very close examination of the warran-
ty shows a significant amount of language that specifically prevents any le-
gal access to any implied warranties as defined in the Uniform Commercial
Code. The commercial aviation industry also has the advantage of past his-
tory of failure rates and warranty incidents. That is not to say that intro-
duction of a new commercial aircraft model does not have a certain amount
of unknowns, but commercial market aircraft generally are of less radically
changed design and operate in a better defined environment than military
aircraft. Therefore it is this researchers conclusion that commercial war-
ranties appear to work well because of the ability to price them due to
known historical failure rate data, a well-defined operating environment,
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and the fact that these warranties are not designed as direct control mech-
anisms over product performance or improvement.
The second conclusion is that while there are many similarities between
commercial aircraft manufacturing and military aircraft manufacturing, re-
spective reliability requirements are not necessarily compatible. Direct
across-the-board application of commercial warranties to military aircraft
is not appropriate.
Thirdly, no one warranty type can be cost effective for every aircraft
procurement. Each transaction between buyer and seller will have some
degree of uniqueness and each warranty should be tailored to fit that trans-
action. Application of a single flat rate or other formula to every procure-
ment would not make the most efficient use of available funds nor would it
insure a good business deal.
The fourth conclusion is that cost and risk are not necessarily shared
equally between the Government and the contractor. Uniqueness of aircraft
type and mission will tend to increase contractor risk since a greater
amount of unknowns are entered into the contractor's cost/risk determin-
ation. Greater warranty coverage requirements represent higher risk ex-
posure to the contractor, which in turn will result in higher cost to the
Government either as a procurement price increase or a directly negotiated
line item.
Next, there is no standard pricing model that will work for every situa-
tion. Each warranty will need to be evaluated by both the buyer and the sel-
ler with the aim of identifying expected cost and anticipated risk so that a
fair and reasonable warranty price can be negotiated.
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Finally, the use of warranties is going to increase. Congress has man-
dated warranty use on all weapons systems acquisitions and if this warran-
ty application is successful, it could manifest even more widespread usage
on other defense' and government acquisitions.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The first recommendation is to attempt to reduce the adversarial rela-
tionship that often exists between the Government and the contractor. Open
discussion and communication are the key to warranty success as may be
seen in the relationship of the airlines and commercial aircraft manufac-
turers. Two things are prerequisite to a successful warranty negotiation.
First, the Government must ask for a realistic warranty, be willing to re-
cognize bonafide exclusions, and be willing to reward the contractor for
assuming risk. Second, the contractor has to recognize that warranty pric-
ing estimates must be made in good faith and be based on realistic expected
costs. Warranties must be fair and equitable to both parties.
It is this researchers recommendation that a warranty training program
be developed and implemented throughout the Department of Defense so that
warranties are not inadvertently voided due to inexperienced or unknowl-
edgeable actions. This program may entail significant costs, but when
weighed against the cost of an invalidated warranty, should prove a wise
expenditure in the long run. Training needs to be addressed for every person
who will work with the warranty.
Future weapon system acquisitions should be evaluated from two re-
lated aspects. The source selection should be based on not only the acquis-
ition price of the system, but also should be based on the cost or benefit of
the included warranty. An aircraft bid that is lower than the next
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competitor's, but has an Inadequate warranty included, is not a good busi-
ness deal and most certainly does not meet the intent or law of warranty
legislation. Contrarlly, a low aircraft bid accompanied by a high warranty
price may be reasonable, depending on the warranty specifications and the
amount of risk the contractor is being asked to assume.
The Department of Defense should develop a handbook or training manual
to assist contract personnel in evaluating warranty cost and price. Atten-
tion needs to be devoted to establishing methods that will identify key ele-
ments of warranty pricing.
Further study should be done to update and develop simpler algorithmic
pricing models. Unless the negotiator has detailed knowledge of integral
calculus and differential equations, most pricing models will be of very
limited value.
Contractors need to develop data bases of warranty incidents. Such
data bases can help to identify the warranty costs, which in turn, may be
used to project future warranty prices. Regression models should be exam-
ined for possible application to warranty pricing problems.
An enforcement board needs to be established to monitor compliance and
effectiveness with regard to warranty legislation. If the legislated war-
ranty laws do not achieve the intended weapon system reliability or main-
tainability, the Department of Defense needs to have the facts available to
readdress the pertinent issues with Congress. This board should be made up
of personnel of each branch of the armed forces so that no one particular
service is dominant and it should direct universal application of warranty
legislation.
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Finally, the Department of Defense and the commercial aircraft manu-
facturers need to develop a standard accounting system to allow proper




ARTICLE 7 - WARRANTT
(a) SCOPE OF WARRANTY
(1) Title
Lockheed warrants that the title to each Airplane when conveyed to
Buyer shall be good and its transfer rightful. Each Airplane shall
upon delivery be free from any security interest or other lien or
encumbrance except as expressly agreed upon by the parties.
(2) Specification Conformation
Lockheed warrants that each Airplane shall upon delivery conform to
the Specification with the exception of those portions which are
stated to be estimates, approximations, or design objectives or
which are stated not to be guaranteed by Lockheed.
(3) Design, Material and Workmanship
Lockheed warrants that each Airplane shall upon delivery be free
from defect in:
(i) design predicated on the state-of-the-art at the time of such
design;
(ii) material resulting from defects in (A) the composition or
substance of the material, (B) the process of its
manufacture, or (C) manufacturing workmanship;
(iii) workmanship; and
(iv) installation;
provided that such warranties shall apply only to items manufactured
by Lockheed or purchased by Lockheed and manufactured to Lockheed's
detail design.
(4) Installation of Purchased Parts
Lockheed's installation of any item purchased by Lockheed and not
manufactured to Lockheed's detail design shall conform to the
installation instructions of the manufacturer thereof so as not to
invalidate the manufacturer's warranty with respect to such item.
(5) Design Information
Detail design information supplied by Lockheed and furnished to
Buyer under tMs ARTICLE 7 for the purpose of repair, rework, or
replacement shall be free from defect.
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(6) Patent Infringement
Lockheed warrants to Buyer that no Airplane delivered under this
Contract shall infringe:
(i) any United States patent; or
(ii) any patent issued under the laws of any other country;
excluding any accessories, equipment, or parts not manufactured by




Buyer's remedy for a breach of the warranty set forth in paragraph
(a) (1) of this ARTICLE 7, and Lockheed's obligation and liability
therefor, shall be determined in accordance with California law.
Lockheed shall have a period of thirty (30) days from the notice of
the alleged breach to cure the defect by providing Buyer with good
title to such Airplane or to otherwise comply with said warranty.
(2) Correction of Defects
(i) Lockheed Correction -
Buyer's remedy for a breach of the warranties set forth in
paragraphs (a) (2), (3). CD and (5) of this ARTICLE 7, and
Lockheed's obligation and liability therefor, are expressly
limited to repair, rework, replacement or correction of any
nonconforming or defective accessory, equipment, or part, or
if the defect relates to design information, correction of
such information. Any repair, rework, replacement, or
correction of any nonconforming or defective accessory,
equipment, or part performed by Lockheed pursuant to this
ARTICLE 7 shall be promptly completed. In the event that
repair, rework, replacement, or correction of a nonconforming
or defective accessory, item of equipment, or part is
infeasible by reason of the loss, damage, or destruction of
the entire Airplane as a result of the nonconformance or
defect, Lockheed's sole obligation and liability shall be to
pay the Buyer the reasonable cost of repair, rework,
replacement, or correction of such accessory, item of
equipment, or part as if it had been performed by Lockheed.
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(ii) Buyer Correction -
As an alternate to the performance of the work by Lockheed
under paragraph (b) (2) (1), Lockheed will, under the
conditions set forth below, recognize the performance of the
repair, rework or correction of nonconforming or defective
items under paragraphs (a) (2), (3) and (4) at Buyer's base
repair shops. Lockheed's estimate of the direct manhours
reasonable for performance of such repair, rework, or
correction, will be the basis for payment or credit to Buyer.
The sua of such direct manhours will be multiplied by the
Buyer's then current direct labor rate to establish the
amount of reimbursement. In the event Lockheed's estimate of
such direct manhours is substantially less than Buyer's, the
manhours to be used for computation shall be fixed by
agreement between Lockheed and Buyer. Lockheed's estimate of
such direct manhours shall Include the time required for
removal, disassembly, reassembly, and reinstallation;
however, Buyer shall be compensated for such costs only if
the corrective action on the nonconforming or defective item
is performed at Buyer's base repair shops.
(iii) Third Party Correction -
Notwithstanding the above, Lockheed agrees that Buyer may
utilize the services of a third party for removal of
nonconforming or defective items and reinstallation of
conforming or nondefective items subject to the following
conditions:
(A) such third party must be acceptable to Lockheed;
(B) the work is performed by the third party in accordance
with Lockheed's approved maintenance procedures; and
(C) Lockheed's responsibility for reimbursement to Buyer for
work performed by the third party will be limited to the
amount of reimbursement Lockheed would have paid Buyer
had Buyer performed the removal and reinstallation
pursuant to paragraph (b) (2) (ii).
(iv) Conditions -
The following conditions apply to work performed by Buyer or
third party:
(A) notification and proof of the defect as stipulated in
paragraphs (c) and (e) hereof shall have been provided;
(B) the work is performed in the manner and to the extent
specified by Lockheed;
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(C) the work is of such nature as practically and feasibly
permits performance of the work at Buyer's base repair
shops or at a third party's facilities; it being further
understood that Lockheed shall be liable for any costs
for the performance of such repair, rework, or
correction only if the nonconformance or defect is
determined to be embraced within Lockheed's warranty;
(D) workmanship, materials and installation furnished by
Buyer or a third party are not warranted by Lockheed;
(E) Lockheed will furnish parts or replacement components,
if required, and such information and data as may be
required for installation; Lockheed shall have no
liability to make payment or to give credit under
paragraph (b) (2) (ii) and (b) (2) (lii) unless the work
shall have been performed within ninety (90) days after
the date of delivery of the parts or component
replacements to Buyer or its designated third party, or
such longer period as may be agreed upon;
(F) disposition of replaced items shall be as directed by
Lockheed and Lockheed shall be entitled to the benefit
of any salvage; and
(G) pending the determination of whether any warranty
liability exists, Lockheed's representative located at
Buyer's principal base repair shop shall have the
authority to determine on behalf of Lockheed whether the
repair, rework, or correction of nonconforming or
defective items can be performed by Buyer pursuant to
paragraph (b) (2) (ii) or paragraph (b) (2) (lii).
(3) Patent Infringement
(i) Buyer's Remedy -
Buyer's remedy and Lockheed's liability under paragraph (a)
(6) above shall be limited to:
(A) one hundred percent (1002) of all loss, cost, or damage
(exclusive of loss of revenue or profit, or cost or
damage resulting from loss of use) from infringement of
any patent issued under the laws of the United States of
America or any other country bound by and entitled to
the benefits of Article 27 of the Chicago Convention on
International Civil Aviation of December 7, 1944; and
(B) fifty percent (501) of such loss, cost, or damage from
infringement of the patent of any country not included
within subparagraph (A) above in which Buyer is lawfully




Buyer's remedy and Lockheed's obligations under this patent
infringement warranty are conditioned upon Buyer:
(A) furnishing to Lockheed written notice within ten (10)
days after notice to Buyer of a suit against Buyer
alleging infringement, or within thirty (30) days after
receipt by Buyer of a written claim of infringement, and
promptly furnishing to Lockheed all pertinent data,
papers, records, and assistance within Buyer's control;
(B) making diligent efforts to minimize (other than by
nonuse) the loss, cost, or damage for which Lockheed is
obligated hereunder and obtaining Lockheed's approval
for payment of any claim (except final judgment); and
(C) authorizing Lockheed to intervene in or control the
defense of any related suit and to negotiate, settle, or
compromise such claim or suit; provided that, at the
request of Buyer, Lockheed will assume and undertake the
conduct and control of any such suit where it is
practicable to do so.
..- (c) WARRANTY PERIODS
Lockheed shall have no obligation or liability under this ARTICLE 7
unless it shall have received written notice of an alleged failure to
comply with the provisions of paragraph (a) within ninety (90) days after
discovery of such failure. In any event, Lockheed's liability under this





With regard to conformance with the Specification under paragraph
(a) (2) above, thirty (30) days following the expiration of eighteen
(18) months from delivery of each Airplane.
(2) Design. Material, and Workmanship
(i) With regard to defects in design under paragraph (a) (3) (i)
thirty (30) days following the expiration of eighteen (18)
months from delivery of each Airplane.
(ii) With regard to defects in design information under paragraph
(a) (5), thirty (30) days following the expiration of one (1)
year after delivery of the information to Buyer.
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(ill) With regard to defects in material and workmanship under
paragraph (a) (3) (ii) and (iii), thirty (30) days following
the expiration of two (2) years from delivery of each
Airplane; provided, however, that for accessories, equipment
or parts not normally Inspected within two (2) years, such
period shall be thirty (30) days after such inspection or
three (3) years after delivery of the Airplane, whichever is
earlier.
(3) Installation
With regard to defects in installation under paragraph (a) (3) (iv)
and (a) (4), thirty (30) days following the expiration of two (2)
years from delivery of each Airplane.
(4) Repaired or Replaced Items
With regard to defects in repaired, reworked, corrected, or replaced
accessories, equipment, or parts, thirty (30) days following the
expiration of one (1) year from delivery of the repaired, reworked,
corrected, or replacement accessory, equipment or part, or for the
remainder of period applicable to its original installation in the
Airplane as set forth in paragraph (c) (2) or (3) above, whichever
expires later.
(d) PURCHASED PARTS
• Lockheed has made reasonable efforts to obtain, for the benefit of Buyer,
reasonably adequate agreements of indemnification against patent
infringement and warranties from the manufacturers of accessories,
equipment, or parts purchased by Lockheed and not manufactured to
Lockheed's detail design. In the event of any claim asserted by Buyer
against any such manufacturer under any such agreement of indemnification
against patent infringement or warranty, Lockheed will, at the request of
Buyer, take all reasonable action in support of Buyer's claim. Except as
to engines, in the event of a default in a warranty obligation assumed by
the manufacturer of any item purchased by Lockheed and not manufactured
to Lockheed's detail design, with respect to such item, then Lockheed's
warranty set forth in paragraph (a) (3) of this ARTICLE 7 shall apply to
such item to the same extent as if such item had been manufactured by
Lockheed or to its detail design; provided, that if the warranty period
available to Buyer under such a manufacturer's warranty is less than the
applicable warranty period under this ARTICLE 7, the lesser period shall
apply and, provided further, that any rights which Buyer may have against
the manufacturer arising from such default shall, at the request of
Lockheed, be assigned to Lockheed by Buyer. In the event of a default by
the manufacturer of any item purchased by Lockheed and not manufactured
to Lockheed's detail design with respect to an indemnification against
patent infringement, Lockheed's warranty set forth in paragraph (a) (6)
of this AflTICLE 7 shall apply to the same extent as if said item had been
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rmanufactured by Lockheed or to Lockheed's detail design; provided that
the conditions set forth in paragraph (b) (3) (ii) of this ARTICLE 7 are
satisfied by Buyer. Lockheed will furnish to Buyer, at least thirty (30)
days prior to the delivery of the first Airplane, summaries of all such
agreements of indemnification against patent infringement and warranties
which Lockheed has obtained from such manufacturers.
(e) CONDITIONS
Buyer's remedy and Lockheed's obligation and liability therefor under
paragraphs (a) (2), (3) , (*0 and (5) of this ARTICLE 7 are expressly
conditioned upon:
(1 ) Proof of Nonconformance or Defect
Buyer shall submit such proof as may reasonably be required by
Lockheed that the asserted nonconformance or defect is due to a
matter embraced within said warranty and that it did not result from
acts or omissions of Buyer.
(2) Return of Airplane to Lockheed
Lockheed will remove nonconforming or defective items from and
install similar conforming or nondefective items in an Airplane;
provided Buyer shall have returned such Airplane to Lockheed at
Palmdale, California, (or such other reasonable place designated by
Lockheed) prior to the expiration of the warranty period set forth
in paragraph (c) hereof and have further complied with the
obligations set forth in paragraph (c) and this paragraph (e).
Buyer shall be responsible for and shall bear all costs associated
with the delivery of such Airplane to Lockheed and the return
thereof to Buyer. Lockheed's responsibility for the Airplane while
it is in Lockheed's possession shall be that of a bailee for hire,
and Lockheed shall not be chargeable for loss of use while the
Airplane is returned under this provision.
(3) Return of Accessories. Equipment and Parts to Lockheed
Buyer shall deliver to Lockheed at Burbank, California, or at such
other place as may be agreed to by Buyer and Lockheed, of any
nonconforming or defective accessories, equipment, or parts upon
Lockheed's acknowledgment that such alleged nonconformance or defect
would be covered by paragraph (a) of this ARTICLE 7, it being agreed
that on Lockheed's acknowledgment that such nonconformance or defect
is due to a matter embraced within said paragraph (a), Lockheed will
pay or credit Buyer the cost of transportation of such item to
Lockheed , and Lockheed will bear the cost of transportation of any
repaired, reworked or replacement item to Buyer at the place of
original shipment by Buyer; provided that Buyer agrees that whenever
practical it shall use its own aircraft for any such transportation,




(1) Wear and Tear
Normal wear and tear and the need for regular maintenance and
overhaul shall not constitute a defect under this warranty.
(2) Disclaimer and Release
LOCKHEED'S WARRANTIES AS SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH (a) HEREOF ARE
EXCLUSIVE, ARE IN LIEU OF, AND BUYER HEREBY WAIVES, ALL OTHER
WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY
IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR OF FITNESS.
The obligations and liabilities undertaken in this ARTICLE 7 are
expressly agreed to be the sole obligations and liabilities of
Lockheed in the event of a breach of the express warranties made by
Lockheed in paragraph (a) hereof. Buyer waives, releases, and
renounces all other rights, claims, and remedies against Lockheed
under this ARTICLE 7 (including without limitation those with
respect to loss of use or other secondary or consequential damage)
,
however occasioned, and whether or not growing out of or based on
Lockheed's negligence, actual or imputed.
(3) Negotiated Agreement
Lockheed and Buyer agree that this ARTICLE 7 has been the subject of
discussion and negotiation and is fully understood by the parties;
that the price of the Airplanes and the other mutual agreements of
the parties set forth in this Contract are arrived at in
consideration of (a) the express warranties of Lockheed and Buyer's
remedies for breach thereof, and (b) the exclusion of and waiver by
Buyer, of all other warranties, express or implied, and the
limitations on remedies. This ARTICLE 7 sets forth the entire
agreement of the parties with respect to warranties and the remedy
for their breach, and the same may not be modified or amended except







Subject to the exceptions set forth in paragraph 2, Boeing
warrants that, at the time of delivery, the Aircraft
(including all accessories, equipment and parts installed
therein) shall:
(a) conform to the Detail Specification, as it may be
changed pursuant to this Agreement, except such
portions of the Detail Specification as are stated to
be estimates, approximations, design objectives,
design criteria or otherwise described as not
guaranteed,
(b) be free from defects in material and workmanship, and
(c) be free from defects in design in view of the
state-of-the-art at the time of design.
2. Exceptions .
The warranties set forth in paragraphs 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c)
shall not apply to Buyer Furnished Equipment, nor to
Engines (as defined in Exhibit(s) D to this Agreement),
nor to any accessory, equipment or part purchased by
Boeing that was not manufactured to Boeing's detailed
design, except that any defect in the Boeing workmanship
incorporated in the installation of such items in the
Aircraft, including any failure by Boeing to conform to
the installation instructions of the manufacturers of such
items that invalidates any applicable warranty from such
manufacturers, shall constitute a defect in workmanship
for the purposes of this Part A and be covered by the
warranty set forth in paragraph 1(b).
3. Survival of Warranties .
With respect to each Aircraft (including accessories,
equipment and parts installed' therein at the time of
delivery), (i) the warranty set -forth in paragraph 1(a)
shall not survive delivery, and (ii) the warranties set
forth in paragraphs 1(b) and 1(c) shall survive delivery
only upon the conditions and subject to the limitations
set forth in paragraphs 4 through 11 of this Part A.
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4. Warranty and Notice Periods .
Buyer's remedy and Boeing's obligation and liability under
this Part A,' with respect to each defect, are conditioned
upon (i) the defect having become apparent to Buyer within
the applicable warranty period, and (ii) Boeing's Warranty
Administrator at Renton, Washington, having received
written notice of the defect from Buyer within 3 months
after the defect becomes apparent to Buyer. The warranty
periods are:
(a) As to a defect in material or workmanship, 24
months after delivery of the defective Aircraft,
accessory, equipment or part. However, in case of
a defect in material or workmanship in an
accessory, equipment or part which was installed in
an Aircraft at the time of delivery and which has
not been inspected by Buyer under Buyer's approved
maintenance program prior to the expiration of the
above period, the warranty period- as to such defect
shall be extended to the first to occur of the
following
:
(i) completion of the first inspection
applicable to such item under Buyer's
approved maintenance program following
expiration of the above period, or
(ii) expiration of 36 months after delivery of
such Aircraft.
(b) As to a defect in design, 18 months after delivery of
the defective Aircraft, accessory, equipment or part.
5
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Return and Proof .
Buyer's remedy and Boeing's obligation and liability under
this Part A, with respect to each defect, are also
conditioned upon:
(a) the return by Buyer as soon as practicable to Boeing
at Boeing's facilities in the Seattle, Washington
area, or such other place as may be mutually
agreeable, of the Aircraft, accessory, equipment or
part claimed to be defective, except when (i) Buyer
elects to perform necessary repair or correction of
defective accessories, equipment or parts in
accordance with the provisions of Part B (Warranty
Repairs and Modifications by Buyer) of this Product
Assurance Document, or (ii) Buyer elects to scrap
non-repairable defective items at Buyer's facilities
in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Part A, and
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(b) the submission by Buyer to Boeing's Warranty
Administrator at Renton, Washington, of reasonable
proof that the claimed defect is due to a matter
embraced within the warranty set forth in paragraph
1(b) or 1(c) and that such defect did not result from
any act or omission of Buyer, including but not
limited to any failure to operate and maintain the
Aircraft, accessory, equipment or part involved in
accordance with applicable governmental regulations
and Boeing's applicable written instructions.
6. Remedies .
Buyer's remedy and Boeing's obligation and liability under
this Part A, with respect to each defect, are limited to
the following:
(a) As to a defect in material or workmanship,
(i) to the repair of such defect in the accessory,
equipment or part in which the defect appears,
or, at Boeing's option, to the replacement of
such accessory, equipment or part with a
similar item free from defect, and
(ii) as to any item repaired by Boeing or furnished
as a replacement by Boeing pursuant to (i), to
the repair or replacement of such item for any
further defect in material or workmanship,
provided
:
(1) such further defect becomes apparent to
Buyer within any unexpired remainder of
the warranty period specified in
paragraph 4(a) computed from the initial
delivery of the item repaired or replaced
pursuant to (i), and
(2) Boeing's Warranty Administrator at
Renton, Washington, receives written
notice of such further defect from Buyer
within 3 months after it becomes apparent
to Buyer.
(b) As to a defect in design,
(i) to the correction of such defect in the
accessory, equipment or part in which the
defect appears, and
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(ii) as to any item corrected by Boeing pursuant to
(i), to the correction of any further defect
in design in such item, provided:
(1) such further defect becomes apparent to
Buyer within 18 months after delivery of
the corrected item or materials required
to correct such item, and
(2) Boeing's Warranty Administrator at
Renton, Washington, receives written
notice of such further defect from Buyer
within 3 months after it becomes apparent
to Buyer.
7. Returned Items .
The following provisions shall apply with respect to each
Aircraft, accessory, equipment or part returned to
Boeing's facilities pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Part
A, or to such other place as may be mutually agreeable:
(a) All repairs, replacements and corrections described
in paragraphs 6(a) and 6(b) shall be performed by or
for Boeing at Boeing's expense with reasonable care
and dispatch in order that the Aircraft, accessory,
equipment or part involved will not be kept out of
service longer than necessary.
(b) The freight charge for shipment from Buyer to Boeing,
or to such other place as may be mutually agreeable,
of any accessory, equipment or part claimed to be
defective shall be paid by Buyer. The freight charge
for the return shipment to Buyer of any accessory,
equipment or part which has been repaired, replaced
or corrected pursuant to this Part A shall be paid by
Boeing. Return of any Aircraft by Buyer to Boeing
and such Aircraft's return to Buyer's facilities
shall be at Buyer's expense.
(c) Title to and risk of loss of any Aircraft, accessory,
equipment or part returned by Buyer to Boeing shall
at all times remain with Buyer, except title to and
risk of loss of a returned accessory, equipment or
part shall pass to Boeing concurrently with shipment
by Boeing to Buyer of any item furnished by Boeing to
Buyer as a replacement therefor. Upon Boeing's
shipment to Buyer of any replacement accessory,
equipment or part provided by Boeing pursuant to this
Part A, title to and risk of loss of such accessory,
equipment or part shall pass to Buyer. (Under this
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paragraph 7(c), the party which has risk of loss with
respect to any Aircraft, accessory, equipment or part
shall have the responsibility of providing any
insurance coverage thereon desired by such party.)
Boeing shall have only such responsibility for any
returned Aircraft, and for any returned accessory,
equipment or part so long as Buyer has title thereto,
as is chargeable by law to a bailee for hire, but
shall not be chargeable for loss of use.
8. Non-Repairable Items .
Buyer may scrap any defective non-repairable accessory,
equipment or part at Buyer's facility, provided that an
authorized Boeing Customer Support Representative has
confirmed such item is non-repairable. Buyer's claim for
any accessory, equipment or part to replace such scrapped
item shall contain the stamp and signature of Boeing's
Customer Support Representative. Such scrapped item shall
be processed by Buyer in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 6 of Part B of this Product Assurance Document.
9. Wear and Tear .
Normal wear and tear and the need for regular maintenance
and overhaul shall not constitute a defect under this
warranty.
10. DISCLAIMER AND RELEASE .
THE WARRANTIES, OBLIGATIONS AND LIABILITIES OF BOEING AND
REMEDIES OF BUYER SET FORTH IN THIS PART A ARE EXCLUSIVE
AND IN SUBSTITUTION FOR, AND BUYER HEREBY WAIVES, RELEASES
AND RENOUNCES ALL OTHER WARRANTIES, OBLIGATIONS AND
LIABILITIES OF BOEING AND ANY ASSIGNEE OF BOEING AND
RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND REMEDIES OF BUYER AGAINST BOEING OR ANY
ASSIGNEE OF BOEING, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARISING BY LAW OR
OTHERWISE, WITH RESPECT TO ANY NONCONFORMANCE OR DEFECT IN
ANY AIRCRAFT OR OTHER THING DELIVERED UNDER THIS
AGREEMENT, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO (A) ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS, (B) ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTY ARISING FROM COURSE OF PERFORMANCE, COURSE OF
DEALING OR USAGE OF TRADE, (C) ANY OBLIGATION, 'LIABILITY,
RIGHT, CLAIM OR REMEDY IN TORT, WHETHER OR NOT ARISING
FROM THE NEGLIGENCE OF BOEING OR ANY ASSIGNEE OF BOEING,
ACTUAL OR IMPUTED, AND (D) ANY OBLIGATION, LIABILITY,
RIGHT, CLAIM OR REMEDY FOR LOSS OF -OR DAMAGE TO ANY
AIRCRAFT, FOR LOSS OF USE, REVENUE OR PROFIT WITH RESPECT
TO ANY AIRCRAFT, OR FOR ANY OTHER DIRECT, INCIDENTAL OR
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES.
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11. Negotiated Agreement .
Buyer and Boeing agree that this Part A has been the
subject of discussion and negotiation and is fully
understood by the parties, and that the price of the
Aircraft and the other mutual agreements of the parties
set forth in this Agreement were arrived at in
consideration of the provisions of this Part A,
specifically including the waiver, release and
renunciation by Buyer set forth in paragraph 10.
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PART B
WARRANTY REPAIRS AND MODIFICATIONS BY BUYER
General .
To expedite the return to service of defective
accessories, equipment and parts that Boeing is obligated
to repair or correct under Part A (Boeing Warranty) of
this Product Assurance Document, Boeing and Buyer agree
that such repairs and corrections may, at Buyer's option,
be performed by Buyer, subject, however, to the provisions
of this Part B.
2. Scope.
This Part shall apply only to accessories, equipment and
parts manufactured to Boeing's detailed design. This Part
is further limited to such repairs and corrections as
Boeing would otherwise be obligated to perform under
paragraph 6(a) or 6(b) of Part A of this Product Assurance
Document, and is subject to the warranty and notice
periods and all other conditions and limitations set forth
in such Part A, except that defective items need not be
returned to Boeing.
Repairs and Modifications .
All repairs and modifications shall be performed in
accordance with Boeing's applicable written instructions,
using such modification kits and other parts and materials
as may be furnished by Boeing.
Reimbursement .
Upon receipt of Buyer's claim for reimbursement, in
accordance with paragraph 5, with respect to any repair or
modification within the scope of this Part B, Boeing shall
reimburse Buyer as follows:
(a) Direct Labor .
At the warranty labor rate specified in paragraph
4(c) for all direct labor hours reasonably expended
by Buyer's direct labor employees in performing the
repair or modification, but not to exceed Boeing's
reasonable estimate of the manhours required for the
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performance thereof by Buyer including, with respect
to modifications accomplished in accordance with
Boeing's service bulletin instructions, disassembly,
removal, installation and reassembly, but excluding
time for testing and excluding, with respect to
component repairs normally covered under the material
and workmanship provisions of Part. A of this Product
Assurance Document, removal, installation, testing
and overhaul time.
(b) Direct Materials .
At the invoice cost thereof to Buyer, excluding any
allowances for handling, overhead or the like, for
all direct materials incorporated in the repair or
modification, excluding any materials used for
overhaul, and also excluding such modification kits,
parts and materials as may be furnished by Boeing at
no charge.
(c) Warranty Labor Rate .
For the purposes of this Part B, the warranty labor
rate shall be $+ per hour or 150% of Buyer's
average direct hourly labor rate, whichever is
greater. For this purpose, "average direct hourly
labor rate" means the average hourly rate (excluding
all fringe benefits, premium time allowances, social
charges, business taxes and the like) paid to Buyer's
employees whose jobs are directly related to the
performance of the repair or modification. Prior to
or concurrent with submittal of Buyer's first claim
for labor reimbursement hereunder, Buyer shall notify
Boeing of Buyer's then-current average direct hourly
labor rate, and thereafter Buyer shall promptly
notify Boeing of any material change in such rate.
If requested, Buyer shall furnish to Boeing such data
as may be reasonably required to substantiate such
rate.
(d) Limitation .
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the total
reimbursement with respect to any repair or
modification shall not exceed 65% of Boeing's then




Claims for Reimbursement .
Unless otherwise agreed in writing, Buyer's claim for
reimbursement with respect to any repair or modification
must be submitted in writing to Boeing's Warranty
Administrator at Renton, Washington, promptly after
completion of the repair or modification. All claims for
reimbursement shall include the following:
(a) The identity of the accessory, equipment or part
involved, including Boeing part number, serial
number, nomenclature and the quantity claimed to be
defective.
(b) The identity of the Aircraft from which each
accessory, equipment or part was removed.
(c) Date the claimed defect became apparent to Buyer.
(d) Description of the claimed defect and circumstances.
(e) Date repair or modification completed by Buyer.
(f) Itemized account of the direct labor hours expended
in performing the repair or modification.
(g) Itemized account of the direct materials incorporated
in the repair or modification.
All claims for reimbursement shall be subject to audit by
Boeing. Boeing shall promptly notify Buyer of Boeing's
disposition of each claim submitted hereunder.
6 Replaced Parts .
In the event component parts of any assembly are replaced
by Buyer, the replaced parts shall be tagged with the
assembly part number, serial number and warranty claim
number and retained for a period of 60 days after
submission of Buyer's claim for reimbursement. Such parts
shall be made available for Boeing's inspection, upon
request, in the event further analysis is required. Such
parts may be scrapped if no inspection is requested by
Boeing within such 60-day period.
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PART C
BOEING SERVICE LIFE POLICY
[ Models 727/737/747SR ]
This Part C defines Boeing's Service Life Policy ("Policy" herein)
applicable to the Aircraft.
1. Service Life Policy .
Should a Failure occur in any Covered Component within the
following periods:
(a) as to any Airframe Component or Landing Gear Component,
within 10 years after delivery of the Aircraft on which
such Component was initially installed; or
(b) as to any Spare Component, within 10 years after
delivery of such Component, or within 10 years after
delivery by Boeing of the last new Model /111/ /1 31/
/747SR/ aircraft to Buyer, whichever first expires,
Boeing shall, at the price provided herein and as promptly as
practicable, either (i) design and furnish to Buyer a
correction for such Failed Component, including any parts
required for such correction (including Boeing designed
standard parts but excluding Industry standard parts such as
MS and NAS standards), or (ii) furnish to Buyer a replacement
Covered Component for such Failed Component.
2. Definitions .
For the purpose of this Policy, the following definitions
shall apply:
(a) "Airframe Component" means any of the primary structural
elements specified in Exhibit A attached hereto of the
wing, fuselage, or vertical or horizontal tail installed
in an Aircraft at the time of delivery.
(b) "Landing Gear Component" means any of the primary
structural elements specified in Exhibit 3 attached
hereto of the landing gear installed in an Aircraft at
the time of delivery.
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(c) "Spare Component" means any airframe element specified
in Exhibit A or landing gear element specified in
Exhibit B that was furnished to Buyer by Boeing as a
correction or replacement under this Policy or that was
purchased by Buyer from Boeing as a spare part.
(d) "Covered Component" means an Airframe Component, Landing
Gear Component or Spare Component.
(e) "Failure" means any breakage or defect in a Covered
Component.
(f) "Failed Component" means a Covered Component in which a
Failure has occurred.
3. Price.
Any Covered Component or part that Boeing is required to
furnish to Buyer under this Policy in connection with
correction or replacement of a Failed Component shall be




P = Price to Buyer.
C = The Boeing then-current spare parts sales price.
T = The total age in months (to the nearest month) of the
Failed Component from the date of delivery of the Failed
Component to the date of the correction or replacement.
4. Conditions and Limitations .
(a) Buyer shall, at Boeing's expense, return to Boeing, if
return is practicable, any Failed Component that Boeing
desires for redesigning studies.
(b) Installation of any Covered Component corrections or
replacements furnished by Boeing under this Policy shall
be at Buyer's expense. If installation of such
corrections or replacements is performed by Boeing at
Buyer's request, the rates charged Buyer for such
installation shall not exceed the rates charged other
commercial customers of Boeing during substantially the
same time period.
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(c) Boeing's obligation under this Policy, with respect to
each Failure, is conditioned upon
(i) Boeing's Warranty Administrator at Ren.ton,
Washington, having received written notice of the
Failure from Buyer within 3 months after it
became apparent to Buyer;
(ii) the Failed Component and the aircraft in which it
was at any time installed having been serviced
and maintained on a scheduled basis in accordance
with recognized standards for scheduled air
passenger carriers subject to regulation by the
Federal Aviation Administration; and
(iii) the submission by Buyer to Boeing of reasonable
proof that the Failure in any Covered Component
is embraced within the scope of this Policy and
that such Failure did not result as a consequence
of any breakage or defect in any other Aircraft
part or component or from any other extrinsic
force, or from any act or omission of Buyer,
including but not limited to any failure to
operate and maintain an Aircraft in accordance
with applicable governmental regulations and
Boeing's applicable service bulletins,
maintenance manuals, overhaul manuals, and
written instructions.
(d) Nothing in this Policy shall be construed as a warranty
or representation as to the time an Aircraft or any
Covered Component will operate without a Failure, or as
an agreement to modify the Aircraft or any Covered
Component to conform to new developments in the state of
design or manufacturing art. Boeing's sole obligation
hereunder is to furnish corrections or replacements for
Failed Components as provided in this Policy. Buyer's
sole remedy and relief for the nonperformance of any
! obligation or liability of Boeing arising under or by
|
virtue of this Policy shall be in monetary damages,
' limited to the amount Buyer reasonably expends in
procuring a correction or replacement for any Covered
Component which is the subject of a Failure covered by
this Policy and to which such nonperformance relates.
Buyer hereby waives, releases and renounces all other
obligations and liabilities of Boeing, or any assignee
of Boeing, and all other rights, remedies and claims,
including all claims for damages, direct, incidental or
consequential, of Buyer against Boeing, or any assignee
of Boeing, express or implied, arising by law or
otherwise, with respect to matters arising under or by
virtue of this Policy.
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[ 727 ] Exhibit A to
Part C
Body (Continued)
(e) Main gear wheel wells, ceiling and bulkheads.
(f) Floor beams in the control cab and passenger cabin
area, excluding seat tracks in both areas.
(g) Pressure bulkhead at Station 1183 and the pressure
bulkhead at Station 178.
(h) Keel beam and breather web between FS bulkhead and
B.S. 950, including splices.
(i) Bulkheads at Stations 178, 259, 294, 351, wing front
and rear spar support bulkheads, 950, 1183 and 1343
excluding all system components and related
installation and connecting devices, insulation,
lining, and decorative panels and related
installation and connecting devices.
(j) Engine strut support fittings attached directly to
body bulkhead.
Vertical Tail
(a) Front and rear stabilizer attachment fittings and
pins.
(b) Stabilizer jack screw support fitting.
(c) Stabilizer hinge support fittings at Station 1343,
but not including the bearing.
(d) External skins between front and rear spars.
(e) Front and rear spar chords, webs and stiffeners.
(f) Inspar ribs.
(g) Support structure in the vertical fin for rudder
hinges and actuators.
(h) Rudder internal, fixed attachment and actuator
support structure.
Horizontal Tail
(a) External skins between front and rear spars.








(d) Stabilizer hinge support structure.
(e) Stabilizer screw support, structure.
(f) Stabilizer center section and fittings splicing to
outboard stabilizer.
(g) Support structure in the horizontal tail for the
elevator hinges, reaction links and actuators.
(h) Elevator internal, fixed attachment and actuator
support structure.
NOTE: The Service Life Policy does not cover any bearings,
bolts, bushings, clamps, brackets, actuating mechanisms


















(c) Orifice support tube.
NOTE: The Service Life Policy does not cover any bearings,
bolts, bushings, clamps, brackets, actuating mechanisms










(a) Upper and lower wing skins and stiffeners.
(b) Wing spar webs, chords and stiffeners.
(c) Inspar wing ribs.
(d) Inspar splice plates and fittings.




Wing center section floor beams, lower beams and
spanwise beams, but not the seat tracks attached to
floor beams.
(g) Front and rear spar wing-to-body attach fittings and
pins.
(h) Support structure in the wing for spoilers and
spoiler actuators, aileron hinges and reaction
links, and for leading and trailing edge flaps.
(i) Trailing edge flap tracks and carriages.
(j) Aileron and trailing edge flap internal, fixed
attachment and actuator support structure.
(a) External surface skins and doublers, longitudinal
stiffeners, circumferential rings and frames,
between Body Stations 178 and 1342, excluding all
system components and related installation and
connecting devices, insulation, lining, and
decorative panels and related installation and
connecting devices.
(b) Window and windshield structure but excluding the
windows and windshields.
(c) Sills and frames around body openings for the entry,
galley and cargo doors and the escape hatches.
(d) Nose wheel well structure, including the wheel well




SUPPLIER WARRANTIES AND PATENT INDEMNITIES
1
.
Supplier Warranties and Supplier Patent Indemnities .
Boeing shall use diligent efforts to obtain from
manufacturers of accessories, equipment and parts
installed in the Aircraft at the time of delivery that
were purchased by Boeing but were not manufactured to
Boeing's detailed design (other than Engines, as defined
in Exhibit(s) D to this Agreement), adequate warranties
and indemnities against patent infringement enforceable by
Buyer (Supplier Warranties). Boeing shall furnish copies
/of the Supplier Warranties to Buyer prior to delivery of
'the first Aircraft. (The commitments of the Engine
manufacturer regarding warranties and indemnities against
patent infringement shall be as set forth in Part F of
this Product Assurance Document.)
2 Boeing Assistance in Administration of Supplier
Warranties .
In the event Buyer experiences any problem in the
administration of any claims Buyer may have initiated
under the Supplier Warranties obtained by Boeing pursuant
to paragraph 1, and Buyer submits to Boeing's Warranty
Administrator at Renton, Washington, such information and
data in its possession as may be reasonably required by
Boeing to investigate any such problem, then Boeing shall
promptly conduct an investigation of such problem and
shall assist Buyer in the administration of any claims
Buyer may have under such Supplier Warranties.
3 Boeing Support in Event of Supplier Default .
In the event that:
(a) any manufacturer, under any Supplier Warranty
obtained by Boeing pursuant to paragraph 1, defaults
in the performance of any material obligation
contained in such Supplier Warranty with respect to a
defect in material or workmanship or a defect in
design in any accessory, equipment. or part installed
in the Aircraft at the time of delivery, and
(b) Buyer submits to Boeing's Warranty Administrator at
Renton, Washington, reasonable proof that such
default has occurred,
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then the warranty set forth in paragraph 1(b) and 1(c), as
the case may be, of Part A (Boeing Warranty) of this
Product Assurance Document, and paragraphs 3 through 11 of
such Part A, shall apply to such defect_to _the___same_extent
as if s_uch __accessory , equ ipme n t
.
jP r part had b e e
n
manu fc t ur ed .to_ Boeinq-ls-_d.etailed design, except th a t
:
(i) the warranty period with respect to such
accessory, equipment or part shall be the
longer of the applicable period set forth in
such Supplier Warranty, if a warranty period
is expressly set forth therein, or the
applicable period set forth in paragraph 4 of
Part A of this Product Assurance Document,
(ii) the notice period set forth in paragraph 4 of
Part A shall be 3 months after the occurrence
of such default.
At Boeing's request, Buyer shall assign to Boeing, and
Boeing shall be subrogated to, any of Buyer's rights
against such manufacturer as Boeing may reasonably require
in the fulfillment of its obligations hereunder.
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[ 3D and 9D-7A ]
PART F
• ENGINE MANUFACTURER'S WARRANTY
[JT3D/JT9D-7A ]
Boeing has obtained from United Technologies Corporation
("United") the right to extend to Buyer the provisions of
United's standard sales warranty subject, however, to Buyer's
acceptance of the conditions set forth in such warranty".
Accordingly, Boeing hereby extends to Buyer, and Buyer hereby
accepts, the provisions of United's sales warranty hereinafter
set forth and such warranty shall apply to turbine engines
installed in the Aircraft at the time of delivery; provided
that Buyer may, by notice given to Boeing and United, prior to
delivery of the Aircraft, elect to substitute for such sales
warranty any corresponding warranty included either in a
General Terms Agreement currently effective between Buyer and
United or in a contract fojr the sale by United to Buyer of
turbine engines. In consideration for such extension, Buyer
hereby releases and discharges Boeing and United from any and
all claims, obligations and liabilities whatsoever arising out
of the purchase or use of said installed turbine engines except
as expressly assumed by United in such warranty.
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION
WARRANTIES, REMEDIES AND LIMITATIONS
1. Defective Goods .
United Technologies Corporation, Pratt & Whitney Aircraft
Group, Commercial Products Division (Seller) warrants to
Buyer that at the time of delivery the goods sold by
Seller will be free from defects in material and
manufacture and will conform substantially to Seller's
applicable specifications. Seller's liability and Buyer's
remedy under this warranty are limited to the repair or
replacement, at Seller's election, of goods or parts
thereof returned to Seller which are shown to Seller's
reasonable satisfaction to have been defective; provided
that written notice of the defect shall have been given by
Buyer to Seller within 90 days after the first operation
or use of the goods (or if the goods are installed in new
aircraft, within 90 days after acceptance of such aircraft
by the operator of each new aircraft) but in no event
later than one year after the date of delivery of such
goods by Seller. Transportation charges for the return of
defective goods to Seller and their reshipment to Buyer
and the risk of loss thereof will be borne by Seller only




[ 3D and 9D-7A ]
2. Title .
Seller warrants to Buyer that it will convey good title to
the goods it sells. Seller's liability and Buyer's remedy
under this warranty are limited to the removal of any
title defect or, at the election of the Seller, to the
replacement of the goods or parts thereof which are
defective in title; provided, however, that the rights and
remedies of the parties with respect to patent
infringement shall be limited to the provisions of
subparagraph 3 below.
3. Patent Infringement .
Seller shall conduct, at its own expense, the entire
defense of any claim, suit or action alleging that, not as
a result of further combination (other than (A)
combination with other Products delivered to Buyer by
Seller and (B) as to engines, combination with the
airframe in which they are installed), the use or resale
by Buyer or any subsequent purchaser or user of the goods
sold by Seller directly infringes any United States patent
but only on the conditions that (1) Seller receives prompt
written notice of such claim, suit or action and full
opportunity and authority to assume the sole defense
thereof, including settlement and appeals, and all
information available to Buyer and defendant for such
defense; (2) said Products are made according to a
specification or design furnished by Seller; and (3) the
claim, suit or action is brought against Buyer or one
expressly indemnified by Buyer. Provided all of the
foregoing conditions have been met, Seller shall, at its
own expense, either settle said claim, suit or action or
shall pay all damages, excluding consequential damages,
and costs awarded by the court therein and, if the use or
resale of such Products is finally enjoined, Seller shall,
at Seller's option, (i) procure for defendant the right to
use or resell the Products, (ii) replace them with
equivalent noninfringing Products, (iii) modify them so
they become noninfringing but equivalent or (iv) with
Buyer's consent remove them and refund the purchase price
(less a reasonable allowance for use, damage and
obsolescence). If a claim, suit or action for
infringement is based on a detailed design or
specification furnished by Buyer or on the use or resale
of the goods sold by Seller in a combination not within
the scope of the foregoing indemaity, Buyer shall
indemnify and save Seller harmless therefrom.
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4
.
Engine Parts Service Policy .
Seller warrants to Buyer that it will extend to Buyer,
with respect to aircraft engines of Seller's Pratt &
Whitney Aircraft Division sold to Buyer, service
allowances and adjustments in accordance with the
applicable Engine Parts Service Policy offered by said
Division on the date of Seller's receipt of the order
therefor. Seller's liability and Buyer's remedy under
this warranty are limited to the service allowances and
adjustments and are subject to the general conditions
stipulated in the applicable Engine Parts Service Policy;
provided, however, that no change in or retraction of such
Policy shall apply to engines delivered or to be delivered
by Seller under orders received by Seller prior to
Seller's announcement of any such change or retraction.
5. Limitation .
THE FOREGOING WARRANTIES ARE EXCLUSIVE AND ARE GIVEN AND
ACCEPTED IN LIEU OF ANY AND ALL OTHER WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION THE IMPLIED
WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY. THE REMEDIES OF THE BUYER
FOR ANY BREACH OF WARRANTY SHALL BE LIMITED TO THOSE
PROVIDED HEREIN TO THE EXCLUSION OF ANY AND ALL OTHER
REMEDIES INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, INCIDENTAL OR
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES. NO AGREEMENT VARYING OR EXTENDING
THE FOREGOING WARRANTIES, REMEDIES OR THIS LIMITATION WILL
BE BINDING UPON SELLER UNLESS IN WRITING, SIGNED BY A DULY




1. Interface Problems .
If Buyer experiences any technical problem in the
operation of the Aircraft or its systems due to
malfunction or failure of an accessory, equipment, or
part the cause of which, after due and reasonable
investigation, is not readily identifiable by Buyer, but
which Buyer reasonably believes to be attributable to the
design characteristics of one or more components of the
Aircraft (an "Interface Problem"), Boeing shall, if
requested by Buyer, and without additional charge to
Buyer, promptly conduct an investigation and analysis of
such Interface Problem to determine, if possible, the
cause—br^
-
cause's of the Interface Problem. and to recommend
such corrective action as- may be ""feasible "I Buyer "shall
furnish to Boeing all data and information in Buyer's
possession relevant to the Interface Problem, and shall
cooperate with Boeing in the conduct 9f its
investigations and such tests as may be required. Boeing
shall promptly advise Buyer in writing at the conclusion
of its investigation of Boeing's opinion as te the cause
or causes of the Interface Problem and Boeing's




If Boeing determines that the Interface Problem is
primarily attributable to the design of any component
manufactured to Boeing's detailed design, Boeing shall,
if requested by Buyer, correct the design of such
component to the extent of any then existing obligations
of Boeing under Part A (Boeing Warranty) or Part C
(Boeing Service Life Policy) of this Product Assurance
Document.
3 Supplier Responsibility .
If Boeing determines that the Interface Problem is
primarily attributable to the design of a component not
manufactured to Boeing's detailed design, Boeing shall if
requested by Buyer, reasonably assist Buyer in processing
any warranty claim Buyer may have against_ the
ma"hufaCtirrer"~of such component. Boeing shall also take
whatever reasonable action is permitted by its contracts
with such manufacturer in an effort to obtain a
correction of the Interface Problem acceptable to Buyer.
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4. Joint Responsibility .
If Boeing determines that the Interface Problem is
par_ti_a_ll y a_t.trj.bu table to the design of a component
manufactured to Boeing's detailed design and partially^ to
the design of components not manufactured to Boeing's
detailed design, Boeing shall, if requested by Buyer,
seek a solution to the Interface Problem through 'the
cooperative efforts of Boeing and the manufacturers of
the other component involved. Boeing shall promptly
advise Buyer of such corrective actions as may be
proposed by Boeing and such other manufacturers; such
proposal to be consistent with any then existing
obligations of Boeing and such other manufacturers. If
such proposal is acceptable to Buyer, the proposed action
shall be taken. Acceptance by Buyer of such action shall
constitute full satisfaction of any claim Buyer may have
against either Boeing or such other manufacturers with
respect to such Interface Problem.
5 . General .
(a) All requests under this Part G shall be directed to
Boeing's Warranty Administrator at Renton,
Washington
.
(b) All reports, recommendations, data and other
documents furnished by Boeing to Buyer pursuant to
this Part G shall be deemed to be things delivered
under this Agreement and shall be subject to the
disclaimer and limitations set forth in paragraph 10
of Part A (Boeing Warranty) of this Product
Assurance Document.
(c) At Boeing's request, Buyer shall assign to Boeing,
and Boeing shall be subrogated to, any of Buyer's
rights against any Supplier as Boeing may reasonably





McDonnell douglas md-80 warranty
I. WARRANTY AND SERVICE LIFE POLICY
A. SELLER'S WARRANTY
1. Coverage - Subject to stated limitations and
conditions, Seller warrants that the aircraft structure,
systems, accessories, equipment and parts of the aircraft
whether installed on the aircraft or as spare or replacement
parts (hereinafter referred to as "Products") if made to
detailed design and detailed specifications originated by
Seller shall, at the time of delivery by Seller, be free from:
a. Defects in material and workmanship;
b. Defects caused by installation by Seller of
any article not manufactured by seller in a manner not in
accordance with the reasonable instructions of the manufacturer;
c. Defects inherent in the design, including
defects arising from selection by Seller of materials or
process of manufacture, in view of the state of the art as of
the date of 3uch design; and
d. Defects arising from failure to conform to
the Detail Specification (Exhibit "A" of the Purchase
Agreement) , except as to portions thereof stated to be
estimates or approximations or stated to be design objectives.
2. Term - Defects as defined in paragraph 1. above
must become apparent to Buyer:
a. As to defects defined only in subparagraphs
a.
, b. and d. of paragraph 1. above, within twenty-four (24)
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months after delivery of each product; provided, however, in
the case of any defects in material and workmanship in any
Products installed in an aircraft at the time of delivery which
have not been inspected by Buyer under its established
maintenance program prior to the expiration of such twenty-four
(2 4) month period, such defects must have become apparent and
Buyer must have notified Seller thereof within one (1) month
after completion of the first applicable inspection or within
thirty-six (36) months, whichever shall first expire after
delivery of each product;
b. As to defects in subparagraph I.e. above,
whether or not also constituting a defect under subparagraphs
a., b. or d. of paragraph 1. above, within eighteen (18) months
after delivery of each product.
3. Repair or Replacement - The extent of Seller's
liability under this warranty as to defects in material or
workmanship, defects arising from the selection of material or
the process of manufacture, defects caused by faulty
installation and such defects arising from such failure to
conform to the Detail Specification is limited to the repair of
such defects in any Product or, at Seller's election where
applicable, to the repair or replacement (with a similar item
free from the defect in question) of any Product which is
defective in any of such respects.
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4. Correction of Design Defects - The extent of
Seller's liability under this warranty as to defects inherent
in the design is limited to the correction at its expense of
all such defects in the product which is defective in design.
If such design defects become apparent and Buyer gives Seller
due and timely notice within the applicable period set forth in
subparagraph 11. f. of this Part I. A. and Seller is obligated to
correct such defect, seller shall also make such correction in
any Product which shall not have been delivered to Buyer.
Seller, however, shall not be responsible nor deemed to be in
default on account of any delays in performance due to any such
corrections. Also, rather than accept a delay in delivery,
Buy«r may elect to accept delivery and subsequently file a
claim for a warranty correction as though the defect had become
apparent immediately after delivery.
5. Timely Corrections - seller, or Buyer with the
approval of Seller, shall make the repairs, replacements and
corrections with reasonable care and dispatch in order that the
Product involved may not be kept out of service longer than
necessary.
6. Seller's Approval - Seller shall, within one-half
(1/2) month following receipt of Buyer's notice of a defect
accompanied by Buyer's request that it be permitted to make a
repair, replacement or correction, notify Buyer of approval or
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disapproval of the request. Pailing timely notice by Seller,
approval of the request shall be deemed to have been given by
Seller.
7. Labor Reimbursement - Should Buyer be permitted
to make any of the repairs, replacements and corrections,
Seller shall establish a "standard" for the labor hours to
repair the defect and will reimburse Buyer for the "standard"
hours or for Buyer's actual labor hours to repair the defect,
whichever is less. Buyer's warranty labor rate shall be based
upon Buyer's direct labor rate per man-hour, subject to annual
review and adjustment as mutually agreed to between Buyer and
Seller, in no event, however, shall the amount exceed the
applicable manufacturing direct labor rate of the Douglas
Aircraft Company, plus a burden rate of one hundred percent
(100%) of the manufacturing rate.
8. Labor Coverage - Buyer's disassembly of the
aircraft to correct the defects, removal of the defective or
faulty products and installation of the corrected or new
Products and reassembly of the aircraft shall be at Buyer's
expense. (when temporary or interim repairs, replacements and
corrections are accomplished by Buyer and not proposed or
requested by seller, seller's liability to Buyer shall not
exceed the furnishing of a permanent repair, replacement or
correction or its monetary equivalent.)
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9. Claims Information - Buyer's claim for
reimbursement with respect to any repair or modification must
be submitted in writing to Seller's Warranty Administrator at
Long Beach, California, promptly after completion of the repair
or modification. All claims for reimbursement shall include
the following:
a. The identity of the Product involved,
including Seller's part number, nomenclature and the quantity
claimed to be defective.
b. The identity of the aircraft from which each
Product was removed.
c. Total flight hours accrued on each product
at the time the claimed defect became apparent to Buyer.
d. Date the claimed defect became apparent to
Buyer.
e. Description of the claimed defect and
circumstances.
f. Date repair or modification completed by
Buyer.
g. Itemized account of the direct labor hours
expended in performing the repair or modification.
h. Itemized account of the direct materials
incorporated in the repair or modification.
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10. Audit, Transportation and Waiver - All ciaims for
reimbursement shall be subject to audit by seller. Seller
shall promptly notify Buyer of Seller's disposition of each
claim. All transportation costs of sending defective products
to Seller's factory shall be borne by Buyer. The
transportation costs for return to Buyer of the repaired,
replaced or corrected Product shall be borned by the Seller.
No approval by seller under this paragraph 10. or paragraph 6.
above shall constitute a determination that a defect, in fact,
did exist.
11. Limitations - Seller shall, as to each defect, be
relieved of all obligation and liability under this warranty if:
a. The aircraft was operated with any Product
not specifically approved by Seller unless Buyer furnishes
reasonable evidence that such Product was not a cause of the
defect;
b. The aircraft was not operated or maintained
in accordance with seller's instructions furnished in the
•AIRCRAFT MANUALS AND DOCUMENTATION' unless Buyer furnishes
reasonable evidence that such operation or maintenance, as the
case may be, was not a cause of the defect;
c. The aircraft was not operated under normal
airline use unless Buyer furnishes reasonable evidence that
such operation was not a cause of the defect;
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d. The aircraft was repaired, altered or
modified without seller's approval or if the aircraft was
operated subsequent to involvement in an accident unless Buyer
furnishes reasonable evidence that the accident or such repair,
alteration, modification or operation after the accident was
not a cause of the defect; however, this limitation, insofar as
it relates to repairs and accidents, shall not be applicable to
operation after minor accidents or to routine repairs or
replacements which normally occur in the operation of an
aircraft, if such repairs or replacements are made with
suitable material and according to reasonable airline
engineering and maintenance standards.
e. Buyer does not (i) report the defect in
writing or by telegram to Seller's Warranty Administrator at
its factory in Long Beach, California, within two (2) months
following the end of the applicable period of time specified in
paragraph 2. of this paragraph A., or within two (2) months
following such defect becoming apparent, whichever is earlier,
and (ii) return the defective or faulty Product to said factory
(or, if return to seller's factory is not feasible and Seller
so agrees in advance in writing, to Buyer's base repair shop or
other appropriate facility in the United States) within two (2)
months following the end of the applicable period of time
specified in paragraph 2. of this paragraph A., or within two
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(2) months following such defect becoming apparent, whichever
is earlier, and further, if for reasons beyond Buyer's control,
return of the item to Seller's factory is not possible within
said two-month period and if Buyer so notifies Seller in
writing, the said two-month period will be waived but Buyer
must return the item to seller's said factory if, as and when
such return does become feasible;
f. Buyer does not submit reasonable proof to
Seller within two (2) months after the defect becomes apparent
(except when such period is waived) that the defect is due to a
matter embraced within this warranty. Seller shall approve or
disapprove Buyer's substantiation of its warranty claim in
writing within two (2) months of receipt.
12. Automatic Approval - with respect to matters made
the subject of Seller's approval under subparagraphs a. and d.
of paragraph 11., seller's approval or disapproval shall be
made in writing to Buyer within two (2) months after Buyer's
timely written notice to seller's Warranty Administrator is
received by Seller at its Long Beach plant requesting approval
and referring to this paragraph 12. in the event of
disapproval, Seller shall set forth the reasons in its
statement of disapproval. Seller's failure to deliver to Buyer
a written statement of approval or disapproval within such
two-month period shall (without extending or increasing
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Seller's obligations in any way) constitute approval by Seller
of the subject matter of the particular request involved.
13. Normal usage - Normal wear and tear and the need
for regular overhaul shall not constitute a defect or failure
under this warranty. Buyer acknowledges that some of the
accessories, equipment and parts, though without defects when
delivered, have a normal service expectancy and warranty
shorter than the periods specified in paragraph 2. of this Part
I. -is set forth in Seller's manuals and documentation furnished
under part IV.
B. WARRANTIES PROM OTHER MANUFACTURERS AND ENGINE WARRANTY
1. Seller's Efforts - Seller shall make every
reasonable effort to obtain warranties (equivalent to Seller's)
fro a other manufacturers, vendors, or suppliers of systems,
accessories, equipment and parts supplied in respect to the
aircraft and selected by seller but not manufactured to
Seller's detailed design and detailed specifications originated
by seller. These warranties shall either run to Buyer
specifically or be assignable by Seller to Buyer. Seller shall
make reasonable effort to obtain for Buyer the same warranties,
more favorable warranties, or alternate overhaul plans, to
encompass Buyer's direct purchase of spare parts. In addition,
Seller shall make reasonable effort to obtain for Buyer said
other manufacturers', vendors' or suppliers' performance
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guarantees, service and product performance guarantees, service
and product support policies and data at least as favorable as
those obtained by Seller. Seller shall convey to Buyer the
nature and extent of such warranties and of the attendant terms
and conditions, guarantees, services, policies and data.
2. Engine Warranty - Seller has obtained from United
Technologies Corporation, Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Group,
Commercial Products Division (UNITED) the right to extend to
Buyer the provisions of UNITED' s sales warranty, attached
hereto as Exhibit "E M . Buyer agrees that the warranty
applicable to turbine engines installed at the time of delivery
in the aircraft to be furnished under this contract shall be
the UNITED sales warranty; provided that Buyer may, by notice
given to UNITED prior to delivery of the aircraft under this
contract, elect to substitute for such sales warranty any
corresponding warranty included either in a General Terms
Agreement currently effective between the Buyer and UNITED or
in a contract for the sale by UNITED to the Buyer of turbine
engines intended for use in direct support of the aircraft to
be furnished under this contract. Buyer agrees that any such
warranty shall be deemed to have been provided directly by
UNITED to Buyer. Buyer shall look to UNITED and not Seller
with respect to any such warranty and Seller has no obligation
under such warranty and does not act as guarantor of UNITED 's
warranty. In consideration of such extension, Buyer hereby
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releases and discharges UNITED fron an/ and all liabilities and
obligations whatsoever arising out of the purchase or use of
said installed turbine engines, except as expressly assumed by
UNITED in such warranty.
C. SERVICE LIFE POLICY
Seller agrees that should fleetwide or repetitive
failure occur in any of the covered components, the provisions
of this paragraph C. (hereinafter referred to as "this Policy")
shall apply.
1. Definitions - For the purposes of this paragraph
C, the following definitions apply:
a. Failure means any breakage of, or defect in,
a covered airframe component (exclusive of intergranular
corrosion) which has occurred and which can reasonably be
expected to occur on a repetitive or fleetwide basis.
b. Covered airframe component means any of the
primary structural elements of the wing, fuselage, vertical and
horizontal empennage of the aircraft as specified in paragraph
7. below.
2. Term - Should a failure occur in any covered
component of an aircraft within ten (10) years after delivery
to Buyer regardless of the number of flight hours or cycles,
Seller will, at the price provided and as promptly as
practicable, either (i) design and furnish to Buyer a
correction for such failed covered component and provide any
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parts required for such correction (exclusive of standard
parts) or (ii) furnish to 3uyer a replacement covered component
for such failed component for installation of such correction
or component by Buyer in such aircraft.
3. Costs - Any part or covered component which
Seller is required to furnish to Buyer under this Policy in
connection with correction or replacement of a covered
component shall be furnished to Buyer at a price determined in




P » Price to Buyer;
C = The Seller's then current spare parts sales
price;
T =» The total time to the nearest month during
which the covered component, which is the
subject of a failure, has been used, and
U a 120 months.
4. Conditions and Limitations - The following
general conditions and limitations shall apply to this
paragraph C.
a. The return to Seller, if such return is
practicable, of any covered component, which is the subject of
a failure, necessary for redesigning studies, shall be at
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Buyer's expense. Any required disassembly and reassembly of
the aircraft or landing gear, or parts of either, removal of
the covered component which is the subject of a failure and
reassembly and installation of the corrected or replacement
covered component, shall be at Buyer's expense. If such
disassembly, reassembly and installation is accomplished by
Seller at Buyer's request, the rates to be charged for any such
services shall not exceed the rates charged to other commercial
customers of Seller during approximately the same time period.
b. Seller's obligations under this Policy are
conditioned upon the submission of reasonable proof to Seller
that the failure is embraced within the scope of this Policy.
c. In case of failure, Buyer must have reported
the breakage or defect in writing or by telegram to Seller's
Warranty Administrator at its factory in Long Beach,
California, within two (2) months after any breakage or defect
in a covered component becomes evident, whether or not said
breakage or defect can reasonably be expected to occur in any
other aircraft. Omission by Buyer to give this required notice
to Seller shall excuse Seller from all obligations with respect
to such failure.
d. The provisions of paragraph 11. (except for
subparagraphs e. and f. thereof) of paragraph A. of Part I.
entitled "Seller's Warranty", are incorporated by thi3
reference- and shall condition Seller's obligations under this
Policy with respect to any covered component.
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e. Seller's obligations under this Policy shall
not apply to any aircraft which has not been correctly modified
in accordance with Seller's Service Bulletin specifications or
instructions furnished by Seller to Buyer prior to the receipt
by Seller from Buyer of any notice of an occurrence which
constitutes, or which at a later date is shown to constitute, a
failure in a covered component.
f. In the event of any breakage or defect in a
covered component, if Seller determines that such breakage or
defect nay not reasonably be expected to occur on a fleetwide
or repetitive basis, this Policy shall not apply with respect
to such breakage or defect.
5. Coverage - This Policy is neither a warranty,
performance guarantee nor an agreement to modify the aircraft
or airframe components to conform to new developments occurring
in the state of airframe design and manufacturing art.
Seller's obligation is to make only those corrections to the
airframe components or furnish replacement as provided in this
Policy.
6. Assignment - Buyer's rights under this paragraph
C. hereof shall not be assigned, sold, leased, transferred or
otherwise alienated by operation of law or otherwise, without •
Seller's prior written consent. Any unauthorized assignment,
sale, lease, transfer or other alienation of Buyer's rights




7. Airframe Co^gonents - The following specific
airframe items are subject to the provisions of paragraph C.l.b
a. PYLONS
Front engine mount yoke
Spars and spar caps
Engine mount yoke to pylon attach fitting




Front and rear spars
Upper and lower stringers and plating
between spars
Landing gear bulkhead and forging
Bulkhead at side of fuselage, including
trapezoidal panel
Flap ribs in the wing
Wing to fuselage attach tee
Wing flap attach fittings
C. FUSELAGE
Frames, plating, stringers and pressure
bulkheads, but excluding all access doors
d. EMPENNAGE
Vertical spars and plating between spars
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Aft fuselage vertical stabilizer
carry- through structure
Horizontal stabilizer spars, integral
plating between spars, and pivot fittings
D . GENERAL
1. THE WARRANTY AND SERVICE LIFE POLICY PROVIDED IN
THIS PART I. AND THE OBLIGATIONS AND LIABILITIES OF SELLER
UNDER SAID WARRANTY AND SERVICE LIFE POLICY ARE EXCLUSIVE AND
IN LIEU OF, AND BUYER HEREBY WAIVES, ALL OTHER REMEDIES,
WARRANTIES, GUARANTEES OR LIABILITIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, WITH
RESPECT TO EACH AIRCRAFT, ARTICLE, PRODUCT, ACCESSORY,
EQUIPMENT, PART, SERVICE, MANUAL, DOCUMENT AND DATA DELIVERED
UNDER THIS AGREEMENT AND RELATED DOCUMENTS, ARISING BY LAW OR
OTHERWISE (INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY OBLIGATION OR
LIABILITY ARISING FROM NEGLIGENCE OR TORT OR WITH RESPECT TO
FITNESS, MERCHANTABILITY, LOSS OF USE, REVENUE OR PROFIT OR
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES). THIS WARRANTY OR SERVICE LIFE POLICY
SHALL NOT BE EXTENDED, ALTERED OR VARIED, EXCEPT BY A WRITTEN
INSTRUMENT SIGNED BY SELLER AND BUYER.
2. BUYER AND SELLER STATE AND AGREE THAT THIS
PART I. HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION AND NEGOTIATION AND
IS FULLY UNDERSTOOD BY THE PARTIES AND THAT THE PRICE OF THE
AIRCRAFT AND THE OTHER MUTUAL AGREEMENTS OF THE PARTIES SET
FORTH IN THIS AGREEMENT WERE ARRIVED AT IN CONSIDERATION OF THE
PROVISIONS OF THIS PART I., SPECIFICALLY INCLUDING THE WAIVER
BY BUYER SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH D.l. ABOVE.
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appendix d
McDonnell douglas kc-io warranty
38. WARRANTY AND SERVICE LIFE POLICY »
Part I - Warranty
a. Subject to the limitations and conditions hereinafter set
forth, Contractor warrants that the aircraft structure, systems,
accessories, equipment, and ail parts of the aircraft, whether instal-
led on the aircraft or as spare or replacement parts, delivered here-
under which have been manufactured by Contractor and by other manufac-
turers .if made to detailed design and detailed specifications originated
by Contractor shall, at the fime of delivery by Contractor, be free from:
(1) Defects ih materiaT" and workma tiship
;"
(2) Defects caused by installation by Contractor of any
article not manufactured by Contractor in a manner not in accordance
with the reasonable instructions of the manufacturer;
(3) Defects Inherent in the design thereof, including defects
arising from selection by Contractor of materials or process of manufac-
ture, in view of the state of the art of the date of such design; and
(4) Defects arising from failure to conform to the Detail
Specification in effect at the time of delivery, except as to portions
thereof stated to be estimated or approximations or stated to be design
objectives.
b. Defects as defined in paragraph a of this Part I must become
apparent to the Government:
(1) As to defects defined only in subparagraphs (1) , (2) and
(4) of paragraph a of this Part I, within sixty (60) months or five
thousand (5,000) flying hours, whichever first expires after delivery
of each aircraft or product.
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(2) A3 to defects in subparagraph a(3) of this Part I,
whether or not also constituting a defect under subparagraphs (1)
, (2)
or (A) of paragraph a of this Part I, within twenty-four (24) months
after delivery of each aircraft or product.
C. The extent of Contractor'* liability under' this warranty as
to defects in material or workmanship, defects arising from the selec-
tion of material or the process of -manufacture, defects caused by faulty
Installation as aforesaid and such defects arising from such failure
to conform to the Detail Specification as aforesaid, is limited to the
repair of such defects in the aircraft, aircraft structure or system
or, at the Contractor's election where applicable, to- the repair or~
replacement (with a similar item free from the defect in question) of
any system accessory, equipment or part which Is defective in any of
such respects.
d. The extent of Contractor's liability under thi3 warranty as
to defects inherent in the design as aforesaid is limited to the cor-
rection at its expense of. all such def ects~JLn the aircraft, aircraft
structure, system, accessory, equipment or part which Is defective in
design. In the event such design defects become apparent and the
Government give3 Contractor due and timely _notice__thereof within the_
applicable period set forth in subparagraph f(5) of this Part I and
Contractor is obligated hereunder co correct such defect, Contractor
shall also make such correction in any aircraft purchased hereunder
which shall not have been delivered to the Government, provided that
Contractor shall not be responsible nor deemed to be in default on
account of any delays in performance of this contract due to any such
corrections and, provided further, rather than accept a delay in deli-
very of such aircraft, the Government may elect to accept delivery and
thereafter file a claim for a warranty correction hereunder as though
the defect had become apparent immediately after delivery of such air-
craft, and further, provided chac caching in this paragraph shall affect
the Government's right to claim the same design defect with respect to
any other delivered aircraft.
e. Contractor, or the Government with the approval of Contractor,—
shall make the foregoing repairs, replacements and corrections with
reasonable care and dispatch in order that the aircraft, system,
accessory, equipment or part involved may not be kept out of service
longer than necessary. Contractor shall, within fifteen (15) calendar -
days following receipt of the Government's notification of a defect —
(as required in subparagraph f(5) of this -Part I) accompanied by the —
Government's request that it be permitted in such instance Co make
repair, replacement or correotion, notify che Government of approval
or disapproval of such request. Failing such timely notice by Con-
tractor* approval of such request shall be deemed to have been given by
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Contractor. Should the Government be permitted to make any of the fore-
going repairs, replacements and corrections. Contractor will establish
_a "standard" for the labor hourg to repair such defect and will reimburse
the Government for such "standard" hours or for the Government's or
logistics support Contractor's actual labor hours to repair such defect,
whichever Is less, a t the Government's or logistics support Contractor's —"
direct labor rate plus a burden of fifty percent C5QZ') of said direct
labor rate; provided, hovever, that in no event shall such amount exceed
the applicable manufacturing direct labor rate of the Douglas Aircraft
Company, plus a burden rate of one hundred percent (1001) of said" manu-
facturing rate. Dissembly of the aircraft to correct the defects, removal
of the defective or faulty structure, system, accessory, equipment or
part and installation of the corrected or new structure, system, acces-
sory, equipment or new part and reassembly of the aircraft shall be at
Contractor's expense ( except as to inspection, checkout and t^est effort) .
to the extent of and in accordance with the formula set forth above unless
such work is performed by Contractor at its expense at it3 factory at
Long Beach, California, or by Contractor at its expense at such other
place as may be mutually agreed upon by Contractor and the Government*
(When temporary or interim repairs, replacements and corrections are
accomplished by the Government and not proposed or requested by Contractor,
Contractor's liability to the Government hereunder shall not..exceed_the
furnishing of a_ permanent-repair , mplacement or correction or the mone-
tary equivalent thereof.) All transportation , costs of sending and.
returning aircraft and sending detective- accessorie s .^equipaent or oarts
t^^tn*e^Contractor^s factory sha. beoorr'.e by the Government. The trans-
portation costs for return to the Government of the repaired, replaced,
or corrected accessories, equipment or part shall be borne by the Contrac-
tor. Ho approval by Contractor under this paragraph e shall constitute
a determination that a defect, in fact, exists.
f- Contractor shall, as to each defect, be relieved of all obli-
gation and liability under this warranty if:
(1) The aircraft is operated with any accessory, equipment
or part not specifically approved by Contractor unless the Government
furnishes reasonable evidence that such accessory, equipment or part
was not a cause of the defect;
(2) The aircraft shall not have been operated or maintained
in accordance with Contractor's operating and maintenance instructi . .
furnished under this Contract's Data Requirements List (CDRL) unlf
the Government furnishes reasonable evidence that such operation ..
maintenance, as the case may be, was not a cause of the defect;
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(3) The aircraft shall not have been operated under normal
ATCA mission use unless the Government furnishes reasonable evidence
that such operation was not a cause of the defect;
(A) The aircraft shall have been repaired, altered or modi-
fied without Contractor's approval or if the aircraft shall have been
operated subsequent to involvement in an accident unless the Govern- ->
ment furnishes reasonable evidence that the accident or such repair,
alteration, modification or operation after the accident was- not a
cause of the defect; provided, however, that this limitation, insofar.
as it relates to repairs and accidents, shall not be applicable to
routine repairs or replacements, if such repairs or replacements are
. made with suitable material and according to standard practice and*
engineering or to operation after minor accidents;
(5) The Government does not (i) report the defect in writing
or by telegram to Contractor's Warranty Administrator at Its ractory *"
in Long 3each, California, within sixty (60) calendar days following"*"
sucn detect becoming apparent to Che Government as provided in paragraph
b ot this Part I, and (ii) return the defective or faulty aircrart,
accessory, equipment or part to said factory (or, if return to Contrac-
tor's factory is not feasible and Contractor so agrees in advance in
writing, to the Government ' s base_rejair_sJmp_or_other_appropriate.
~~£acillty in"The" Oni ted States) within sixty (60) calendar days fol-
.
lowing the end of the applicable period of time specified in paragraph
b of this Part I, or within sixty (60) calendar days following such
defect becoming apparent, whichever is earlier, and further provided
that, if for reasons beyond the Government's control, return of the
item to Contractor 's factory i3 not possible within said sixty (60)
calendar day period and if the Government so notifies Contractor in
writing, the said sixty (60) calendar day period will be waived but
the Government must return the item to Contractor's said factory if,
as and when such return does become feasible;
(6) The Government does not submit reasonable proof to Con-
tractor within sixty (60) calendar days after the defect becomes
apparent (except when such period is waived) that the defect is due
to a matter embraced within the Contractor's warranty hereunder.
Contractor shall app rove or disapprove the Government's suostantiation
of its warranty claim in writing within sixty {oU) calendar aay5 Of
.
receipt thereof, and in the event of disapproval, the Contractor snail
state its reasons theretor.
--fc
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With respect to matters made the subject, of Contractor's
approval under, subparagraphs (1) and (4) of this paragraph f, Contrac-
tor's approval or disapproval thereof shall be made in writing to the
Government within sixty (60) calendar days after the Government's timely
written notice to Contractor's Warranty Administrator is received by
Contractor at its Long Beach plant requesting approval and referring
Co this paragraph f. In the event of disapproval. Contractor shall set
forth the reasons therefor In its statement of disapproval. Contrac-
tor's failure to deliver to the Government a written statement of
approval or disapproval within such sixty (60) calendar day period shall
(without extending or increasing Contractor's obligations hereunder in
any way) constitute approval by Contractor of the subject matter of the
particular request involved.
g. Normal wear and tear and the need for regular overhaul shall
not constitute a defect or failure under this warranty.
h. When an aircraft, accessory, or item of equipment, or other
deliverable item under this contract, has been corrected, repaired
or replaced pursuant to the conditions of this provision, the period
of the Contractor's warranty under this Part I with respect to such
correction, repair, or replacement, whichever may be the case, shall
"be~the same as'those setTorth fdr'tfie "original" delivered item.
i. None of the warranties made by Contractor with respect to any
aircraft, product or article delivered under this contract shall sur-
vive acceptance by the Government, except to the extent and upon the
conditions specifically set forth in paragraph a through h of this Part
I, inclusive, and the Part IV of this clause entitled "General."
Part II - Service Life Policy
In addition to the warranties set forth in the Part I of this
clause entitled "Warranty," Contractor agrees that should DC-10 fleet-
wide or repetitive failure occur in any of the covered components,
then the provisions of this Part II shall apply.
a. Definitions
For the purposes of this Part II, the following definitions
apply:
(a) Failure means any breakage of, or defect in, a covered
component (except for corrosion as a result of improper maintenance pro-
cedures and practices)which has occurred and which can reasonably be
expected to occur on a repetitive or DC-LO fleetwide basis.
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(b) Airframe component means any of the primary structural
elements of the wing, fuselage and vertical and horizontal empennage of
the aircraft as specified in Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
(c) Landing gear component means any of those primary
static structural elements which are part of the landing gear installed
In an aircraft at the time of delivery thereof to the Government,
specified in Exhibit "£" attached hereto. - x
(d) Covered component mean3 any airframe component or
landing gear component. >
(e) Landing means any normal touchdown- wherein tires"
contact the ground including all touch and go's.
b. Service Life Policy
Should a failure occur in any covered component of an aircraft
within the following periods (whichever i3 applicable)
:
(a) As to any airframe component of an aircraft, within
thirty thousand (30,000) flying hours or within ten (10) years after
delivery of such aircraft to the Government^ whichever .shall firsj: expire..
(b) As to any landing gear component of an aircraft, prior
to the accumulation by such component of an aggregate of twenty thousand
(20,000) aircraft landings or thirty thousand (30,000) flying hours
Involving the use of such component or within ten (10) years after
delivery of such component to the Government, whichever shall first
occur
.
Contractor will, at the price hereinafter provided
and as promptly as practicable, either (i) design and furnish to the
Government a correction for such failed covered component and provide
any parts required for such correction (exclusive of standard parts) or
(ii) furnish to the Government a replacement covered component for such
failed component for installation of such correction or component by
the Government in such aircraft or the affected landing gear.
c. Price
Any part or covered component which Contractor is required to
furnish to the Government under this Policy in connection with correction
or replacement of a covered component shall be furnished to the Government
at a price determined in accordance with the following formula:
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P - CT
N
P Price to the Government
C The Contractor's then current spare parts sales price
As to airframe components:
T The total flying time in hours during which the
airframe component, which is the subject of a
failure, has been used, and
M - Thirty thousand (30,000),
As to landing gear components, either:
T - The total number of airplane landings which have
been accumulated by the landing gear component,
which is the subject of a failure, and
N - Twenty thousand (20,000),
or
T » The total flying time in hours during which the
landing gear component, which is the subject of a
failure, has been used, and
J. N - Thirty thousand (30,000),
whichever yields the higher fraction.
d. General Conditions and Limitations
(1) The return to Contractor, if such return is practicable,
of any covered component which is the subject of a failure necessary .
for redesigning studies, shall be at the Government's expense. Any
required disassembly and reassembly of the aircraft or landing gear,
or parts of either thereof, removal of the covered component which is
the subject of a failure and reassembly and installation of the cor-
rected or replacement covered component, shall be at the Government's
expense, and if such disassembly, reassembly and installation is
accomplished by Contractor at the Government's request, the prices
to be charged for any such services shall not exceed the prices charged
to other commercial customers of Contractor during sunstantially the
same time period.
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(2) Contractor's obligations under this Policy are conditioned
upon (i) the submission of reasonable proof to Contractor that the
failure is embraced within the scope of this Policy; (ii) with respect
to landing gear components, the maintenance by the Government of log
books and other historical records available for inspection by Contrac-
tor and adequate to enable determination of whether the defect or fail-
ure claimed is covered by this Service Life Policy and, if so, the t
amount of the payment to be made to Contractor hereunder and adequate
to enable determination that the servicing, overhaul, maintenance and
modification of any such landing gear component or related equipment
has been accomplished in accordance with subparagraphs (4) and (5) of
this paragraph d and (iii) the Government must have reported the. failure,
breakage or defect of a covered component in writing or by telegram to
Contractor's Warranty Administrator at its factory in Long Beach,
California, within sixty (60) calendar days after any failure, breakage
or defect in a covered component becomes evident.
(3) The provisions of paragraph f (except for subparagraphs
(5) and (6) thereof) of the Part I of the clause entitled "Warranty,"
are incorporated herein by this reference and shall condition Contrac-
tor's obligations under this Policy with respect to any covered component.
(4) Contractor's _o_bligatloji3_under- this- Policy—shall" not apply
-
to auy "covered component which has not been correctly modified in accord-
ance with Contractor's mandatory or recommended Service Bulletin speci-
fications or instructions furnished by the Contractor to the Government
provided , however , that
:
(a) failure to correctly modify is the proximate cause of
the failure; and
(b) the Government received the Service Bulletin in
sufficient time to incorporate the modification.
(5) Contractor's obligations under this Policy shall not
apply to any landing gear component with respect to which there has
been the failure to either (i) correctly service, maintain and over-
haul such landing gear component or the landing gear or the aircraft
it is at any time apart of, in accordance with the applicable Con-
tractor's instructions regarding such servicing, maintenance and
overhaul, including, without limitation, the Contractor maintenance
manuals, overhaul manuals and special instructions applicable to
landing gears and their component parts or (ii) periodically service
and maintain such landing gear component, landing gear and aircraft on
a scheduled basis in accordance with recognized standards for scheduled
air passenger carriers, subject to regulations by the Federal Aviation
Administration.
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e. Nature of Agreement *
This Service Life Policy is neither a warranty, performance
guarantee nor an agreement to modify the aircraft, airframe components
or landing gear components to conform to new developments hereafter
occurring in Che state of airframe or landing gear design and manufac-
turing art. Contractor's obligation herein is to make only those
corrections to the airframe components and landing gear components or
furnish replacement therefor as provided in this Policy.
£. Assignment of Rights
The Government's rights under this Part II, except as set forth
elsewhere in this provision, shall not be assigned, sold, leased, trans-
ferred or otherwise alienated by operation of law or otherwise, without
prior Contractor consent thereto given in writing. Any unauthorized
assignment, sale, lease, transfer or other alienation of the Government's
rights under this Policy shall immediately void this Policy in its
entirety.
Part III - Vendor Warranties and Indemnity Against Patent Infringement
a. The contractor shall make reasonable efforts to obtain through
formal agreements with the manufacturers of accessories and items of
equipment installed on the aircraft to the extent not covered by the
-Contractor's warranty- ancT-ther Contractor's indemnity against infringe-
ment of patents and other proprietary rights, respectively, favorable
warranties, indemnities against infringement of patents and other
proprietary rights. The Contractor shall promptly advise the Government
and Logistics Support Contractor as to the character and extent of pro-
tection afforded the Government by such agreements of indemnity and
warranties so obtained and provide them, with all acquired rights, to
the Government and Logistics Support Contractor. The Contractor shall
contractually require that all vendor warranties conveyed to the Govern-
ment can be administered by the Logistics Support Contractor.
b. The Contractor shall assist the Government in the resolution
of any problems associated with all vendor warranties provided. In the
event of a default by any such manufacturer in the performance of any
material obligation under any applicable warranty obtained by the
contractor from such manufacturer pursuant to this Provision, or in the
event of a disclaimer of responsibility by such manufacturer for any
defect constituting a breach of any such warranty and upon notice
thereof to the Contractor, the warranties and all other terms and
conditions of the Provision hereof entitled "WARRANTY AND SERVICE LIFE
POLICY" shall become applicable to any accessories or items of equipment
involved as if the same had been manufactured by the contractor or to
it3 detailed design, except, that the warranty periods as to such acces-
sories or Items of equipment shall be the lesser of (i) the warranty
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period as set forth in the applicable warranty of such manufacturer or
(il) the applicable warranty period set forth in the Provision hereof
entitled "Warranty and Service Life Policy" and the Government agrees
to assign to the contractor, and the contractor shall be subrogated to,
all of the Government's right3 against such manufacturer with respect
to and arising by reason of such default or disclaimer, provided that
this paragraph c shall not be applicable to engines or their manufacturer.,




a. THE WARRANTY AND SERVICE LIFE POLICY PROVIDED IN THIS CONTRACT,
AND THE OBLIGATIONS AND LIABILITIES OF THE CONTRACTOR UNDER SAID WARRANTY
AND SERVICE LIFE POLICY", ARE EXCLUSIVE AND IN LIEU 0F~, AND THE GOVERNMENT
WAIVES, ALL OTHER REMEDIES, WARRANTIES, GUARANTEES OR LIABILITIES EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, WITH RESPECT TO EACH AIRCRAFT, PRODUCT AND ARTICLE DELIVERED
HEREUNDER, ARISING BY LAW OR OTHERWISE (INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION,
ANY OBLIGATION OR LIABILITY OF THE CONTRACTOR ARISING FROM NEGLIGENCE
OR WITH RESPECT TO FITNESS, MERCHANTABILITY, LOSS OF USE, REVENUE OR
PROFIT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES). THIS WARRANTY OR SERVICE LIFE POLICY
SHALL NOT BE EXTENDED, ALTERED OR VARIED, EXCEPT BY A WRITTEN. INSTRUMENT
SIGNED BY THE CONTRACTOR AND THE GOVERNMENT. THIS PROVISION SHALL NOT
LIMIT THE GOVERNMENT'S RIGHTS OR THE CONTRACTOR'S OBLIGATIONS AS SPECI-
--FIED IN-THE CLAUSE- ENTITLED-'HNSPECTION"- EXCEPT -THAT",- WITH REGARD-TO
AIRCRAFT, THE GOVERNMENT'S RIGHTS BECAUSE OF LATENT DEFECTS ARE LIMITED
IH THAT THE CONTRACTOR MUST BE NOTIFIED OF ANY LATENT DEFECT IN SUCH
AIRCRAFT WITHIN THE TIME PERIOD SPECIFIED IN PART I PARAGRAPHS b(l) OR
(2) AS THE CASE MAY BE.
b. All warranties specified in Part I above shall also apply to
Support Equipment and Configuration alternate kit3 delivered pursuant
to this contract.
c. The Government may, without contractor approval, designate the
ATCA Logistics Support Contractor to act in its behalf In all instances
where "the Government" is referenced above. The Government shall advise
the contractor in writing of any such designation.
d. In all instances above where notification must be given to the
contractor after a defect or other condition becoming apparent, evident,
etc., this shall mean becoming apparent, evident, etc., to the Contrac-
ting Officer (CO), or the Logistics Support Contractor, where such
delegation has been made.
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EXI-JI3IT "A"
TO PROVISION J-38 WARRANTY AND SERVICE LIFE POLICY
The following specific airframe items are subject to the provisions
of Part II of the clause entitled "WARRANTY AND SERVICE LIFE POLICY:"
PYLONS - WING AND CENTER ENGINE
Pylon engine mount fittings _1. -«
Pylon engine mount bulkheads
Spars
Side skin and skin stiffeners
Pylon wing attach angle and center engine support angles
Pylon wing attach bulkhead and. center engine attach bulkhead
WINGS
Front and rear spars
Upper and lover stringers and plating between spars
Landing gear bulkhead and fitting
Dihedral and sweepback bulkhead
-Flat—support—ribs- -in -the- wing-
Wing to fuselage attach tee
FUSELAGE
Frames, plating, stringers and pressure bulkheads but excluding
all doors
Fuel tank pressure bulkheads and panels




Vertical spars and plating between spars
Aft fuselage vertical stabilizer carry-through structure
Horizontal stabilizer spars, integral plating between spars
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EXHIBIT "B"
TO PROVISION J-38 WARRANTY AND SERVICE LIFE POLICY
The following specific landing gear components are subject to the
provisions of Part II of the clause entitled "WARRANTY AND SERVICE
LIFE POLICY."
MAIN GEAR AND CENTER LINE GEAR
Bogie beam and axles









MCDONNELL DOUGLAS PROPOSED C- 17.WARRANTY
SECTION S
$5. WARRANTY AND SERVICE LIES POLICY
Part I — Warranty
a. SCOPE OP WARRANTY
Subject to the limitations and conditions hereinafter set forth
,
Contractor grant3 to the Government the following warranties:
(1) Pleet Reliability, Maintainability and Availability
(RM&A)
Contractor warrants that the fleet of C-X aircraft 3hall
meet or exceed the RM&A values specified in this contract in
effect at any given time in accordance with the RM&A requirements
tables and growth curves contained in the System Specification.
(2) Contractual Specification Conformation, Design
Integration, Material and Workmanship
Contractor warrants that each aircraft; its structures
and systems; all spares', replacements, or repair parts; {bat not
including engines); and all items of support equipment, together
with related data and software, shall upon delivery, with the
exception of those portions which are stated to be design goals
or objectives, be free from: j
...--- •
_.
.(i) Defects resulting from failure of the C-X system to
^conform to or perform in accordance with" "the specifications
incorporated in this contract;
C i 1 ) Defects in the design ' and integration thereof,
'including defects arising from selection of material or process
'of manufacture, in view of the state of the art a3 of _ the date of
such design; j
(iii) Defects . in material resulting from defects in (AJ?
the composition or substance of the material, (B) its manufac-
turing workmanship, except with respect to items no t_ manufactured
by Contractor
(





(iv)~ Defects in workmanship except that the workmanship
of GFE item3 and items not manufactured by Contractor or to
Contractor's design or performance specifications, shall not be
warranted; and
(v) Defects caused by the installation of any article.
In addition to the warranty otherwise provided by this paragraph
a. (2) , it is expressly agreed that with regard to any defects
discovered in any structural components of the durability test
article by virtue of the durability test program, as defined by
Annex 11, to the PSED Statement of Work, paragraphs 3.3.2,
through the first forty-five thousand (45,000) hours of durabi-
lity test, the warranty of this paragraph a. (2) shall extend to
such defects, discovered in the durability test article, to the
same extent as if such defects has been discovered in a produc-
tion aircraft during the warranty periods set forth in paragraph
d. hereof, notwithstanding that such warranty periods may have
expired for any of the aircraft delivered hereunder.
(3) Installation of Parts
Contractor warrants that all systems, accessories
,
equipment, subassemblies, parts, or other articles, including
engines, shall be installed in such manner as to insure confor-
mance to and performance in accordance with the specifications of
this contract and further warrants that in no event will its
installation of any such accessories, equipment, subassemblies,
parts, or other articles, including engines, be such as to inva-
lidate any warranty of any manufacturer thereof.
(4) Design Information,'
Contractor warrants that detail design information,
^technical orders, technical data, and engineering data ._(but not-
including engine data) furnished pursuant to this contract and
;rall other detail design information or technical or engineering
data supplied by Contractor and furnished to the Government foj
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'the purpose of repair/ rework," replacement logistics ' support,
•maintenance/ maintenance operations, or maintenance training
"shall be free from defect, notwithstanding that any 3uch detail
design information, technical orders, or technical or engineering
data shall have been verified by the Government. Data not
supplied for the purpose of repair, rework/ replacement,
logistics support, maintenance, maintenance operations, or main-
tenance training shall be warranted in accordance with the
General Provision of this contract entitled, "Warranty of
Technical Data,"
b. RZMZDIZS *
(1) [Corrections of Defects'^?
(i) Contractor Corrections
(A) The Government's remedy for a breach of the
warranties set forth herein and Contractor's, obligation and
liability thecefor, shall be Contractor's performance of the
following at no change in contract targets or ceiling prices:'
^
(a) j As regards paragraphs a. (1) and. (21/
hereof—the correction,' repair, rework, replacement, or redesign 1
of any nonconforming or defective structure, system, component,
or item of support equipment, including spares delivered under
the separate spares contract, P33657-31-C-2109 , determined to be
the cause or contributing cause of the aircraft's defective con-
dition or failure to conform to and perform in accordance with
the specifications (including RMSA values) , such that said defect
or nonconformance i3 eliminated; /
(b) As regards paragraph a. (3) hereof— the
correction of any such improper installation and to the extent
such installation shall have caused the invalidation of any ven-
dor warranty required to be passed through to the Government pur-
suant to paragraph b. (2) hereof or any engine warranty pursuant
to b. (3) hereof, Contractor shall, with regard to any such inva-
lidated warranty, assume the liability the vendor or engine manu-





(c) As regards any defect in design infdr-
'mationl, technical orders, or technical or engineering data pur-
suant to paragraph a. (4) hereof—correction of such design infor-
mation, technical order, or technical or engineering data and re-
pair, rework, or replacement of any damage to the immediate sud-
system or piece of support equipment caused by the Government'
3
reasonable reliance upon such defective information, technical
order, or technical or engineering data. ?or the purpose of this
warranty, the "subsystems" of the air vehicle are those major
subdivisions listed in Table "C" , attached hereto; the term
•immediate subsystem" refers to the damaged subsystem upon which
repair or maintenance was being accoraplisted in reliance upon the
defective data and not to other subsystems damaged consequen-
tially. Under no circumstance shall the entire airframe or any
substantial portion thereof be deemed to be an "immediate
subsystem.
"
(d) I With respect to any defect or specifica-
tion nonconformance or failure to meet RM&A values as embraced by
this warranty, including any defect in the aircraft's structural
components discovered by virtue of the durability test, program
through the first forty-five thousand (45,CC0) hours of durabi-
lity test, Contractor shall correct such defects by appropriate
modification of the design and/or manufacturing processes or pro-
cedures for all undelivered aircraft /whether in the process of
manufacture or to be manufactured,, and shall retrofit all
completed aircraft, whether delivered or undelivered to correct
said defects, nonconformances or failures. Provided, however,
that regarding defects embraced by paragraph a. (1) hereof and any
defect discovered in the durability test article by virtue of the
first forty-five thousand (45,000) hours of durability test,
Contractor's obligation to retrofit aircraft previously delivered
under this contract at no change in contract targets or ceiling
prices, shall be limited to the number of aircraft procured
through the first two production options of this contract, but
not to exceed IS aircraft.
(B) Any repair, jevork__f_ replacement, or correction^
of " any__nonconforming or _ defective aircraft structure, system, J
168
SZCTIOH H
Component, or item of equipment performed by Contractor pursuant
to this warranty shall be promptly conpleted. In the event that
fepair, rework, replacement, or correction of a nonconforming or
defective structure, sy3tam, accessory, item off equipment , or
Part is infeasible by reason of the loss, damage, or destruction
Qt the aircraft as a result of \-he specification nonconformance
Oc defect, Contractor' 3 liability 3hall be limited to the cost of
Repair, replacement, or correction of the defect as if it had
been performed. 171th respect to dsfact3 within the ^cope of
Paragraphs a. (1) , (2), (3), and (4) above, Contractor shall not
fee. liable for consequential damages to the aircraft or support
*
tquipment caused by or related to failure »o£ an item or component.
determined to be defective hereunder, beyond the immediate • sub-;
System of which such item or component is a part. Under no cir— .
Gu»stance shall the entire airframe cr any substantial portion,
thereofbe deemed to be an "immediate subsystem.*.
(C) Contractor' s liability under this warranty for
Correction of defects pursuant to paragraphs a. (1) , (2) , (3) and
(4) shall also extend to correction of such defect as it relates
t*0 any . aircraft purchased hereunder which shall not have been,
delivered to the Government, provided that Contractor shall not
k* responsible nor deemed to be in default on account of any
delays in performance of this contract due to any such correc-
tions and, provided further, rather than accept a delay in deli-
*«?ry of such aircraft, the Government may elect to accept
delivery and thereafter file a claim for a warranty correction
hereunder as though the defect had become apparent immediately
*£ter delivery of such aircraft, and further, provided that •
fvtjthing herein shall affect the Government's right to claim the"*




(D) Disassembly of the aircraft to effect removal
o£ any defective or faulty structure, system, or component for
shipment to Contractor's plant for correction, repair or replace-
ment under thi3 warranty and reinstallation of the corrected or
n »w structure, system, or component and reassembly of the
aircraft performed by the Government ^(except as to inspection,
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checkout and test effort) shall entitle the Government to reim-J
burseraent in accordance with the formula set forth in paragraph
b.(l)(ii)(B) unless such work is performed by Contractor, at no
change in contract targets or ceiling prices, at such place as'
may be mutually agreed upon by Contractor and the Government*
(2) If the Fleet RM&A performance observed at ORE
fails to meet specification requirements and is thereby a defect
under this warranty, the corrective action proposed by Contractor
under paragraph b. (1) (v) hereof shall be verified after implemen-
tation to determine if the RM&A performance has in fact been
corrected. Such verification shall be in accordance with
Contractor's proposed corrective action' plan submitted pursuant
to paragraph b. (1) (vj hereof, but shall as a minimum require com-
parison of Actual Fleet RM&A performance against the values spe-
cified in the System Specification, Appendix Section 70, using
the values from the growth curves applicable to the number of
hours on the fleet at the time verification in fact occurs. If
Contractor's corrective action does not remedy the defective RM&A
performance, he shall propose and implement additional corrective
actions until such defects are remedied. Verification of such
additional corrective actions shall be as provided above.
(ii) Government Corrections
(A) As an alternative to the performance of the
work by Contractor under paragraph b. (1) (i) hereof, such repairs
and corrections (excluding correction of design defects— see
paragraph a. (2) hereof) say, at the Government's option, be per-
_formed by the Government or any logistics support organization,
designated by the Government. Should the Government elect to
effect such repairs or corrections, Contractor will, under the
conditions set forth below, reimburse the Government for the
repair, rework or correction of any specification nonconformance
or defect under paragraphs a. (1) , (2) (excluding defects in'
design)
, (3) and (4) at the Government' 3 repair facilities or by
a logistics support organization designated by the Government,
and will recognize same for any and ail other purposes as a





(B) Should the Government el set to sake any of the
foregoing repairs, replacements and corrections, Contractor will
negotiate with the Government a •standard" for the labor hour 3 to
repair such defect and will reimburse the Government for such
standard" hours or for the Government's or logistics support
organization's actual labor hour3 to repair such defect, which-
ever is less, at the Government* 3 or logistics support organiza-
tion's direct labor rate plus a burden of fifty percent (505) of
said direct labor rate; provided, however, that in no event shall
such amount exceed the applicable manufacturing direct labor rate
of the Douglas Aircraft Company plus a burden rate of cne hundred
percent (100%) of said aanufacturing ra*e.
r
Disassembly of the
aircraft to correct the defects, removal ' of the defective or
faulty , structure, system, accessory, equipment or part and
'installation of the corrected or new part and reassembly of the
aircraft if by the Government (except as to inspection, checkout
and test effort) shall also entitle the Government to reimbur-
sement for such effort in accordance with the formula set forth
above, unless such work is performed by Contractor at it3 factory
at Long Beach, CA or by Contractor at such other place as /say be
mutually agreed upon by Contractor and the Government ::t no
'"change in contract targets or ceiling prices. .('When temporary or
interim repairs, replacements and corrections are accomplished by
the Government and* not proposed or requested by Contractor,
Contractor's liability to the Government hereunder shall not
exceed the furnishing of a permanent repair, replacement or
-correction of the monetary equivalent thereof.)
(C) In the "" event of Government correction,
Contractor shall reimburse the Government for the.. parts and
materials use_d__at _the cost to the Government.
(iii) Transportation Charges
(A) When the Government returns supplies to the
Contractor for correction or replacement pursuant to thi3 clause,
the Contractor shall be liable for transportation ..charges ju-p to
an amount equal to the cost of transportation by the usual csm-
^aerical method2 of shipment frcm the designated destination point
under this contract to the Contractor's plant, in addition to any —
charges provided for by (3) below. The Contractor shall also
;bear " the ~ responsibility for" the "supplies while in transit?.
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(B) When compliance with the term3 of this clause
by the Contractor, involves shipment of corrected or replacement
supplies from the Contractor to the Government, the Contractor
shall be liable for transportation charges up to an amount equal
*to the cost of transportation by the usual commercial method of
shipment from the Contractor's plant to. the designated destina-
tion point under this contract,, in addition to any charges pro-
vided for by (A) above. The Contractor shall also bear the,j
responsibility for the supplies while in transit.
_
(C) Por the purposes of this paragraph (iii) , the
word "supply" in the phrase "supplies wbi^e in transit" shall not
include an aircraft.
(iv) Contractor, or the Government at its (the Govern-
ment's) election, shall make the foregoing repairs, replacements,
or corrections with reasonable care and dispatch in order that
the aircraft, system, component, or item of equipment involved
may not be kept out of service longer than necessary..
(v) Contractor shall, together with the written accep-'
tance or denial of warranty liability required by c. 12) hereof,
within forty-five (45) calendar days after receipt of the Govern-
ment's notification of defect, submit to the Government in as
much detail as possible: (A) a complete identification of the
cause; (B) the proposed method for effecting and verifying the'
repair, replacement, or correction; (C) the Life Cycle Cost
''impact of (B) above; and (D) the proposed schedule for
accomplishing (B) above. The above information shall be sub-
mitted without regard to whether Contractor accepts or denies
liability pursuant to c. ( 2) hereof. x ~ ' ' -•--•-«
(vi) Should the Government during the course of any ser-
vice, maintenance, T.O, , T.C.T.O., or service bulletin compliance
or any preflight or postflight operation or inspection whether'
scheduled or unscheduled effect the repair, removal, and/or
replacement of any item determined during or after such repair,
removal, or replacement to be defective and/or nonconforming with
specification pursuant to this warranty, Contractor's liability
therefore shall be the same as if said defect or specification
nonconformance was discovered prior to said repair, replacement,
or removal and the Government had elected pursuant to paragraph
b. (1) (ii) hereof, to make the repair , -rework, or correction of
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such specification nonconformance or defect itself. In the case
of removal and replacement as described in this paragraph
b. (1) (vi) , the .Government shall hold any removed item for a
period not to exceed sixty (60) days subject to inspection by
Contractor and further action pursuant to the notice and remedy
provisions of this warranty. .
(2) Vendor Warranties
(i) Contractor shall make reasonable efforts to obtain
for and on behalf of the Government through formal written
agreements with its subcontractor manufacturers and vendors,
warranties, certified by such subcontractors and vendors to be at
least as favorable as those provided by such manufacturers/ven-
dors to their most favored commercial customers, covering the
accessories, components, and items of equipment installed on the
aircraft which are not manufactured by Contractor or to
Contractor's design or performance specifications. Such warran-
ties shall not require covered items to be serviced and main-
tained by FAA certified mechanics.
(ii) Contractor shall promptly advise the Government as
to the character and extent of protection afforded the Government
by such warranties so obtained.
(iii) Contractor shall, during the term of Interim
^Contractor Support (IC3) , administer and enforce for and en,
'^behalf of the Government, _ all manufacturer/ vendor -warranties
feobtained/."" "The Government "will consider the extent to which
-Contractor saves the Government expenses for labor and/or
materials by enforcement of such warranties against manufac-
turers/vendors in the operation of the Award Fee Special
Provision, H-44, hereof. The operation of the award fee provi-
sion is subjective and completely discretionary on the part of
the Government; however, the Government will consider, in making
the award fee determination hereunder, the degree to which




(iv) Contractor shall make reasonable efforts to obtain
written agreement with respect to all manufacturer/vendor warran-
ties that upon termination of any phase of ICS the remaining teem
of such- warranties shall/ at the election of the Government, be
transferable to the Government for administration and enforcement
by the Government or any designated Logistics Support
Organization.
(3) Engine Warranty
Contractor shall obtain for and on behalf of the Govern-
ment/ through formal written agreement with the engine manufac-
turer, a warranty and service policy on installed, uninstalled,
and spare engines, spare engine parts, and engine technical and
engineering data which warranty and service policy shall be cer-
tified by the engine manufacturer to be at least as favorable to
the Government in terms of scope, breadth and duration of protec-
tion and remedies as that provided by said engine manufacturer to
its most favored commercial customers during substantially the
same time period for the same family of engines taking into
account severity of use. This warranty shall not require the
engines to be serviced and maintained by PAA certified mechanics.
Contractor shall promptly advise the Government or any designated
logistics support organization as to the character and extent of
protection afforded the Government by such warranty so obtained
and provide such, with all acquired rights, to the Government or
any logistics support organization designated by the Government.
Contractor shall contractually require.. that such engine warranty
and service policy may be conveyed to the Government and further
that such warranty and service policy can be administered by any
logistics support organization designated by the Government.
Contractor shall assist the Government in the resolution of any
problems associated with the engine warranty and service policy
provided.
C. LIMITATIONS
(1) Contractor shall, as to each defect, be relieved of
liability under this warranty if:
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(1) The aircraft is operated with any accessory,
equipment or part not specifically approved by Contractor unless
the Government furnishes reasonable evidence that such accessory
,
equipment or part was not a cause of the defect;
(ii) The aircraft shall not have been operated or
maintained in accordance with Contractor's operating and main-
tenance instructions furnished under this Contract's Data
Requirements List (CDRL) unless the Government furnishes reason-
able evidence that such operation or maintenance , as the case
may be, was not a cause of the defect;
*
(iii) The aircraft shall have been engaged in flight
operations in a theater of actual combat, provided that it i3
demonstrated that such operations were the cause of the defect;
(iv) The aircraft shall have . been altered or
modified without Contractor's approval or if the aircraft shall
have been operated subsequent to involvement in an accident
unless the Government furnishes reasonable evidence that such
alteration, modification or operation after the accident was not
a cause of the defect; provided, however, that this limitation,
shall not be applicable to routine repairs or replacements made
with suitable material and according to standard • practice and
engineering or to operation after minor accidents;
(v) The Government does not submit reasonable
evidence to Contractor that the defect is due to a natter
embraced within the Contractor '3 warranty hereunder and that said
defect was discovered within the warranty period.
(2) The. Contractor shall accept or deny the Govern-
ment's substantiation of' its warranty claim, together with sub-
mission of the information required by b. (1) (v) hereof, in
writing to the Government within forty-five (45) calendar days
after the Government's timely written notice to Contractor's
Warranty Administrator is received by Contractor at its
Long Beach, California plant. In the event of denial, Contractor
shall state it3 reasons therefor. Contractor's failure to
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deliver to the Government a written statement of acceptance or
denial within such forty-five (45) calendar day period shall
constitute acceptance by Contractor of its obligation to perform
in accordance with the paragraph aereof entitled, "Remedies," at
no change in contract targets or ceiling prices.
(3) If Contractor, by issuance of written denial does
not agree that he is responsible pursuant to this warranty to
correct, repair or replace the defect alleged by the Government,
he shall nevertheless proceed in accordance with the written
request of the PCO , if any, citing this paragraph, to effect such
correction, repair or replacement. Any such failure of the
Government and Contractor to agree concerning whether any alleged
defect is embraced by this warranty shall be treated as a dispute
concerning a question of fact pursuant to the clause of this
contract entitled "Disputes." In the event the Contractor, pur-
suant to direction under this paragraph, effects correction,
repair, or replacement of an alleged defect which is later deter-
mined not to be embraced by this warranty, the contractor shall
be entitled to an equitable adjustment therefor.
d. WARRANTY PERIODS
(1) Defects as covered by paragraph a. (1) of this
warranty must be discovered by the Government prior to the
expiration of 90 days after the completion of the Operational
Readiness Evaluation as defined in paragraph 4.1.1.2 of the
System Specification, but in no event later than 130 days after
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) . Tor the purposes of this
Warranty, IOC shall be defined as the delivery of 12 production-
configured aircraft, with all ancillary items required by this
contract to perform the assigned mission, including, but not
limited^ to: spares, support equipment, and data.
(2) Defects covered by paragraphs a. (2) and (3) must be
discovered by the Government prior to the expiration of 130 days
from the delivery of the last aircraft procured through the first
two production options under this contract, provided, however,
that any such defect discovered in the durability test article
during 45,000 hours of durability test shall be deemed a defect
found in each warranted aircraft .as if it had been discovered
during this same period.
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(3) Defects covered by paragraph a. (4) of this Warranty
must be discovered by the Government prior to the expiration of
180 days from the delivery of such design information.
e. GENERAL
(1) • "Defect" shall be defined as any failure, fault,
weakness or like characteristic or condition which causes the C-X
aircraft to fail to conform to and perform in accordance with the
specifications and requirements of thi3 contract, including but
not limited to: performance specifications, parameters, and
requirements; specified levels of reliability, maintainability,
and availablity for the fleet of C-X aircraft; specified toleran-
ces and/or margins of safety; and other specified operational
capabilities, limitations, and requirements, but only to the
extent that such failure, fault, weakness, characteristic, or
condition results from Contractor's failure to comply, by act or
omission, with the C-X SOW, System Specification for C-X, Air
Vehicle Prime Item Specification, Support Equipment General
Specification, other requirements of the schedule of this
contract or good practice within the aircraft industry, taking
into account 'the state of the art at the time of design and manu^-
facture. Provided, however, normal wear and tear and the need
for regular overhaul or periodic maintenance shall not constitute
"a defect or failure under this warranty.
t
Further provided, that
with regard to those structural elements of the airframe and
landing gear which are listed in Tables "A" and "3" hereof,
cracks shall not constitute a defect or failure hereunder unless
any such crack or cracks when found or if left unrepaired would
grow within the aircraft's structural lifetime, as defined in the
System Specification, to a length that, would: (i) reduce the
structural strength to the extent that the structure aight not
sustain limit load; or (ii) cause functional impairment. Further
provided that with regard to those structural elements of the
airframe and landing gear which are not listed in Tables "A" and
"B" hereof, cracks shall not constitute a defect or failure
hereunder unless such crack or crack3, when found or if left
unrepaired for the period between scheduled maintenance would
cause a functional failure of the air vehicle's system.
177
SECTION a
(2) The Government 3hall (A) report the defect in
writing or by telegram to Contractor's Warranty Administrator at
its factory in Long Beach, California within thirty (30) calendar
days following such defect having been discovered by the
Government/ provided such defect was discovered within the effec-
tive period of the warranty hereunder, and (B) return the defec-
tive or faulty aircraft, accessory, equipment, or part to said
factory (unless return to Contractor's factory is not feasible or
the Government elects to effect the repair at its own or a
logistics support organization facility) within sixty (60) calen-
dar day3 following the end of the applicable period of time spe-
cified in paragraph d. of this Part I / or within sixty (60)
calendar days following such defect having been discovered by the
Government, whichever is earlier, and further provided that if
for reasons beyond the Government's control, return of the item
to Contractor's factory i3 not possible within said sixty (60)
calendar day period and if the Government 30 notifies Contractor
in writing, the said sixty (60) calendar day period shall be
waived, but the Government must return the item to Contractor's
said factory if, as and when, such return does become feasible.
Where return is feasible and the Government elects not to effect
the repair but to have Contractor make the repair, Contractor may
elect to have the Government retain the defective item for a
period not to exceed sixty (60) days for Contractor directed
disposition or dispose of the defective item; if it is to be
replaced.
(3) A defect shall be deemed to have been discovered by
the Government at the time it in. fact becomes known to the Prin-
cipal Contracting Officer (?CO) without regard to whether it
should have or could have become known at any earlier time and
without regard to whether any other officer, employee or agent of
the Government had prior knowledge of same, provided, however,
that a defect shall be deemed to have been discovered by the
Government not later than six (6) months following its discovery
and documentation in accordance with T.O. 00-35D-54 by an officer
or employee of the Government other than the ?CO.
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(4) The design, material, workmanship, and specifica-
tion conformation (to it3 own specifications) of Government
Furnished Equipment (GFE) are not embraced by this warranty,
except to the extent of defects in specification conformation
(paragraph a. (2}(i)) and system design and integration (paragraph
a. (2)(ii)) as they relate to system integration, for which
Contractor has total resonsibility , and defects caused by or
related to the installation of any system, accessory, item of
equipment, subassembly, part, or other article (paragraph a. (3) )
.
(5) The Government may, without Contractor approval,
designate a logistics support organization to act in its behalf
in all instances where "the Government" is referenced above. The
Government shall advise Contractor in writing of any such desig-
nation.
(6) As used in this warranty with respect to any
aircraft, structure, system, accessory, item of equipment, part,
or other product, the word "delivery" shall mean: the physical
transfer of possession to the Government or the time of accep-
tance by the Government-- i.e. , execution of DD Form 250—which-
ever shall^. later occur.
(7) It i3 the intent of the parties that Contractor
shall be responsible hereunder to effect whatever corrective
action' is necessary to remedy a defect as defined in e(l) hereof
of the C-X aircraft system, including, if necessary, replacement,
repair, rework or other correction of parts or components of the
aircraft. It is not the intent of the Government for this
warranty to apply to deficiencies or malfunctions in individual
•parts or components of the aircraft, unless such deficiencies or
malfunctions cause or contribute to C-X aircraft system failure
to conform to or perform in accordance with specifications of
this contract. Individual deficiencies in components or items
•which do not cause or contribute to a system defect snail be
warranted, if at all, by vendor warranties on such items.
(8) THE WARRANTIES PROVIDED HEREIN ARE EXCLUSIVE AND IN
LIED OP , ALL OTHER WARRANTIES , 2XPRESSED OR IMPLIED , WITH RESPECT
TO EACH AIRCRAFT, PRODUCT AND ARTICLE DELIVERED HEREUNDER INCLUD-
ING ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR PURPOSE.
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THE RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF THE GOVERNMENT
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PROVIDED IN THIS CLAUSE: (i) SHALL NOT BE AP7SCTED IN ANY WAY BY
ANY OTHER PROVISIONS UNDER THIS CONTRACT CONCERNING THE CONCLUSI-
VENESS OF INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE; AND (ii) ARE IN ADDITION TO
AND DO NOT LIMIT ANY RIGHTS AFFORDED TO THE GOVERNMENT BY ANY
OTHER CLAUSE OF THIS CONTRACT. THIS WARRANTY SHALL NOT BE
EXTENDED, ALTERED OR VARIED, EXCEPT IN WRITING BY A BILATERAL
CONTRACT MODIFICATION.
Part II — Service Life Policy
In addition to and NOT in substitution, for the warranties set
forth in Part I of this clause entitled "Warranty" , Contractor
agrees that should a repetitive failure occur in any of the
covered components , then the Government is granted the right3,
hereinafter set forth in this Part II.
a. DEFINITIONS
For the purpose of this Part II, the following defini-
tions apply:
(1) Repetitive failure means any breakage of, or defect
in, a covered component (except for corrosion as a result of
improper maintenance procedures and practices) which has occurred
and which can reasonably be expected to occur again.
(2) Airframe component means any of the primary struc-
tural elements of the wing, fuselage, and vertical and horizontal
empennage of the aircraft as specified in Table "A" attached
hereto.
(3) Landing gear component means any of those primary
structural elements which are part of the landing gear installed
in an aircraft at the time of delivery thereof to the Government,
specified in Table "B" attached hereto.
(4) Covered component means any airframe component or
landing gear component, and any such spare or replacement com-
ponent purchased from Contractor.
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(5) Landing means any nonaal touchdown wherein tires
contact the ground including all touch and go's.
(6) As used in this Service Life Policy, the term deli-
very shall have the same meaning as thai set forth in paragraph
e. (6) of Part I entitled, "Warranty".
b. OPERATION OP SZRVICZ LI72 POLICY
Should a repetitive failure occur in any covered com-
ponent of an aircraft within the following periods (whichever is
applicable) :
(1) As to any airframe component of an aircraft, within
ten thousand (10,000) flying hour3 or within ten (10) years after
delivery of such aircraft to the Government, whichever shall
first expire.
(2) As to any landing gear component of an aircraft,
prior to the accumulation by such component of an aagregate of
twenty thousand (20,000) aircraft landings or ten thousand
(10,000) flying hours involving the use of such component or
within ten (10) years after delivery of such component to the
Government, whichever shall first occur.
Contractor shall, at the price hereinafter provided and as
promptly as practicable, either (i) design and furnish to the
Government a correction for such failed covered component and
provide any parts required for such correction (exclusive of com-
mon hardware) or (ii) furnish to the Government a replacement
covered component for such failed component for installation of
such correction or component by the Government in such aircraft
or the affected landing gear.
c. PRICZ
Any part of a covered component which Contractor is
required to furnish to the Government under this Policy in con-
nection with correction or replacement of .a covered component
3hall be furnished to the Government at a price determined in




P Price to the Government
C The Contractor's then current spare parts price
As to airframe components:
T The total flying time in hours during which the
airframe component, which is the subject of a
failure, has been used, and
N Ten Thousand (10,000)
As to landing gear components, either:
T The total number of aircraft landings which
have been accumulated by the landing gear com-
ponent, which is subject to a failure, and
M Twenty thousand (20,000) (Aircraft useful life
in number of landings) , or
T « The total flying time in hours during which the
landing gear component, which is the subject of
a failure, has been used, and
M Ten Thousand (10,000),
whichever yeilds the higher fraction.
d. GENERAL CONDITIONS AND LIMITATIONS
(1) The return to contractor pursuant to this Part II,
if such return is practicable, of any covered component which is
the subject of a failure necessary for redesigning studies, shall
be at the Government's expense. Any required disassembly and
reassembly of the aircraft or landing gear, or parts of either
thereof, removal of the covered component which is the subject of
a failure and reassembly and installation of the corrected or
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replacement covered component, shall be at the Government's
expense, and if such disassembly, reassembly and installation is
accomplished by Contractor at the Government's request, the pri-
ces to be charged for any such services shall not exceed the pri-
ces charged to its most favored commercial customers of
Contractor during substantially the same time period.
(2) Contractor's obligations under this Policy are con-
ditioned upon (i) the submission by the Government of reasonable
evidence to the Contractor that the failure is embraced within
the scope of this Policy; (ii) with respect to landing gear com-
ponents, the maintenance by the Government of log books and other
historical records available for inspection by Contractor and
adequate to enable determination of whether the defect or failure
claimed is covered by this Service Life Policy and, if so, the
amount of the payment to be made to Contractor hereunder and ade-
quate to enable determination that the servicing, overhaul, main-
tenance and modification of any such landing gear component or
related equipment has been accomplished in accordance with sub-
paragraphs (5) and (6) of this paragraph d? and ( iii ) the
Government must have reported the failure, breakage or defect of
a covered component in writing or by telegram to Contractor's
Warranty Administrator at its factory in Long Beach, CA within
calendar days after any failure, breakage or defect in
a covered component has been discovered by the Government.
(3) The provisions of paragraph c. (1) (except for sub-
paragraph (v) thereof) of the Part I of the clause entitled
Warranty" , are incorporated herein by this reference and shall
condition Contractor's obligation under this Service Life Policy
with respect to any covered component.
(4) A failure, breakage or defect shall be deemed to
have been discovered by the Government at the time it in fact
becomes known to the Principal Contracting Officer (?CC) without
regard to whether it should have or could have become known at
any earlier time and without regard to whether any other officer,
employee, or agent of the Government had prior knowledge of same.
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(5) Contractor's obligation under this Policy shall not
apply to any covered component which ha3 not been correctly
modified in accordance with T.C.T.0.3, provided however, that:
(a) Pailure to correctly modify is the proximate
cause of the failure; and
(b) The Government received the TCTQ in sufficient
time to incorporate the modification.
(6) Contractor's obligation under this Policy shall not
apply to any landing gear component with, respect to which there
has been the failure to correctly service, maintain and overhaul
such landing gear component or the landing gear or the aircraft
it is at any time a part of, in accordance with the applicable
Contractor's instructions regarding such servicing, maintenance
and overhaul*
e. NATURE OP AGREEMENT
This Service Life Policy is neither a warranty, perfor-
mance guarantee, nor an agreement to modify the aircraft,
airframe components, or landing gear components to conform to new
developments hereafter occurring in the state of airframe or
landing gear design and manufacturing art. Contractor's obliga-
tion herein is to make only those corrections to the airframe
components and landing gear components or furnish replacement
therefor as provided in this Policy. Provided however, that to
the extent that any defect or failure is embraced both- by the
warranty provided in Part I hereof and also by the Service Life
Policy of this Part II, Contractor shall first be liable for that
repair, rework, or replacement to which the Government is
entitled by virtue of the warranty provided in Part I hereof.
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f. ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS
The Government's rights under this Part II, except as set
forth elsewhere in this provision, shall not be assigned, sold,
leased, transferred or otherwise alienated by operation of law oc
otherwise, without prior Contractor consent thereto given in
writing. Any unauthorized assignment, sale, lease, transfer or
other alienation of the Government's rights under this Policy
shall immediately void this Policy in it3 entirety.
g, COSTS IN EXCESS OF PRICE TO THE GOVERNMENT
Costs incurred by Contrator in complying with the
Service Life Policy in excess of the Price to the Government, as
calculated pursuant to paragraph c. hereof, shall be allocable to
this contract, but shall not be allowable as a direct or indirect
charge under any other Government contract.
PART III
(i) INCENTIVE PRICE REVISION (I? APPLICABLE)
All costs incurred or estimated to be incurred by the
Contractor in complying with this clause shall be considered when
negotiating the total final price under the Incentive Price
Revision clause of this contract. After establishment of the
total final price, Contractor compliance with this clause shall
be at no increase in the total final price. Any equitable
adjustments nade pursuant to this clause shall be governed by the
paragraph entitled "Equitable Adjustments Under Other Clauses" in





TO PROVISION H.65 WARRANTY AND SERVICE LIPS POLICY
The Subsystems of the air vehicle, foe the purposes of this
Provision H.S5, are as follows:












12. Auxiliary Power and Engine Starting
13. Electrical Generation and Distribution




TO PROVISION H.S5 WARRANTY AND SERVICE LIES POLICY
The following specific landing gear components are. subject to the
provisions of Part II of the clause entitled 'WARRANTY AND




Shock strut outer cylinder
Shock strut piston











66. APPLICATION OF CORRECTION OP DEFICIENCIES CLAUSE TO FOLLOW-ON
CONTRACTUAL EFFORT AND APPLICATION OP SPECIAL PROVISION H.65
TO CHANGE PROPOSALS UNDER THIS CONTRACT
a. Contractor and the Government hereby agree to incor-
porate the provisions set forth in paragraph c. below, entitled
"CORRECTION OP DEFICIENCIES , in the next annual buy of C-X pro-
duction aircraft (FY36) , with the agreement that system level
RM&A requirements shall be excluded from it3 coverage. Con-
tractor further agrees the cost of this incorporation shall not
exceed 1% of proposed aircraft unit target price or firm fixed
price (for the purposes of this Provision, H.S6, target amounts,
ceiling price, and firm fixed price are used together; the pre-
cise terminology will be specified as individual contractual
actions are def initized.
)
b. Additionally, for any change proposals submitted under
this contract, Contractor hereby agrees to apply Special Provi-
sion H.65 of this contract to FSZD and all production options.
Contractor further agrees that the cost of this application shall
not exceed 2% of the target price or firm fixed price of the
proposed change.
C. CORRECTION OP DEFICIENCIES
a. Definitions as U3ed in this clause:
(1) "deficiency" means any conditions or charac-
teristic in any supplies, but not including engines or other
items not manufactured by Contractor or to Contractor's design or
performance specifications (which term shall include related
technical data) or services furnished hereunder, which is not in
compliance with the requirements of thi3 contract. "Deficiency"
also means any condition or characteristic in any supplies fur-
nished hereunder (including, but not limited to, spares, support
equipment, training equipment and related technical data) which
may be in compliance with the particular contract specifications
for such individual supplies at the time furnished to the
Government but which must be altered, redesigned, reconfigured or
reworked because of other deficiencies to assure that the
integrated C-X System will meet all of the requirements of this
contract. (Failure of the fleet to meet system level RM&A
requirements shall not be deemed a deficiency) ;
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(2) "correction" means any and all actions
necessary to eliminate any and all deficiencies;
(3) "acceptance" of supplies and services means
the execution of a DO Form 250 or similar document by the
Government for the supplies or services, or portions thereof,
furnished under this contract; provided however, that acceptance
thereof, with identified deficiencies, shall not be deemed accep-
tance to the extent of such deficient supplies.
b. General
»
(1) The rights and remedies of the Government pro-
vided in this clause:
(i) shall not be affected in any way by any
other provisions under this contract concerning the conclusive-
ness of inspection and acceptance; and
(ii) are in addition to and do not limit any
rights afforded to the Government by any other clause of this
contract.
(2) This clause shall apply as follows:
(i) To deficiencies in specification confor-
mation, design, integration, installation, workmanship, and
material deficiencies discovered by either the Government or the
Contractor within one hundred and eighty (130) days after accep-
tance of the respective supplies by the Government.
(ii) To deficiencies in technical data,
regardless of the nature of the deficiency disclosed by either
the Government or the Contractor within 3ix months after accep-





(3) The Contractor shall not be responsible under
this clause for the correction of deficiencies in Government fur-
nished property, except for deficiencies in installation, unless
the Contractor performs or is obligated to perform any modifica-
tions or other work on such property. In that event, the
Contractor shall be responsible for correction of deficiencies to
the extent of such modifications or other work.
c. Modification of Contract With Respect to Uncor-
rected Deficiencies.
In the event of timely notice of a decision not to
correct or only to partially correct, the Contractor shall
promptly submit a technical and co3t proposal to amend the
contract to permit acceptance of the affected supplies or ser-
vices in accordance with the revised requirements, and an
equitable reduction in contract target amounts, ceiling price or
firm fixed price 3hall' promptly be negotiated by the parties and
reflected in a supplemental agreement to thi3 contract.
d. Deficiencies in Supplies or Services Not Yet
Accepted.
If the Contractor becomes aware at any time before
acceptance by the Government (whether before or after tender to
the Government) that a deficiency exists in any supplies or ser-
vices, he shall promptly correct the deficiency or, if he elects
to invoke the procedures In c. above, he shall promptly com-
municate information concerning the deficiency to the Contracting
Officer in writing, together with his detailed recommendation for
corrective action.
e. No Extension in Time for Performance; No Increase
in Contract Price
(1) The Government shall not be responsible for
extension or delays in the scheduled deliveries or periods of
performance under this contract as a result of the Contractor's
obligations to correct deficiencies, nor shall there by any
adjustment of the delivery schedule or period of performance as a
result of such correction of deficiencies, except as may be




(2) It is hereby specifically recognized and
agreed by the parties hereto that this clause shall not be
construed as obligating the Government to increase the contract
target amounts, ceiling price, or firm fixed price.
f. Transportation Charges.
(1) When the Government returns supplies to the
Contractor for correction or replacement pursuant to this clause,
the Contractor shall be liable for transportation charges up to
an amount equal to the cost of transportation by usual commercial
method of shipment from the designated
%
destination point under
this contract to the Contractor's plant, in addition to any
charges provided for by (2) below. The Contractor shall also
bear the responsibility for the supplies while in transit.
(2) When compliance with the terms of this clause
by the Contractor involves shipment of corrected or replacement
supplies from the Contractor to the Government, the Contractor
shall be liable for transportation charges up to an amount equal
to the cost of transportation by the usual commercial method' of
shipment from the Contractor's plant to the designated destina-
tion point under this contract, in addition to any charges pro-
vided for by (1) above. The Contractor shall also bear the
responsibility for the supplies while in transit.
(3) For the purpose of' this paragraph the word
"supplies" in the phrase "supplies while in transit" shall not
include an aircraft.
g. Contractor Responsibility to Proceed with
Correction or Replacemenc
If the Contractor does' not agree to his responsibility to correct
or replace the supplies delivered, he shall nevertheless proceed
in accordance with the written request issued by the Contracting
Officer under paragraph c. to correct or replace the defective or
nonconforming supplies. In the event it is later determined that
such supplies were not defective or nonconforming within the pro-
visions of this clause, the contract target amounts, ceiling
price, or firm fixed price will be equitably adjusted. Failure
to agree to such an equitable adjustment shall be a dispute con-
cerning a question of fact within the meaning of the clause of
this contract entitled "Disputes."
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h. Correction of Deficient Fepacement ana Re-performances
Any supplies or parts thereof ccirected or furnished in
replacement and any services re-performed pursuant to this clause
shall also be subject to all the provisions of the clause to the
same extent as supplies or services initially accepted. . The
warranty with respect to such supplies, parts or services shall be
equal in duration to that set forth in b.(2) above, and shall apply
from the date of delivery of such corrected or replaced supplies.
i. Incentive Price Revision (if applicable)
All costs incurred or estimated to be incurred by the
Contractor in complying with this clause shall be considered when
negotiating the total final price under the Incentive Price Revision
clause of this contract. After establishment of the total final
price. Contractor compliance with this clause shall be at no
increase in the total final price. Any equitable ad justments made
pursuant tc this clause shall be governed ty the paragraph entited
•Equitable Adjustments Under Other Clauses" in the Incentive Price
Revision clause of this contract.
67. NOTICE TO THE PRINCIPAL CONTRACTING OFFICER
a. The Contractor agrees tc furnish, commencing en 1 April 1985
and thereafter at quarterly intervals, a written statement to the
Principal Ccntracting Officer stating either (1) that no
circumstances have occurred which would be a basis for requesting an
adjustment in target cost, target prcfit, target price, ceiling
price. Firm Fixed Price, delivery schedules, or any other terras and
conditions of the contract, cr (2) what circumstances (regardless cf
their nature or who was responsible for them) have ocurred which may
cause the submission cf a request fcr adjustment in cost, tee,
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